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1Preface
When we met in Luster county, Sogn, some months ago, the
idea was not to have just another seminar on Wittgenstein.
Rather, we wanted to confront his philosophy with a specific
theme; the situation within contemporary theories of lan-
guage. Those theories – be it in philosophy, linguistics, com-
puter sciences or textual studies – occupy an important and
problematic place in modern thought. The question is per-
haps not so much to accept them or reject them, but more
how we should discuss them and how we should under-
stand them. For such a purpose Wittgenstein's philosophy
might be particularly apt in order to stimulate our thinking.
On the other hand, we can in this way measure his philoso-
phy with respect to its power or its absence of power in deal-
ing with questions that contemporary theories of language
cannot but make us ask.
We tried to do this in 1992. Our discussions, the good atmo-
sphere, and most of all the place that made up the indispens-
able framework of our words and sayings, cannot – of
course – be reproduced in written form. Nevertheless, what
follows are the papers presented at the seminar and some of
the comments that were given after each paper. The papers
have kept their original colloquial form and they have not
been significantly revised by their authors.
Some words must be added about the background of the
seminar: In 1914 Wittgenstein had a cottage built in
Skjolden, a small village in the county of Luster in western
Norway. Not only was this the place where he wrote much
of what was later to become his two most famous works of
philosophy, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philo-
sophical Investigations, it was also a place he loved, both for
the beauty of its landscape and for the many close friends he
2made there. In recognition of what Wittgenstein has meant
to Skjolden and of what he still means to Norwegian philos-
ophy, the Wittgenstein Seminars in Skjolden were founded
in 1990. 
French philosophy is not well known in Norway and Nor-
wegian philosophy is not well known in France. The bridge
spontaneously gave itself: Many Norwegian philosophers
are interested in Wittgenstein. And in France there is a
growing interest in Wittgenstein. So Collège International de
Philosophie, the Wittgenstein Seminars in Skjolden, and The
Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen decided to
organize the 1992 seminar in Skjolden as a French-Norwe-
gian Wittgenstein seminar.
We wish to express our gratitude to the County of Luster,
both for their economical support and for their hospitality,
giving us some unforgettable impressions of the Norwegian
landscape of Wittgenstein. 
We thank Professor Heinz von Foerster for sharing with us his
recollections of Wittgenstein during an evening address
sponsored by Norsk Hydro, whome we also thank for their
contribution to and interest in the seminar. 
Last, but not least, we wish to thank the Norwegian Research
Council (NAVF) and Collège International de Philosophie
(CIPh), for their economical support.
Paul Henry
Collège International de Philosophie
Arild Utaker
University of Bergen
3Paul Henry
CNRS/Collège International de Philosophie
Wittgenstein and Contemporary Linguists
In the Yellow Book, that is to say the notes for the Cambridge
lectures of the years 1932 to 1935, in the middle of a discus-
sion about what makes the difference between hypotheses
and grammatical rules, Wittgenstein suddenly asks us to
consider all the things about which we would have to
change our minds in order to be able to accept as an hypoth-
esis that there is a hippopotamus in this room. He thus
chooses a hypothesis which is at the limit of absurdity in
order to compel us to consider that which we would other-
wise escape. Wittgenstein has used the same trick many
times. For instance, when, in the Philosophical Investigations,
he considers the proposition "a rose has no teeth", saying
that we would like to take it as obviously true, more sure
than the one stating that a goose has none, but that this is
not, in fact, so clear if we look at the matter more closely.
Whereas we know where we have to look in order to check
whether gooses have teeth or not, we do not know at all, at
first sight, where we could find the teeth of a rose. There
could be, for example, a drawing or a photography of a hip-
potamus somewhere in this room. Or there could exist a spe-
cies of hippotamus not bigger than a mouse, or a fly, or even
smaller, that has remained unnoticed up to now. What
grants that an hippopotamus is a very big animal? His dis-
cussion about the teeth of the rose leads Wittgenstein to the
very strange proposition that it is more accurate to say I
know what you think than to say I know what I think. He
says that we have here a whole cloud of philosophy con-
densed in a drop of grammar. From Wittgenstein's point of
view, this is a question of grammar. The same holds for the
4proposition: "there is an hippotamus in thisroom". What we
have to do with such a proposition depends upon what we
mean by a hippotamus. The hippotamus can very well be a
fat, more or less unpleasant, awkward, person, if we have in
mind that an hippotamus is that kind of being. All this
shows very clearly that Wittgenstein's concept of grammar
is very far away from that of the linguists.
I cannot pretend to cover such a broad topic as "Wittgenstein
and contemporary linguists"; I should have better entitled
this paper: "Some remarks about Wittgenstein and contem-
porary linguists". I have choosen this topic because very few
people seem to have been really interested in it. "Wittgen-
stein and language" that is almost a lieu commun. But "Wit-
tgenstein and linguistics" or "Wittgenstein and linguists"
that does not seem to have been much studied. We have lin-
guists who have tried to use some of Wittgenstein's ideas
about language. We have other linguists who have rejected
vigorously any of those ideas as a kind of provocation. But
who has tried to understand why at the same time this inter-
est and this repulsion?
First of all, let me draw your attention upon the fact that
Wittgenstein does not seem to have been interested in the
works of the linguists. He does not seem to have been
acquainted with any of those. Anyway, his main concern is
with the philosophers and the logicians, not with the lin-
guists. 
For instance, Wittgenstein has discussed extensively names,
and names have also worried Frege and Russell, as well as
any of those we consider to be "philosophers of language".
The question of names has been linked to that of the logical
constants. What does Wittgenstein say about names? He
does not try to tell us what is a name; he does not try to
5show that, as a linguistic expression, a name is a specific
kind of such expression, having a specificlinguistic function.
He criticizes our way of using such expressions as "names of
..."; "names of numbers", "names of colors"; "names of direc-
tions (in space)" ... In the Brown Book he shows that we use
the different expressions we call names in very different
ways; he denies that there is something common to all the
different uses of such expressions; he says that those uses
must be studied case by case and that if some of them
appear as governed by rules, we should not take as granted
that there is a super-rule that we could call the rule of names
of which the different rules of names would be special cases.
In particular, he criticizes the idea that such a rule of names
would he that any name refer to an object; he says that if we
do so, we have to consider numbers, colors, directions, and
so on, as objects, and then what we call objects appear to be
so different things that we are compelled to say that we have
different kinds of objects. We are then compelled, he tells, to
say in particular that we have concrete objects on the one
hand and abstract objects on the other. This is how philosoph-
ical problems arise, because as soon as we differentiate
between abstract and concrete objects, we have to discuss
what these two types of objects have in common, as well as
what makes the difference; we would so be led to discuss the
specific modality of existence of each kind of objects. Shall
we, for instance, conceive this distinction in the line of that
introduced by Plato between the tangible and the intelligi-
ble, between the numbers as numbers and the numbers used
by merchants and speculators, between the numbers which
can be handled only by thought and those which have a vis-
ible and tangible body. As you know, Wittgenstein attacks,
in the Blue Book, those who say that a number and a numeri-
cal sign are two different kinds of objects (the number one
and the sign "1") for instance. So Wittgenstein sees behind
the problem of names a problem that has worried philoso-
6phers since philosophy exists, that of ontology. And as you
know also, fromWittgenstein's point of view, philosophical
problems are only pretended problems arising from our
uncritical use of language.
If we now turn our eyes towards the linguists, things are
completely different. As a matter of fact, we can see that at
least in some grammars, we also speak of names, of different
kinds of names; common names and proper names, names
of objects and names of persons, and so on. But, from a con-
sistent linguistic point of view, this has to be justified, what-
ever grammarians of the past have done. It is not obvious
and self-evident that the category of names is a linguistic
category. If, as a linguist, we want to use such a category, we
have to show that at least in some languages, or even in one
language, we have a class of expressions which have all one
common linguistic function, a function that differentiates the
expressions of this class from other expressions. But it might
well be that in a given language, the category of names does
not exist. There has been, among linguists, a long discussion
about whether there exist languages in which there are no
verbs, the famous case being that of the Basque language (in
which there is instead an ergative function which can be
attached to almost any kind of words). We could have a sim-
ilar discussion about the existence of names in some lan-
guages. But it might even be that we should conclude that
the category of names does not exist as a linguistic category
in any language. Finally, in the case that such a category
exists as a linguistic category, it might well be that what lin-
guists then call names did not always coincide with what we
are used to call names (think, for instance, of the distinction
between the masculine and the feminine).
So, linguists also have to discuss what we call names as well
as about what they call names. But when they discuss that
7point they do not do it as Wittgenstein does. What Wittgen-
stein has in mind is our usual way of speaking of names, our
usual way ofdistinguishing between different kinds of
names given that this differentiation is also used by philoso-
phers in an uncritical way, as if it was obvious and self-evi-
dent that it is grounded. He does not discuss the way
linguists speak of names. That, in many cases, the linguists
have also followed uncritically the usual way of speaking of
names, is a point on which we cannot but agree. The ques-
tion whether it is possible or not, from a linguistic point of
view, that is to say from the point of view of the linguistic
function of words and expressions, to speak of names and of
different kinds of names, remain. And this has to do with
what linguists require.
The linguists require at least two things. First, they require
that it is possible, within any language, to distinguish
between classes of expressions or units on the base of their
linguistic function. Second, they require that the classes of
expressions, their functioning, as well as their relations, can
be defined in such a way that we get a basis of description of
any language whatsoever. This second possibility has to do
with that of general linguistics. These are the minimal
requirements for any linguistics. They presuppose that we
can speak of languages, i.e. that we can distinguish what
belongs to a given language from what does not. And we
know that this can raise many problems which are not
solved by speaking of dialects instead of languages. To be
able to speak in terms of dialects also requires that we can
distinguish between what belongs to a given dialect and
what does not. In that case too, we have to use notions such
as those of grammaticality or correctness or the like. Without
the possibility of using such notions, no linguistics is possi-
ble. But there is another specificity of languages. The case of
languages is not alike that of an animal for instance. If we
8have to do with animals, and if that animal is not a dog then
it is another animal, a cat or whatsoever. Despite the fact that
the definition of zoological taxonomies might raise prob-
lems, the situation is not the same with languages. What-
does not belong to a given language, no matter whatever the
criterion might be to decide that, does not necessarily belong
to another language. Moreover, that which does not belong
to a given language, without belonging to another, can still
belong to a language and have a meaning. Furthermore,
anything that has meaning does not necessarily belong to
language. So linguists need to be able to speak of the lan-
guage in general; they need to be able to put within lan-
guage things that do not belong to any language but to
language in general. In other words, they need to be able to
distinguish what belongs to language in general from what
does not. We all know that, for instance, gestures may have
more or less the same meaning as linguistic utterances
(pointing with one finger to an object, nodding one's head,
and so on).
Wittgenstein has placed himself in a position in which he
might appear as having get around all the difficult problems
that these fundamental requirements of any possible linguis-
tics arise. For instance, it happens that, in some cases, he
puts on the same level gestures and linguistic utterances. It
also happens that within an argument he refers to words or
utterances belonging to different languages. But, precisely,
in those cases, he does not deal with those words and utter-
ances as belonging to different languages. On the other
hand, his notion of language games raises problems which
have some similarities with those which the linguists are
confronted. What makes the difference between one lan-
guage game and another game? What kind of relations
exists between the different language games? What makes
the difference between what is a language game and what is
9not a language game? Can we find within Wittgenstein's
writing a definite concept of language?
No more than I have attempted to discuss what Wittgenstein
says about names or language games, will I try to discuss
whether therequirements of the linguists are grounded or
not. Let me just draw your attention upon the fact that those
requirements define an ideal. How this ideal can be reached,
as well as to which extent it can be reached, is an other point.
I have recalled all this only to stress the fact that Wittgen-
stein's point of view and that of the linguists appear as radi-
cally different. And that raises a question: does what
Wittgenstein has written or said about language have any
relevance for linguists and linguistics? This will be my ques-
tion today.
Saying that Wittgenstein has made of language a crucial
concern for philosophy implies ipso facto that his conceptions
deserve to be considered by linguists has, I think, induced
much confusion. More precisely, I will try to show that the
attempts to apply – I insist on that word "to apply" – some of
Wittgenstein's ideas to linguistics, have generated confusion
because those ideas were not relevant from the point of view
of linguistics. These attempted applications have induced
confusion on both sides; they have led to betray Wittgen-
stein's conceptions and to betray linguistics. But I will also
try to show that if we drop the idea of applying Wittgen-
stein's ideas to linguistics, then we can see that some of his
ideas are relevant for linguistics, but in a very specific way.
In order to avoid the confusions just mentioned, I think that
this relevance must be very precisely defined and circum-
scribed.
I have stressed the difficulties linguists are confronted with.
I have more or less presupposed that there exist such a thing
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as the linguistic point of view. Linguists need to believe that
such a point of view exists and that it can be precisely and
without ambiguity defined, but that does not imply that this
belief is grounded. As for the contemporary linguists, we
can see that very few of them have attempted to clear up
that point whereas it is obvious that among all those who
claim to be linguists, there is no agreement about what islin-
guistics, what it should be or can be. The question which is
raised today, bears precisely upon the possibility to reach
such an agreement. Today, in France at least, this question is
even raised at an institutional level because linguistics has
been put among what is now called the "sciences of lan-
guage" and because, among those pretended sciences, the
specificity of linguistics appears as diluted. That among
those sciences of language we find that part of psychology
(cognitive or not) that deals with language, that part of neu-
rophysiology or neuropathology that deals with the use of
language, its acquisition, its disturbances, that part of sociol-
ogy which, under the name of sociolinguistics, deals with
language, and so on – all this cannot but rewake the old dev-
ils that, since the very beginning of linguistics, linguists have
perceived as threatening their knowledge and identity.
When I discuss with my linguists friends today, many of
them appear to be more or less in a state of anxiety or even
of anguish, seeing threats all around them. Others seem to
be ready to burn all the saints they have revered and to pass
with weapons and luggage in the camp of the threateners.
Some of them, eventually, call for Wittgenstein for support
and legitimization of what they are doing.
On the other hand, if we consider the past history of linguis-
tics, we can ask ourselves whether linguists have not always
felt more or less insecure about what they are doing. The
case of Baudouin de Courtenay gives a very exemplar
instance of what I am talking about. As you now, Baudouin
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has with his pupil and colleague Kruszewski contributed in
a very decisive way to the elaboration of the concept of pho-
neme and thus to the foundation of phonology. Baudouin is
the one who claimed, in his inaugural lecture in Saint-
Petersburg in 1870, that linguistics should be considered as
an independent science, not to be confused with psychology
or physiology. Baudouin is also the one who has agreed for a
whilewith the opinion of Kruszewski according to which the
only firm base which the science of language can have has to
be found within language itself and not outside it (i.e.,
among other possibilities, within the brain or the society ...).
This conception of what should be linguistics has led Bau-
douin and Kruszewski to elaborate a whole set of concepts
or notions which have been later retaken and re-elaborated
by Saussure and other pioneers in linguistics. But Krusze-
wski died prematurely and it seems that his death has been
quite dramatic. At least, this death has been very dramatic
for Baudouin. What has happened is that, after Kruszewski's
death, Baudouin has rejected the whole of what he had done
in collaboration with Kruszewski. Baudouin had followed
the teaching of one of the founders of the Leipzig school,
Alfred Lieskens. Whereas, at the same time of his collabora-
tion with Kruszewski, he had taken some distance with that
psychophysics, it is on that base that he has rebuilt his con-
ception of language and of linguistics during his last years.
The psychophysics of the Leipzig school imposed to him
theoretical as well as methodological orientations: a strong
separation between the physical aspects of language, which
had to be studied by physical and physiological methods,
and its psychological aspects which had to be investigated
by means of introspection, both being linked together
according to conceptions inspired by Fechner. The psycho-
logical aspect of the phoneme, in order to be able to be stud-
ied by means of introspection, had to be conceived as
belonging to the conscious linguistic representation of the
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individual. This led Baudouin to deny that there exist such
things as languages; he was driven to argue that the reality
of language is purely individual and that the only reality of
language is that of idiolects. To speak of the properties of the
Russian language, for instance, became, from his point of
view, a convenient but misleading way of speaking. When
we look more closely at Baudouin's last texts, we can see that
all his anxiety became focusedon the modality of existence
of linguistic entities, especially that of the phoneme. He
seemed to have also feared in a very acute way what, when
we are speaking and listening, remains out of our conscious
control. On the contrary, what had so much impressed
Kruszewski when he met Baudouin was the stress the later
was putting on the unconscious feature of the forces operat-
ing within language. Baudouin has ended his life in a state
of deep depression, saying that all the disappointments he
had to face during so many years made him pessimistic and
have deprived him of any desire to live. He said that he con-
sidered himself as a superfluous and worthless being.
I could comment upon this by just saying that to commit
oneself to the study of language is not free from any threat
upon one's psychological equilibrium. But the story I have
just told raises, I think, a more fundamental question as sim-
ilar events seem to have repeatedly occurred all along the
history of linguistics. Think on what happened to Saussure
when he started to find anagrams in any piece of language
and not only in Latin verses. Saussure seems to have experi-
enced, in those circumstances, something which was close to
madness. If later he seems to have been more quiet, he has
dropped his investigations on anagrams. But, first, that does
not mean that his experience with anagrams has not had a
decisive influence upon his later conceptions, those
expressed in his famous lectures on general linguistics. Sec-
ond, if Saussure has adopted in his Cours a position in the
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line of that taken at the beginning by Baudouin and Krusze-
wski, in his investigation of the Germanic legends which he
carried on at the same time, he was somehow contradicting
what he was saying in the Cours. This leads me to consider
the strange kind of desire which might pushe people to
become linguists, a kind of desire which might be somewhat
masochistic since it might be that, in the last resort, linguists
cannever be sure that the knowledge to which they devote
all their efforts is not purely illusionary.
One may say that the case of the linguist is not so specific as
it may appear. We have the cases of leading scientists who,
like J.F. Mayer or Georg Cantor, have experienced such a
deep insecurity about the grounding of what they had dis-
covered that this has left them without defenses in front of
serious mental disorders. Nevertheless there seem to be
something specific to the study of language, at least with the
attempts to build a science of language as did Saussure, Bau-
douin and Kruszewski. If we agree upon the fact that lan-
guage has something to do with our existence as subjects, if
not with our existence as living beings, then studying lan-
guage concerns our existence as subjects. Language is not
any kind of object of scientific investigation, especially if one
considers that the proper ground for this investigation has to
be found within language and not outside it. That may
explain why those who have devoted themselves to the
study of language have been so strongly and recurrently
inclined to escape this fate by looking outside of language
for bases able to account for it. Considering language as a
form of behavior, eventually as a rule governed form of
behavior, or as a mean of communication of thoughts (while
taking as granted that thought exists independently of lan-
guage), or as a code for communicating information (also
existing independently of language), stand among the avail-
able means which have been recurrently used for this end.
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This is what Baudouin, going back to a psychological
account of language, did at the end of his life. As long as he
has not been alone facing the intrinsic evanescence of lin-
guistic entities (the languages, the phonemes ...) Baudouin
has been able to stick to his position, even if we can find in
his early writings some confusions or indications which can
explain the later drift of his thought. It seems that after
Kruszewski's death he has not been able anymore to faceal-
one uncertainty and doubts about the existence of linguistic
entities. His comments about Kruszewski's works, in the
necrological note he wrote about his former friend, sound
like the bitter echoes of an unhappy love-affair. He was
much unfair in his evaluation of Kruszewski's contribution
to linguistics because, without that friend, he was pushed to
withdraw as quick as possible to positions that he felt more
secure for himself, even if those positions revealed them-
selves afterwards, as the end of his story tells, to be nothing
but pis-allers.
Now, we can understand why Wittgenstein's ideas upon
language have exerted such a mixture of fascination and
repulsion upon linguists. To put it in a few words, I may say
that Wittgenstein has put his finger straight in the middle of
the wound with a precision, an accuracy and an insistence
which has never been matched. Furthermore, we can say
that he has not only put his finger straight in the middle of
the wound; he has at the same time cut all the possible ways
of withdrawal. More systematically than anyone else, Wit-
tgenstein exposes the traps of all forms of psychologism.
Those who have attempted to interpret what he means by
language games in a sociological way have obviously
betrayed his thoughts. And for him, as for the founders of
linguistics, language cannot be accounted for from the out-
side. In other words, more than any one else, Wittgenstein
compels linguists to be faithful to themselves and to face
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their fate; he compels them to clear up their point of view,
what makes its specificity, what it requires. Today, given the
situation of confusion in which linguistics is, that cannot but
deserve consideration. But that does not imply that Wittgen-
stein gives to the linguists the means for grounding linguis-
tics. On the contrary, his position may be understood as
denying the possibility of any linguistics whatsoever.
Some linguists have well seen that. They belong among
those who have shown their concern with the problem of the
epistemological status of linguistics, and who have tried to
give to it at least the beginning of an answer. There are
rather few of them. But I know at least one who has
attempted to grapple with that problem in a book recently
issued: Jean-Claude Milner in his book Introduction a une sci-
ence du langage (Paris, Le Seuil, 1990). In his attempt, Milner
could not but encounter Wittgenstein. In fact, he refers to
him only twice, but at crucial steps. Furthermore, he says
something that I feel very important; that linguists cannot
demonstrate that Wittgenstein is wrong in his basic concep-
tions of language, even if those imply that no linguistics,
conceived as a science of language, is possible. As you know,
the fact that you cannot demonstrate that a statement is
wrong does not imply that this statement is right and, con-
versely, the fact that you cannot demonstrate that a state-
ment is true does not imply that this statement is wrong.
Mathematicians know that well. In that sense we might
speak of a Wittgensteinian conjecture about language. More-
over, I insist upon that point, formulating statements that
cannot be demonstrated as being right or wrong is, first of
all, not easy at all, not trivial, and, furthermore, always
highly meaningful.
But we have a problem. What does it mean to say that we
cannot demonstrate that Wittgenstein is wrong (or right)?
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When Milner says that, it is of course in reference to a pre-
cise issue, not about Wittgenstein's sayings as a whole. It
concerns what I have recalled at the beginning, i.e. that from
Wittgenstein's point of view we just have words and expres-
sions that we can use, that our uses of words and expres-
sions must be studied case by case, that if those uses appears
as governed by rules, those rules do not combine themselves
together so as to make a whole or an unified system. Then,
says Milner, if we follow Wittgenstein, we have to conclude
that there isno such a thing as what we call a language, that
we have just language games, and that what we call a lan-
guage or the language does not exist or exists only as exists
for Spinoza the general idea. Wittgenstein's point is that
there are no rules common to all possible language games,
even that speaking of all possible language games is mean-
ingless. Having in mind, when we speak of a language,
instead of what we call, for instance, Norwegian, or French,
or English, but dialects or anything of that kind whatsoever,
does not change anything in that respect. What is the case is
that Wittgenstein rejects the minimal requirements under
which any linguistics is possible. Therefore, says Milner, if
we follow Wittgenstein, we have to declare that linguistics is
illusionary.
We might be inclined to say that Wittgenstein's position is
close to that one of Baudouin de Courtenay at the end of his
life. But there are in fact fundamental differences between
the two conceptions. First, even such a thing as Baudouin's
idiolect does not exist for Wittgenstein; for him, there is no
unified systematicity of that kind either. Anyone is, by turns,
engaged in one or another language game, but there is no
general, unified systematicity of all language games. Second,
Wittgenstein does not establish his views upon language on
psychological considerations as Baudouin did. There is a
link between these two points because what linguists have
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always tried to save is the idea that any language makes a
unified homogeneous system. That holds at all levels, that of
the languages, of the dialects or even if, like Baudouin, they
make use of the concept of idiolect, at that level too. Of
course linguists agree that within language one must distin-
guish between at least a phonological, a syntactical and a
semantical level. But the general theoretical assumption that
there is a single type of organization common to all these
levels has been dominant within linguistics. According to
this general assumption, language as an object wouldbe
describable by progressive complexification (combinations
of phonemic traits making phonemes, combinations of pho-
nemes making words, combination of words making sen-
tences...). Structuralism has given this assumption its
greatest extension in linguistics, making of language a struc-
ture of structures. In that conception of language, this one is
organized in levels of stratification, the law of organization
of each level being the same, for instance that of a linear
structure in which all the properties can be stated in terms of
contiguity (syntagmatic contrasts) and of distinctivity (para-
digmatic opposition). (See, for instance, Roman Jakobson,
"Two aspects of language and two types of Aphasias", in
Jakobson, R. and Halle, M., Fundamentals of Language.
S'Gravenhague, Mouton, 1956, pp. 55-86 or Noam Chomsky,
Aspects of the theory of syntax, Cambridge (Mass.) M.I.T.
Press, 1965, n. 2, p. 131). 
It has been almost spontaneously admitted that language
has a homogeneous, unitary, structure. But such a hypothe-
sis, whatever has been its fecundity, is a very strong one. It
has led linguists constantly to look for speculative justifica-
tions. Saying that language is a psychological reality or a
social reality or that the basic organization of language is
determined by that of the brain, are the justifications which
have been most frequently ventured because the mind, or
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the society, or the brain, have been conceived as having also
a homogeneous, unitary, structure. But it must be noticed
that, first, such justifications have not had any concrete inci-
dence upon linguistic descriptions and, second, that, if on
the theoretical level, we have had this hypothesis of homo-
geneity, at that of empirical description, even within struc-
turalism, language has been treated as heterogeneous and
not homogeneous. When Wittgenstein says that language is
a toolbox, that words are tools which like any tools can be
used in so many different ways, that there is nothing in com-
mon to all these different ways of using wards as tools, he
adopts aconception of language as heterogeneous and not as
homogeneous. In that sense we might say that Wittgenstein
can help linguists to break with the hypothesis of the struc-
tural homogeneity of language and, so, to put their theory in
agreement with their practice. But the insistence of Wittgen-
stein upon the heterogeneity of language has been devel-
oped for philosophical ends, not in view of linguistic
description and theory. In fact, Wittgenstein does not give
any key for that description or theory. What he can bring to
linguists is essentially critical and not constructive. He
insists upon a problem which has always worried linguists
without giving them the means for solving it. We neverthe-
less should not underestimate the importance of Wittgen-
stein's critic of the assumption of the structural homogeneity
of language.
As already said, Milner mentions Wittgenstein once more in
his book. And this concerns another crucial point, a critic of
the use by Chomsky and the Cambridge School, as well as
by the cognitivists, of the notion of "unknown rule". What
Wittgenstein has written about what it is to follow a rule has
been used to criticize Chomsky. Milner does not reject those
critics. He just draws from them conclusions which are the
opposites of those which have been made (See for instance,
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G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Language, Sense and Nonsense,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1984). He recognizes that the way Chom-
sky uses the notion of "unknown rule" is very problematic.
But instead of saying, as it has been the case, that this should
led us to reject any of the theories of language of the kind
proposed by Chomsky, Dummett, Davidson or others, he
proposes to drop the notion of a rule, at least within linguis-
tic theory. Following up to a certain point Searle, Milner says
that what we are used to name rules within linguistics (rules
of grammar, rules of transformation, or the like), should be
and can be reconsidered in terms of laws. Moreover, he says
that it is because he uses the notion of "unknown rule"
thatChomsky has been led to look in the direction of psy-
chology and, beyond psychology, in that of biology. The
problem for Chomsky was that of giving a ground for the
notion of "unknown rule", even if this ground has no inci-
dence upon the way he concretely accounts for such or such
property of language. The concrete identification of those
properties could not but remain based on purely linguistic
considerations, biology or psychology being in fact of no
help. On the other hand, Milner contests that what Wittgen-
stein says about rules can give a ground for using such a
notion within linguistics. If we are faithful to Wittgenstein's
conceptions, we cannot separate the notion of rule from that
of a game. Then, if we agree upon the fact that dealing with
language in terms of language games, as Wittgenstein does,
is in contradiction with the minimal requirements for any
possible linguistics, we are led to conclude that what Wit-
tgenstein can bring to linguists is to push them to give up
their attempts to deal of language in terms of rules (tacit or
explicit). There too, we can see that this does not tell to lin-
guists what to do, but at least what not to do. And that
might be priceless.
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Comment on Henry's Paper: 
On the Difficulties in Thinking of Language
Some years ago both linguistics and the linguistic turn in
philosophy promised a new and well-grounded start for the
sciences of language and for philosophy. As you all know,
things did not turn out that way. Neither linguistics nor phi-
losophy of language succeeded with their "revolutions". But
this situation is of course more dramatic within linguistics
than within philosophy. Different positions and theories of
the same object, as well as different positions on how to talk
about it, is normal in philosophy but not in a science. There-
fore this situation may be confronted more seriously by a
linguist than by a philosopher; the linguist may feel more
dramatically that he cannot cope with what is supposed to
be his object. Furthermore, within philosophy of language
the reference to language has been mostly subordinated to
questions as how we can justify that a proposition is true –
or in what sense our words or sentences have references.
Thus, with respect to language proper, it is perhaps the lin-
guist which is the philosopher on the condition that he is not
absorbed by methodological issues, on the condition that he
experiences the difficulties in thinking of language. 
The "misadventures" of linguistics and philosophy of lan-
guage reveals the obvious fact that language is not any kind
of object. It might be that this situation is not an effect of
insufficient methods and procedures; that a linguistics can
satisfy all the demands for scientificity and still be unsuc-
cessful – or that a theory within philosophy of language can
satisfy the most sophisticated formallogic and still be unsuc-
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cessful: Object and method may pass by one another. Any-
way, it seems that language poses itself as the obstacle we
meet when we try to reflect upon it – thus the confusions
and mystifications in our talk on language. But if we grant
that this obstacle is something inherent in language, eluding
("le contourner") it amounts to loose language and thereby
to think about something different. In my reading of Paul
Henry's paper, this is the important point. What is more,
Paul Henry proposes here an original explanation of the
constant recurrence of reductionism both in linguistics and
in philosophy of language. The explanation is not only that
our language is experienced as an obstacle when we try to
think it, something to be clarified by a light outside of lan-
guage. But, furthermore, this obstacle is closely related to the
way we are made subjects in being turned into speaking
beings: "Language has something to do with our existence as
subjects, if not with our existence as living beings, then
studying language concerns our existence as subjects". The
same can be said of "madness". Thus it is not a pure coinci-
dence that some of those who have been closest to think of
language without reducing it to something else, have in
some way or another been close to "madness". There is
something which, with the terms of Michel Deguy, could be
called "La folie de Saussure". Particularly, the link between
"madness" and the study of language, may appear when the
stress is put upon the unconscious feature of the forces oper-
ating within language (as Saussure did in his way of think-
ing of language). And this will easily be reinforced if,
quoting Henry's paper, "it might be that linguists, in the last
resort, never can be sure that the knowledge to which they
put all their efforts is not purely illusionary". 
Within this picture, Paul Henry, poses the relationship
between Wittgenstein and the linguists in a new way. The
point is not the traditional one in using Wittgenstein in refer-
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ring to the pragmaticsof language as an argument against
for example Chomsky. The point is rather the opposite one.
For granted that Wittgenstein exposes the traps of reduc-
tionism with respect to language, he compels linguists to be
faithful to themselves. But this is a position where Wittgen-
stein only can tell the linguist what not to do. If this is some
form of support, however, it might be a diabolical one; "his
position may be understood as denying the possibility of
any linguistics whatsoever". Cling to your object, but your
science is illusionary. A message that should be received by
the linguist as "Cling to your object, but your science may be
illusionary". 
I accept the paper's argument: Neither can Wittgenstein
demonstrate that the linguists are wrong, nor can the lin-
guists demonstrate that Wittgenstein is wrong. This follows
from the radical difference between Wittgenstein and the
linguists – a difference that makes the importance of the
relationship between Wittgenstein and linguists. I wonder
however, if this difference may even be greater than envis-
aged by Henry and if in making it so we may also, in some
sense, get them closer to each other. This is the question that
occurred to me when I read Paul Henry's paper. My answer
will be affirmative. But I have neither sufficient time nor
space in order to develop it in some detail. I will limit myself
to two issues: 1) The question of the structural homogeneity
of language. 2) The question of the presuppositions underly-
ing linguistic and philosophical perspectives on language. 
1) In what sense does Wittgenstein deny the thesis of the
structural homogeneity of language presupposed in linguis-
tics?
If we claim that Wittgenstein is offering descriptions –
assembling reminders – of different ways we are using lan-
guage, it is in no sense obvious how such would-be descrip-
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tions could serve as arguments against a theory; theories
being on another level than theone Wittgenstein is creating
for his own thought. There are at least two possibilities: Wit-
tgenstein and the linguists are doing radically different
things. So different that we could imagine Wittgenstein
accepting the right for the linguist to speak for instance of a
language as Norwegian or French. I think this interpretation
can be substantiated, and substantiated in a way that can
clarify Wittgenstein's philosophical discovery: Even if I
understand a sentence in its linguistic sense (because I speak
the same language), it might be that I do not understand it.
The question of the linguist is thus; I understand my own
language and how am I to explain that? The Wittgensteinian
question is on the contrary; I do not – in many cases – under-
stand my own language and how am I to explain that? Lan-
guage and culture (the cultural conditions for the use of
language) are consequently of primary importance for Wit-
tgenstein. The same is not the case for the linguist. In this
reading Wittgenstein is interested in discourses, not in lan-
guages (in different languages). 
The other possibility is the following one: Granted that Wit-
tgenstein does something radically different from the lin-
guist, this is just what can make him into the unhappy
consciousness of the linguist – of constantly reminding him
of what his science might blind him from. In this sense a
reading of Wittgenstein could liberate the linguist by bring-
ing him to a reflection of his own object. Thus, he may see
his own science as a possible illusion. But this does not nec-
essarily mean that a science of language for Wittgenstein is
an illusion. The liberating effect of seeing one's own science
as a possible illusion, could quite simply amount to a real-
ization of its contingency: There could be another science –
another theory – of language. For this reason the linguist
could very well stick to his thesis of the structural homoge-
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neity of language, but he could add that he did not have any
proper theory for it. The condition – of course – is to accept
Wittgenstein's voice as the voice of the foreigner. Chomsky
does not:"One difficulty, however, in interpreting Wittgen-
stein, is that it is unclear when what he says is to be taken lit-
erally. Some remarks are so outrageous that one can only
suppose that something else was intended (e. g. when he
asserts that thinking may be an activity performed by the
hand, when we think by writing)" (in Morgenbesser: Essays
in Honor of Ernst Nagel p. 283). Chomsky states here clearly
how we can avoid listening to someone foreign to one's own
profession: Do not take it literally, something else must have
been intended, or it must be taken in a metaphorical sense.
Chomsky will not be interrupted – but how can he then have
a hope of thinking something he has not thought before?
How may Wittgenstein awaken the philosopher in the lin-
guist?
Therefore it is not excluded that the linguist may try to think
his thesis of the structural homogeneity of language in direc-
tions indirectly inspired by Wittgenstein. He might for
instance turn skeptical to his concepts of codes and rules –
suspect that they on the one hand might be empty (in
explaining nothing) on the other hand that their popularity
might be linked to the relative ease by which they can enter
into formalization. In this case, Wittgenstein is not only the
philosopher telling what not to do. He might shed a new –
unexpected – light on what you are doing and at the same
time open up new possibilities (which of course do not fol-
low directly from Wittgenstein as some sort of an alterna-
tive). This could be a "therapy" for linguists, having a
foreigner to express their problems and distress to and
through. It might even be that such a relation would be bet-
ter than the one between Wittgenstein and the philosopher:
This one can turn too narcissistic by abolishing the differ-
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ence between Wittgenstein and the philosopher (reading
him or trying to listen to him). Or we can simply say that
Wittgenstein is a philosopher only for someone who can feel
at the same timeboth the fascination and the resistance of his
thought (we cannot repeat it but we can think against it). 
2) Much has been written on the common grounds of lin-
guistics and philosophy. It has been argued that the con-
cepts of sign and name have constituted such a common
core. The question is then if linguistics – I'm thinking prima-
rily of Saussure – has broken with those traditional condi-
tions and if Wittgenstein in another way also can also be said
to inaugurate such a rupture. This question is of course too
vague and too general. And furthermore; even if we should
reflect upon the history of our concepts, this does not mean
that we can neatly circumscribe the current conditions for
our thinking about language. Of course there are such condi-
tions, as the distinctions between expression and meaning,
and between expression and form (structure). And these are
functioning in our discourses on language both within phi-
losophy and within linguistics. But if we say that this is all, if
we say that this can make what we say about language
transparent, we cannot but fool ourselves. What is more, it
might be that both modern linguistics and the linguistic turn
in philosophy arose precisely at that moment where there
was no more common ground for our culture's way of think-
ing language; thus what is reflected is perhaps that it is lan-
guage itself that has been a problem. Nothing in our culture
is thought about in so many different ways as we think
about language. It is enough to be reminded of the differ-
ence between Frege and Saussure in order to realize this.
And if we agree that Chomsky is closer to Frege than to Sau-
ssure, we realize that this difference is not simply a differ-
ence between philosophy and linguistics. 
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So it seems that the modern discovery of language as a
groundless ground implies at the same time the dispersions
in our efforts tothink it – that our thinking it makes us real-
ize that this thinking has no ground either – or that its foun-
dation in our concepts is groundless. But this is only one
side of the coin. Because granted what has just been said, we
may encounter language and our thinking about language
as something grounded in ourselves. Or as something that
concerns ourselves in our existence as subjects. And this
means that not anything can be said about language. We
have good reasons for distinguishing between right and
wrong perspectives on language; Wittgenstein as an argu-
ment against reductionistic (and psychologistic) views of
language – without claiming for this a scientific or a tran-
scendental basis (a basis that again might be of such a type
that we thereby can loose the specificity of language). 
Finally, Wittgenstein might help the linguist (and his reader)
to ask the following question: Do I understand what I am
writing (reading), is it comprehensible? One of my favorite
quotations from Chomsky is the following one: "We have
practically no understanding of the semantic component –
no one has even been able to devise a really good terminol-
ogy for the semantic representation of sentences, let alone
the rules that apply to them" (Studies on Semantics in Genera-
tive Grammar, 1972, p. 58). Is there a semantic component in
language that the linguist has practically no understanding
of? Maybe Chomsky assumes something like that. But then
he seems to forget that he as a linguist is using words and
inventing terms – among them the expression "semantic
component". In this case there is no semantic component
that awaits a discovery in such a way as to make a proper
semantic representation of sentences possible. There is only
a hope – and perhaps an illusion – created by a certain term
and more generally by a certain discourse. If we do not see
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such a simple fact the linguist is unable to read himself on
the level of his own words, of his own language. The conse-
quence is conceptualconfusions. But this conceptual confu-
sion is made invisible through the concentration on
methodology; methods of formalization, rewriting rules etc.
And this connection appears to be systematic; Methodology
and conceptual confusions are mutually supporting and
reinforcing each others. His concept of science makes him
blind for his own concepts as they are given in his own dis-
course. This leads the linguist to a preoccupation with the
methodology of linguistics, not to a preoccupation with the
ontology of language (what is language? what is our concept
of a language?), not to a preoccupation with the history of
his own concepts. But saying this implies that it is not neces-
sarily linguistics as linguistics that is problematic. It might
be that there is something wrong with our conception of sci-
ence granted that a science turns so easily idle and so easily
into confusions when confronted with an object as language.
Otherwise we have to conclude that language is the philo-
sophical object. Or maybe this is not the alternative. Maybe
language as a philosophical object has to be considered from
a linguistic perspective. 
However, I'm not quite happy with my last sentence. Let me
add a word on the relationship between Wittgenstein and
the linguists (as I interpret it in Henry's paper). Both, Wit-
tgenstein and the linguists, are aware of a blindness in lan-
guage; In Wittgenstein this is thought of as a surface given
within our language-games, in linguistics this is thought of
as a depth in our grammar. But this is perhaps the lesson of
Wittgenstein: The surface of language is as difficult to see as
it is easy to go wrong in its depth. Does this mean that the
surface and the depth of language (the heterogeneity and the
homogeneity of language) are one the same thing?
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Language, Computer Sciences and Tacit Knowledge
There are various conceptions of the nature of language in
circulation in linguistics. Common to all of them is, how-
ever, some reliance on the concept of rule, explicit or
implicit. Typical in this respect is the remark of Jerrold Katz
in The Philosophy of Language where he contends that "one
who knows a natural language tacitly knows a system of
rules".1 A natural as well as a constructed language is con-
ceived as a system of rules in some sense. On the syntactical
level this does not seem to meet with unsurmountable diffi-
culties. On the semantical level the situation is far more
problematic. It is for instance basic to Katz' conception of
language that rules also are constitutive of linguistic mean-
ing. And some version of this idea has to be correct if the
more ambitious aims of the computer sciences be realized, as
one is here radically dependent upon the possibility of trans-
lating the meaning of each and every linguistic expression
into a set of machine readable rules which are formulated in
such a way that there is a definite answer to any possible
case of application. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein developed his own version of this idea
of language in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus where he
made an intriguing attempt at grasping the relation between
language and the world based upon the assumption that
language can picture actual and possible states of affairs in
the world in virtue of having logicalform in common. Essen-
tial to this picturing relationship was a general rule of pro-
jection:
1. Jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, Harper & Row, New York, 1966, p.
100. The emphasis is mine. 
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A gramophone record, the musical ideas, the written
notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in
the same internal relation of depicting that holds
between language and the world.
There is a general rule by means of which the musician
can obtain the symphony from the score, and which
makes it possible to derive the symphony from the
groove on the gramophone record, and (....) to derive the
score again. (....) That rule is the law of projection that
projects the symphony into the language of musical nota-
tion.2
In the Tractatus-period a proposition was for Wittgenstein a
picture of reality, and the supposed method of projection
was to think out the sense.3 Later he came to realize that he
had confused the method of projection with the lines of pro-
jection.4 Nevertheless, these few remarks should suffice to
2. The reference is to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F.Pears &
B.F.McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1961), 4.014 and 4.0141. 
In the sequel I am going to refer quite extensively to central writings from
Wittgenstein`s Nachlaß that have been edited and published as separate
works. I shall use the following more or less conventional abbreviations for
his writings:
T= Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Oxford (1922). 
PI= Philosophical Investigations, Oxford (1953). 
OC= On Certainty, Oxford (1969). 
PG= Philosophical Grammar, Oxford (1974). 
ROC= Remarks on Colour, Oxford (1977).
RFM= Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford, 3. revised edition
(1978).
C&V= Culture and Value, Oxford (1980).
3. T, 4.021 and 3.11.
4. Peter Winch tells us that Wittgenstein once made a remark to this effect in
conversation with Rush Rhees. See his article "The Unity of Wittgenstein´s
Philosophy" that serves as an introduction to the volume, Studies in the Phi-
losophy of Wittgenstein, London (1969), which he himself edited. At pp. 12-13
Winch tries to spell out what might be involved in confusing the method of
projection with the lines of projection in this context as that is far from clear.
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indicate that a special concept of rule wasto be found at the
very heart of Wittgenstein's theory of how language and the
world were related. In addition comes the general use this
concept had in logic. 
In a linguistic version this idea was also exploited by the log-
ical positivists. Thus we see that the concept of rule was a
basic tool in the philosophical tradition for understanding
both the nature of language in general and the character of
concepts in particular. Such an approach is still very much
alive in certain quarters as indicated earlier. Against this
background it is easily understood that an explication of the
main content of what is involved in Wittgenstein's analysis
of rule-following behaviour and rule-governed activities is
not merely of exegetical interest to the Wittgensteinian
scholar. It has in fact wide ramifications for all those scien-
tific enterprises that essentially involve or are based upon
some particular conception of the nature of concepts and the
human language.
This set the scene for Wittgenstein's interest in rule-follow-
ing behaviour and rule-governed activities in his later phi-
losophy. His former rationalistic conception of the nature of
language is there turned into a pragmatic concern for the
application of the rules that he earlier saw as essential to the
nature of language. When he finally discovered that he had
confused the method of projection with the lines of projec-
tion he also came to see that the use of language was not
something that was only contingently related to its nature: It
should instead be thought of as constitutive of it. This
explains why he is so obsessed with the fact that a rule does
not dictate its own application. 
But he also operates with a much wider concept of language
than the one he worked with in Tractatus. In his later philos-
ophy he includes such things as gestures, facial expressions,
posture, the atmosphere of the situation, as well as such situ-
ationally determined actions as, for example, smiling and
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nodding to an acquaintance as we are passing, turning one's
back on somebody and going off withoutsaying a word,
standing on the quay and waiving goodbye to friends, sit-
ting in a restaurant and making a discreet sign that the
waiter's presence is desired, attending an auction and mak-
ing an offer with a little hand movement, etc. 
This extended concept of language is aimed at capturing all
the means we make use of in our day-by-day situations to
make ourselves understood. In the pragmatic perspective it
is quite natural to make such thing part of the concept of lan-
guage, since they are all sense-making means in the situa-
tions in which we use or react to a sentence with
understanding. If this seems far-fetched you just need to
remind yourself of the fact that a sentence does not say, of
itself, that it is to be taken as, say, an assertion. Other ele-
ments in the situation must be understood in a certain way if
this is to be the natural response to it. The very same sen-
tence could in different contexts express quite another
thought content. Take for instance the sentence: "Laurence
Olivier was convincing as Hamlet". It may be used to convey
many different types of thought content depending upon
the wider context in which it is employed. Let me just indi-
cate a few of them:
 1. It could be used to convey a description of his inter-
pretation of the Hamlet role in the contextually implied
production.
 2. It could be used to give expression to a certain inter-
pretation of his performance in a naturalistic perspective.
 
 3. It could be used to evaluate both his interpre-
tation of the role and his performance of it.
These are logically speaking very different types of thought
content that must be kept apart lest confusion should arise.
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But if we do notknow the closer details of the current use-sit-
uation, we will not be able to make up our minds about
what is actually said. From this it follows that our mastery of
a natural language must include a kind of grasp or practical
understanding of an enormously large repertoire of situa-
tions involving the use of language. One must know what is
going on in a concrete case, and that kind of knowledge can-
not be had from any sort of linguistic inventory. The ade-
quate use of pieces of language, and the appropriate
response to it, requires a situational understanding and a
judgmental power that transcends what can be derived from
the meaning immanent in the sentence alone. This is one of
the reasons why Wittgenstein urges us to investigate the use
of language. That will lead us to the discovery of the neces-
sary interplay between the sentence form and the character
of the situation in which it is applied.
One of the most striking features of Wittgenstein's later phi-
losophy is perhaps his turning away from dealing with rules
and their logical form to investigating what it means to fol-
low rules. In this way the application of the rule and the
very nature of the situation of the user become the focus of
his philosophical interest. This is sometimes called "the
pragmatic turn". Since one and the same rule can be fol-
lowed in different ways, the correspondence rules of the log-
ical positivists cannot do what was asked of them: constitute
the meaning of the empirical concepts and thus mediate
between language and reality. What guarantees that a rule is
followed in the same way time after time cannot itself be a
rule at all. It must in the end depend upon our actions and
different kinds of spontaneous reactions involving what
Wittgenstein once called intransitive understanding.5 
This is the deeper significance of his remark that rule-follow-
ing is a practice.6 This concept is one of the key concepts in
his later philosophy. We meet here most of the themes that
dominated his thinking during this period. It is therefore not
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unreasonable to consider his later philosophy as a kind of
practice philosophy, if by this term we mean all philosophy
that operates from the insight that there exists a complicated
network of mutually constitutive relations between concept
formation, human reactions and activities, and what we call
our reality. To learn to master a natural language is, in this
perspective, not to learn how to formulate well-formed sen-
tences on the basis of syntactical rules and with the help of
language signs, which are tied via correspondence rules
(semantic rules) to a certain segment of reality. It is, instead,
to learn to master an enormously large repertoire of situa-
tions where use of language is included in an exceedingly
varied, but non-eliminable way. In other words, it is a matter
of mastering human reality in all its complexity. It is a mat-
terof learning to adopt an attitude towards it in established
ways, reflecting over it, investigating it, gaining a foothold
in it, and becoming familiar with it. This is accomplished
mainly because we are born into it, grow up in it, and even-
tually are trained in the practices of linguistic involvement. 
5. The expression "intransitive understanding" is used in Philosophical Grammar
(PG), p. 79, where Wittgenstein tries to make up his mind about how to char-
acterize the understanding of a picture. He gives us the following options: "If
I say "I understand this picture" the question arises: do I mean "I understan-
dit like that? With the "like that" standing for a translation of what I under-
stand into a different expression? Or is it a sort of intransitive
understanding?" If the latter is the case, "then what is understood is as it
were autonomous, and the understanding of it is comparable to the under-
standing of a melody". He gives us to understand that he goes for the second
alternative. Thus we see that understanding a picture or a melody has an
intransitive character in the indicated sense. This also applies to the under-
standing of poetry where we are said to understand "something that is
expressed only by these words in these positions", Philosophical Investigations
(PI) I, § 531. In this context it is once more a question of having an alternative
expression for what is understood or not: "We speak of understanding a sen-
tence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the
same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any
more than one musical theme can be replaced by other.)" ibid. 
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This, then, is the background for maintaining that there
exists an internal relationship between concept formation,
forms of human reactions and activities, and the reality
which emerges as our reality by virtue of the concepts we
have formed on this basis about it.
But now we might feel tempted to ask: "What is the impor-
tance of Wittgenstein's conception of practice?" To give an
adequate answer to this question would take a book. I have
elsewhere tried to indicate the main lines of such an answer.
In this context it should suffice to mention a selection of the
most prominent features relevant to the case at hand. One of
the things he achieves by emphasizing the concept of prac-
tice is drawing attention precisely to the factors that are con-
stitutive of meaning in situations involving the use of
language in a non-eliminable way. One of the more surpris-
ing things that surfaces in this perspective is that the very
exercise of an activity might be a constitutive part of the for-
mation of concepts. The content of a concept can thus be
regarded as a function of the established use of its expres-
sion.7 The exercise of a given practice is consequently to be
taken as a necessary element as regards the expression of a
concept. To document that one does in fact master a given
concept one has to be accepted as a competent performer of
the series of established activities or practices which incor-
porates the concept. The practice can thus be said to repre-
sent the application of the concept. This yields the following
principle of conceptual mastery:
6. The concept of practice is introduced in the middle of his discussion of rule
following in PI, § 202, to emphasize its most fundamental aspect. It articu-
lates the observation that there exists a way of understanding a rule that is
not an interpretation, an understanding that is expressed in ways of acting.
Its character as intransitive understanding is fairly clearly indicated in OC, §
139, where Wittgenstein says that "the practice has to speak for itself". I
return to this question and elaborate upon it below.
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The grasp a given concept gives us on the world is
expressed adequately only in practice.
It is our application or practice which shows how we under-
stand something. That is probably what Wittgenstein has in
mind when in his lapidary style maintains that "practices
give words their meaning".8 
But the concern for the use of rules or the rule-following
behaviour has also other sources. Kant had a long time ago
suggested that concepts in fact were best understood as
rules. The general form of this conception of concepts was
hypothetical in character:
If X has the properties Pl, P2, P3, ... Pn, then X is an 0.
Husserl improved upon this conception by pointing out that
concepts should be understood as hierarchies of rules, i. e.
rules that contain other rules under them. 
The first and most important thing about Wittgenstein's
analysis of rule-following is to get an inkling of the very
7. There is some need for caution in the way of expressing this point, since the
traditional understanding of rules and concepts takes it for granted that the
rules or the concepts can be articulated in their entirety. When, in the previ-
ous text, I have put rule and formulatable conceptual content more or less on
an equal basis, this has been a concession to the tradition in the name of con-
venience. At this point in my presentation it is therefore incumbent on me to
call attention to the fact that for Wittgenstein there is also such a thing as a
rule that can only be partially articulated. Accordingly we can talk about
rules and thus about rule-following activities also when it is a matter of
being incapable of articulating the rule itself completely by verbal means,
and not only when it concerns the very performing of the practice in ques-
tion. Consequently we shall have to distinguish between that type of intran-
sitive understanding which in general is attached to the application of
concepts and the one that isa function of the logical character of the rule or
concept itself. There exists a kind of family resemblance between these two
types of intransitive understanding, but they have different sources and are
thus different in kind.
8. This remark is to be found in a manuscript that has been published in two
different books, On Certainty and, Remarks on Colour. In the published mate-
rial it turns up as § 317 in the latter.
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basic level at which it is conducted. It is the level where no
demonstrations are possible,where no definitions can be
given, where the possibility of giving reasons no longer
exists. It is the level where you might be able to get some
glimpses of the limits of the intelligibility of the human lan-
guage. Wittgenstein at one place describes it as the level
where one is in a position to grasp what he calls "the limits
of the empirical". And he also indicates that these limits con-
sist in "ways of comparing and ways of acting".9 Operating
at this level Wittgenstein cannot possibly make any use of
theories. That explains why he keeps insisting that philoso-
phy is an activity contributing to the clarification of the logi-
cal grammar of our concepts. This clarifying task is, it
should be insisted, not wholly therapeutical in character.
The repeated application of his language-game analysis,
which essentially consists in making various comparisons
and rearrangements, is aimed at producing an insight into
the nature of language:
(W)e too ... are trying to understand the essence of language
its functions, its structure. (And this essence is found in)
something that lies open to view and that becomes survey-
able by a rearrangement.10
This is why he says that "philosophy simply puts everything
before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since
everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain".11
This is not only a remark about Wittgenstein's conception of
philosophy, it is just as much a remark about the level on
which he thinks that a proper philosophical investigation
should be conducted. It is the level"before all new discover-
9. RFM, VII, § 22.
10. PI, § 92.
11. Ibid., § 126.
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ies and inventions" are made.12 Philosophy simply makes us
aware of things that are already there. One of the means for
doing that is by rearranging "what we have always
known".13 This element of rearrangement is absolutely basic
to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. That explains
why the order of his remarks carries such weight with him.
Each one of them should be seen in connection with a
selected group of other remarks. Otherwise none of them
will be understood in the right way. This is, of course, a indi-
rect way of communicating the kind of understanding that
Wittgenstein wanted to produce in his readers. But to him it
was the only way that was open to philosophy as he con-
ceived of it. This, by the way, also goes some way to explain
why Wittgenstein was struck by what he called "the queer
resemblance between a philosophical investigation and an
aesthetic one".14 He once remarked that "Philosophie dürfte
man eigentlich nur dichten" – (Philosophy ought really to be
written only as a poetic composition.)15 And this is all con-
nected with the very basic level on which philosophy oper-
ates, according to Wittgenstein. 
After thus situating the rule concept in the context of Wit-
tgenstein's later philosophy, let me then return to his analy-
sis of rule-following as it is here we meet with what was
earlier called "intransitive understanding" – and probably
with some kind of knowledge that are not translatable into
verbally articulate rules – an aspect of our grasp of the world
that has become known as tacit knowledge. We should by
now be in a better position to understand what he is after
when he says such a seemingly outrageous thing as that
there is nochoice when we obey a rule: "I obey the rule
blindly"16 is Wittgenstein`s way of putting it. It is a remark
12. Ibid., § 126.
13. Ibid., §§ 92 and 109.
14. C&V, p. 25.
15. Ibid., p. 24.
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that has to do with the possibility of determining sense or
fundamentally making sense, if that expression is more to
your taste. In this respect rule-following plays the same role
in his later philosophy as did the idea of atomic propositions
in Tractatus.
This much is clear from some of the things he says about the
opposition between interpreting the expression of a rule and
the plain rule-following. Thus there is far more to rule-fol-
lowing than the rule that is followed. The rule itself is in fact
the least important element in the analysis that Wittgenstein
made of the phenomenon of rule-following. It is the very act
of following it and how to establish its identity that occupies
the centre of his interest. And the reason for this should by
now be clear. To go on to apply a word or react to a signpost
in certain determinate ways are considered to be conditions
for the possibility of making sense, to express the point in a
Kantian way. Looking at the rules themselves does not get
us anywhere in these fundamental matters. What stands fast
for us, as he puts it in his last work, On Certainty, does not do
so in virtue of some intrinsic and self-evident quality, "it is
rather held fast by what lies around it".17 Essentially the
same point is also expressed in Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics (revised edition, 1978) where he says that
"(w)hat, in a complicated surrounding, we call "following a
rule" we should certainly not call that if it stood in isola-
tion".18 
What is at stake then in his analysis of rule-following behav-
iour and rule-governed activities is the bit-by-bit uncovering
of those aspects of our mastery of language that are condi-
tions for the possibility of communicating simpliciter. This is
more or less clearly stated in thelast paragraph in his analy-
16. PI, § 219.
17. OC, § 144.
18. RFM, VI, § 33.
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sis of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations. It goes like
this:
If language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but also
(queer as this may sound) in judgments.19
But here one should not be tempted to try to specify what
kind of judgment he is talking about. For it is not an agree-
ment in any specifiable type of judgment or opinion, it is
said to be an agreement in form of life.20 It is in other words
not a question of relating to any propositional content
expressed by the judgments, but rather a means of making
us realize how fundamental are our ways of acting and
reacting when it comes to establishing a system of meaning-
ful signs in human communication. 
This must suffice as an indication of the light in which Wit-
tgenstein's remarks on rule-following behaviour should be
seen. Let us then take a closer look at what goes on in the rel-
evant passages in Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere
where the question of rule-following is on the agenda. There
exists a manifold of human activities that appropriately
could be described as rule-following activities: applying a
concept to situations that are different from those in which
the concept was first acquired, developing a series of num-
ber on the basis of its principle, acting according to a moral
norm in a particular case, playing a game in conformity with
the rules that hold good for it, following a definition of a
given word, subscribing to the laws that apply to making up
one s will, etc., etc. 
In cases like these we are tempted to think that it is our
understanding of the rule involved that makes us act or react
19. PI, § 242.
20. Ibid., § 241.
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in the proper way on future occasions of following the rule.
But if the supposed rule is formulated verbally we immedi-
ately realize that its verbal expression can be interpreted in
different ways. Thus the rule cannot itself guarantee that it is
followed in the intended or established or correct way. And
neither can a new rule be formulated in order to determine
how the first one is to be followed since exactly the same
kind of problems will arise in connection with it as with the
first one.
We have already touched upon the fact that Wittgenstein in
Philosophical Investigations terms following a rule a practice.21
If we ask what is achieved by this way of looking at rule-fol-
lowing, we get a fresh approach to our basic question. The
concept of practice is namely called upon to resolve the par-
adox that Wittgenstein develops when investigating what is
involved in saying that we do act according to rules. He out-
lines the conceptual conflict in this way: "No course of action
could be determined by a rule, because every course of
action can be made out to accord with the rule".22 This seems
to be completely detrimental to our most deeply ingrained
intuitions in these matters. His next remark, though, compli-
cates things still more. He proceeds by pointing out that "if
everything can be made out to accord with a rule, it can also
be made to conflict with it. And so there would be neither
accord nor conflict here".23 This shows the full extent of the
predicament we find ourselves in if acting according to rules
is thought to involve an understanding of the rules that has
the character of interpretation. In a concrete situation the fol-
lowing might be the case: Whatever we do is, on one inter-
pretation, in accord with the rule, and on another
interpretation it is in conflict with the very same rule. Such
21.  Ibid., § 202.
22.  Ibid., § 201.
23.  Ibid., § 201.
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anoutcome is, of course, intolerable. Wittgenstein s way out
of the quandary is to insist that
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an inter-
pretation; but which is exhibited in what we call
"obeying a rule" and "going against it" in actual
cases.24
Hence we must resist the temptation to think that every kind
of action according to rules is a matter of interpretative
understanding of the rules since this creates an logically
impossible situation. The alternative is a kind of under-
standing that is expressed in acting in concrete cases. That is
why Wittgenstein in the following paragraph concludes that
"hence also "following a rule" is a practice". This is the end of
a series of logico-grammatical remarks concerning rule-foll-
owing behaviour that is aimed at showing at least three
interdependent and far-reaching conclusions about how lan-
guage and world are related. The first one has to do with the
rejection of the name-object model for mental predicates,
exemplified here by the term "understanding". It is not the
case that there need to be an internal and mental object of a
sort that is always present when we correctly say that some-
body understands something. The model requires this since
the mental object is supposed to be or guarantee the mean-
ing of the term "understanding". The second conclusion has
to do with the rejection of the idea that only the presence of
an interpretation of the rule can explain why we normally go
on acting or applying the term in question in the intended
way in the future. We both can and do manage quite well
without such an interpretation. That means, on the other
hand, that we have to accept another kind of understanding
that is primarily expressed in acting the grasping of a rule
24.  Ibid., § 201.
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that is exhibited in following it in the customary way. This
turns out to be the kind of understanding we have already
met withunder the name "intransitive understanding".25
This is a most appropriate expression that catches the very
kernel of the point being discussed here. The third conclu-
sion has to do with the rejection of the idea that interpreta-
tion should be considered a basic category in the explication
of how a system of communication is possible. It is in this
context that the concept of practice has an important task to
perform. Interpretation and practice are in fact by Wittgen-
stein made out to be opposites. Interpretation is to him
something that involves conscious intellectual activity. To
interpret is to form an hypothesis. But such a hypothesis or
interpretation can in no way be said to determine meaning,
as we already have had occasion to see. To assume that
"every action according to a rule is an interpretation"26 cre-
ates a conceptually impossible situation. At some point,
though, it must be possible to indicate what in fact does
determine meaning, otherwise we are caught in a circle with
no escape a really vicious one. This is exactly what the con-
cept of practice is supposed to accomplish. In one place Wit-
tgenstein simply notes that "(p)ractice gives words their
meaning".27 In what is in fact the very same manuscript, but
published as a different book, he states that "(r)ules leave
loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself".28
This remark has a peculiar aphoristic character and it is
more than reminiscent of the aphorism that Wittgenstein
used in Tractatus to convey the inexpressibility of logic. It
goes like this: "Logic must take care of itself".29
25.  See note 5.
26.  PI, § 201.
27.  ROC, § 317.
28.  OC, § 139.
29.  T, 5.473.
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The point of the indicated opposition between interpretation
and practice should by now be fairly clear. Wittgenstein is
reaching for some means to make his reader realize that
there is more to knowing the meaning of a word than
abstractly knowing the rules according to which the word is
used. And this additional element is brought out with the
help of the concept of practice. For this non-interpretative
way of grasping a rule is thought of as a kind of rock bottom
that is, in different ways, involved in all determination of
sense, or concept formation if you prefer that way of putting
the point. An interesting consequence of this is that if any-
thing is rightly to be talked about as a rule, it must of neces-
sity be related to an established way of following it. And
that means that rules actually get their identity from the
very practices in which they are embedded.30 The question
of the identity of a given rule has, however, more to it than
its being "inscribed" in a particular practice. Earlier I quoted
Wittgenstein's remark to the effect that only in complicated
surroundings could we sensibly talk about "following a
rule". Understanding a rule cannot thus be an isolated or
chance happening. It must of necessity be related to an inte-
grated whole making up a human language. This is indi-
cated by Wittgenstein when he is commenting upon what
goes into understanding a given sentence: "To understand a
sentence means to understand a language".31 A more hesi-
tant way of expressing essentially the same point can be
found in Philosophical Grammar: "The understanding of lan-
guage .... seems like a background against which a particular
sentence acquires meaning".32 The same holds, mutatis
mutandis, for practices since themanifold of practices has
30. The question of the identity of rules I have treated more fully in my article,
"Rule Following and Tacit Knowledge", AI & Society. The Journal of Human
and Machine Intelligence, Volume 2, No. 3 (1988).
31.  PI, § 199.
32.  PG, p. 50.
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been shown to be the very anchoring point for human lan-
guage. And "(l)anguage, I should like to say, relates to a way
of living".33 Only by having a sufficient mastery of the mani-
fold of practices making up a language can one be said to
understand the particular rules that could be abstracted
from them. This understanding is furthermore not primarily
of an intellectual kind. The grasp that the mastery of a par-
ticular concept gives us of something can only adequately be
expressed by being practised. It is our application or practice
that shows how we understand something. From this it fol-
lows that rules or concepts can never be fully understood
except by those who successfully master the manifold of
practices making up a human language. This does not pre-
clude the possibility of constructing elaborate theories or
models showing how the human mind and the human lan-
guage works. But it is a sort of reminder that such theories of
necessity are forced to leave out that very aspect of human
languages that lies at the bottom of all sense-making – that it
is practice that gives extractable rules direction, point, uni-
tary application and identity as "these" or "those" particular
rules. This aspect of our mastery of a natural language
essentially escapes being articulated in the form of verbal
rules or propositions. It is instead a necessary conditions for
the application of any kind of rule as a rule. Accordingly the
computer sciences shall never be able to reach their most
ambitious aim of simulating human intelligence in toto. 
33.  RFM, VI, § 34.
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A Void in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy
I am no scholar on Wittgenstein, nor on scholars on Wittgen-
stein. This needn't be said, as you are bound to discover
yourself, but I thought it best to tell you, since, in a sense, I
have come not to praise but to bury. The works I shall attend
to are basically Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations
(PI).
Without perhaps being able to give a decisive argument, let
me say that I go with those who hold there are deep-running
agreements and similarities between the early and the later
works of Wittgenstein. One may substantiate such a claim in
several ways: biographically, Wittgenstein's philosophical
heart was pretty constant, from the start to the finish his idol
was Frege, given his temperament I would find that implau-
sible unless he also admired Frege for his problems and
philosophical depth (when he, late in life, Zettel, § 712 writes
"The style of my sentences is extraordinarly strongly influ-
enced by Frege. And if I wanted to, I could establish this
influence where at first sight no one would see it.", this is no
mere stylistic matter); thematically, there is a substantial
overlap of central topics between Tractatus and later works,
just spell out the list in the preface to PI (meaning, under-
standing, proposition, logic, foundations of mathematics,
states of consciousness), furthermore, central positions
remain in place, e.g. the adherence to meaning as truth con-
ditional, and the view of logic, where logical relations are
seen as revealed through the use of ordinary sentences, tau-
tologies are neither pictures of facts, nor are logical truths
the most general laws of nature, as Frege thought; finally,
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the character ofWittgenstein's remarks about philosophy, his
'metaphilosophy', has a constant core.
The plan I follow is this: first, I detail some features of what I
take to be his metaphilosophy, and see them as spelling out
the impossibility of giving explanations in philosophy
(indeed of philosophy itself), not merely on the articulation
thereof; secondly, I sketch the Tractatus answer to a particu-
lar problem, the one probably overshadowing every other in
Wittgenstein's view, viz. the problem of linguistic meaning;
thirdly, I argue that its replacement in PI, required, since he
gave up the Tractatus answer, is strictly speaking not there
(this is the void I found) and I go on to suggest what should
take its place, in strict conformity with his metaphilosophy.
("Metaphilosophy" is my term, Wittgenstein himself, in PI §
121, denied that there is a second-order philosophy, it is all
philosophy, on the same level as it were; I am just picking
out those remarks that would be second-level if we were to
use that word: remarks about philosophy, philosophers,
etc.)
What then are his metaphilosophical pronouncements?
Going by the Tractatus we have that the problems of philoso-
phy are posed because the logic of our language is misun-
derstood. The proper consequence to draw from this,
according to Wittgenstein, is that what can be said can be
said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must be
silent about, that is, we cannot think about it either.
This is from the preface. Later in the book we get such senti-
ments as that the whole of philosophy is full of fundamental
confusions (3.324), that the deepest problems are not prob-
lems at all, that most propositions and questions in philoso-
phy are not false but nonsensical, and arise from our failure
to understand the logic of our language (4.003). As descrip-
tions of philosophy, we get things like "All philosophy is a
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critique of language" (4.0031), and that it aimsat the logical
clarification of thought. Philosophy is furthermore not a
body of doctrines but an activity, consisting essentially of
elucidations (4.111). And, from 6.54, we get that for anything
to serve as elucidations means that those who understand
them recognize them as nonsensical. A concomitance of this
position on philosophy is, for Wittgenstein, that, even
though philosophy is not one of the natural sciences (4.111),
the correct method in philosophy is to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science (6.53).
In 4.11 we hear that all true propositions belong to natural
science, the place of philosophy is above or below natural
science, setting limits to its sphere (4.113). On a more
detailed level we have "in philosophy the question what we
actually use this word or this proposition for repeatedly
leads to valuable insights" (6.211). Finally, we hear that all
the propositions of our everyday language, just as they
stand, are in perfect logical order (5.5563).
Much of this is found also in the Philosophical Investigations,
in a subtly altered form.
The depth of philosophy is the depth of a grammatical joke.
Problems that arise through a misinterpretation of our forms
of language have the character of depth, their roots are as
deep as the forms of language. And, startlingly, their signifi-
cance is as great as the importance of our language (§ 111).
The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or
another piece of plain nonsense and of the bumps that the
understanding has got by running its head up against the
limits of language (§ 119). We suffer from an urge to misun-
derstand the workings of our language (§ 109). 
Philosophy can only describe language, not interfere with it.
It leaves everything as it is (§ 124).
If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would never
be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree
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to them (§128). Philosophy only states what everone admits
(§ 599), is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelli-
gence by means of language (§ 109) and aims at complete
clarity, which simply means that all problems disappear (§
133). But, philosophers are like savages, misinterpreting the
expressions of civilized men (§ 194).
In addition to § 97, there are two other paragraphs extremely
important as expansions on Tractatus 5.5563 (that our every-
day language is perfectly in order), § 81 and § 194. Wittgen-
stein brings in the concepts of game, calculus and machine
to show how we are tempted to think we measure language
up against an ideal one, and that logic, as an instrument of
assessment, is really descriptively true only of the ideal lan-
guage. (The "when we do philosophy we are like savages"
occur at the end of § 194.)
This stuff is very similar to the Tractatus material, one differ-
ence is that Tractatus has only marginal remarks about the
philosopher. Another difference, very marked, is that sci-
ence is virtually absent in PI. Wittgenstein seems to have
interjected grammatical remarks between philosophy and
science, evicting the latter from his concern. This shift seems
due to a marked inclination to disfavour explanations as
against descriptions. Grammatical descriptions seem impor-
tant to Wittgenstein for two reasons, they evade the stric-
tures on theses and explanations, and they are marked with
truth, thus replacing the need for science. I shall ignore this
shift, as the change is probably caused by his lack of belief in
the possibility of giving relevant explanations. The best way
of combatting that is to provide explanations. A marked
similarity is that both works must consider philosophical
activity to be a perennial one.This is due to the nature of the
causes behind philosophy. That he, in the Tractatus, claimed
to have found the truth, is beside the point. Even the truth
may have to be found, and stated, again and again. It is here
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well worth remarking that even though Wittgenstein speaks
of the philosopheras a savage, it is not the philosopher who
by his activity creates the misunderstandings underlying
philosophy: both the Tractatus and PI make clear that it is us,
humans (the chattering classes), who, by knocking up
against the limits of language, misunderstand it, the philoso-
pher is just the whipping boy. His remarks about us, that we
(not the philosophers) are confused about language, misun-
derstand it, goes well with the notion that although lan-
guage is perfectly all right, radical work needs to be done
with us. What it goes less well with is the notion that it is
philosophical thinking alone that needs to be stopped. As I
read Wittgenstein, he is easily misread on this point. The
therapy needed is not to stop us doing philosophy, but to
stop us running up against the limits of language. ("The real
discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to." § 133) Since this is not a
philosophical discovery, what makes me capable? The
answer is: whatever capable of removing the causes behind
philosophy.
The picture theory
I assume most here know the Tractatus, so I shall not go into
great detail. The salient points are these: sentences, as logical
pictures of possible worldly circumstances, are themselves
facts, these facts are propositional signs in a projective rela-
tion to the world. The propositions spell out their meaning
by expressing their truth conditions. The curious, and
important, thing about propositions is that because they
contain everything but the projected, including their own
projective relations, they vouch for their own meaningful-
ness. The projected is the propositional sense, so the propo-
sition doesn't contain its own sense, but it includes the
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possibility of expressing its sense. (3.11; "The method of pro-
jection is to think the sense of the proposition.") When we
entertain (think)a proposition, we think its sense. Elemen-
tary sentences cannot but help showing off their sense, so
they cannot be misunderstood, there is no place for interpre-
tation. (As we all know, Wittgenstein keeps this structural
spot in PI.) Logic has set up the proposition, both in its rela-
tion to us and in its relation to the world, in such a way that
its ability to picture the world is self-explanatory. As I see it,
this is the crucial point, there is no problem about meaning
because propositions impose on us their own meaningful-
ness.
When Wittgenstein came to disown the picture theory he
did so because he rejected the way the theory made proposi-
tions contain the projective relation to the world, in other
words, he came to reject the picture theory's explanation of
its own meaningfulness. Rush Rhees is reported to have
stated in conversation that Wittgenstein later said that in the
Tractatus he confused the method of projection with the lines
of projection. This is one way of distinguishing the explana-
tory part of the picture theory from what I shall later call the
theory of meaning part. Wittgenstein must have come to
realize that when he, in the Tractatus, believed he gave an
account of meaning, he merely presented, in schematic form,
which meaning a proposition would have. 
There is, by the way, an overkill in the transition from the
Tractatus to PI. Wittgenstein has two rejections of the picture
theory, the first in the Tractatus itself. His metaphilosophy
alone is sufficient to reject the picture theory. But the actual
rejection (caused by Sraffa's Neapolitan gesture, if folklore is
to be trusted), suggesting that his metaphilosophy is idling,
seems to have been brought about by a change in his views
on logic: logic cannot show that propositions satisfy the
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intelligibility conditions put on propositions, not in the way
required by the picture theory. What Tractatus claimed was
that propositions and suitable parts of the world share the
same logicalform, thereby explaining the existence of lan-
guage, since we, when thinking the sense of a proposition,
project it onto the world. Such an explanation doesn't,
strictly speaking, account for the existence of language, the
sheer existence of the signs is not accounted for, but, that
apart, the picture theory explained meaning. When Wittgen-
stein later, in PI, tried to explain the role of truth, see e.g.
paragraph 136, he introduced two expressions and tried to
contrast them: belong to and fit. The bad picture is to imag-
ine that since "a proposition is whatever can be true or false",
the concept of truth fits a proposition in such a way that we
could use it "to determine what is and what is not a proposi-
tion." But, "what a proposition is is in one sense determined
by the rules of sentence formation (in English for example),
and in another sense by the use of the sign in the lan-
guage-game. And the use of the words "true" and "false"
may be among the constituent parts of this game; and if so it
belongs to our concept 'proposition' but does not fit' it." Put
logic in for the truth values and we get a perception of what
Wittgenstein saw as wrong with the picture theory.
What I suggest is that he didn't reject the picture theory's
notion of what meaning is, an issue I shall return to. Wit-
tgenstein's rejection of the picture theory was a rejection of
something else: the explanation of meaning. The picture the-
ory is, or has the form of, an explanation, it satisfies the con-
dition: if true, it explains (accounts for) whatever it purports
to be an explanation of. With hindsight we can say that the
explanatory part of the picture theory is the negative part of
Wittgenstein's view, it showed itself not to be the truth, by
showing what unutterable, philosophical nonsense it was.
So, having lost the picture theory, we are short of an expla-
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nation of meaning. What in PI does do that? My answer, in
short, is, nothing.
I said a moment ago that Wittgenstein held on to the Tractar-
ian view on meaning, basically the view that meaning is
given by spelling out the truth conditions of propositions.
To do so is the work of a theory of meaning. (Please put no
stress at all on theory.) Let me first spell out the ground rules.
The thing of importance to be accounted for in a theory of
meaning is semantic value, a notion fairly close to Fregean
Bedeutung. A theory of meaning for a given language gives
us the semantic values, for expressions (or utterances) of that
language, where expressions range from sentences down to
the smallest meaning-contributing features of the language.
Classically, sentential semantic values are the truth values,
and designators have objects as semantic values. Linguistic
meanings, as ordinarily understood, contribute to the fixing
of values, so a large part of a theory of meaning is the lexicon
and syntax. A theory of meaning thus purports to give us
the actual ties between linguistic expressions and the world.
But, the theory of meaning, by itself, does not tell us how
there came to be these ties, nor how there came to be ties at
all. In other words, a theory of meaning does not, as such,
contain an explanation of meaning. (I prefer here to state this
as a problem about how something actually exists "how
does language exist", rather than as a problem about tran-
scendental conditions "How is language possible".)
As I have said, the picture theory gives both a theory and an
explanation of meaning, what Wittgenstein basically gave
up when he dropped it, was the answer it gave to the sec-
ond, the existence question. But, to drop such a reply
doesn't, in itself, entail that it is impossible to give an expla-
nation of meaning, only that philosophy cannot give any,
says the metaphilosophy. My claim is further that we
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haven't been given an alternative explanation in the Investi-
gations. So, by looking at an example, let us see what he does
do in PI. 
First, and very shortly, allow me to suggest something about
the way to understand the early remarks in PI, those where
Wittgenstein plays down talk of meaning, in favour of talk
of use of words. I agree that these paragraphs are to be read
as constituting an attack on the picture theory. But, my sug-
gestion is that these remarks are directed at that part of the
picture theory I claim he wishes to give up, the part that
explains meaning. Wittgenstein gives up the 'glassy essence
of logic', thus the stress on variety, differences in use, lack of
one essential feature to all circumstances, etc. His target is
therefore not meaning as such, notice the seemingly innocu-
ous §§ 10 and 13, where he admits that talk of signification
needs to be accounted for and explained. When Wittgen-
stein, in paragraph 10, says "Now what do the words of this
language signify? – What is supposed to shew what they sig-
nify, if not the kind of use they have? And we have already
described that.", he doesn't deny that words signify, he
claims that determining the use of the word shows us its sig-
nification.
Having just said that, to the example. My focus shall be on
the very first language game in PI, the shop example. This is
fairly complicated, involving three (or, a bit perversely, two)
persons, and two situations. Someone sends someone shop-
ping, that is the first, (don't read "else" with the second
"someone" and we may have two persons). Then the shop-
per enters the shop and engages the shopkeeper, that is the
second situation. The shopper delivers a slip with three
words written on it, and the shopkeeper acts on them. I shall
here disregard the fact that the words were written down,
and not uttered, by the shopper, we could pretend the
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words were said, it doesn't matter. The words are "five red
apples". My central contention is this: Wittgenstein is mis-
taken if he believes that the meanings of the words dictate
that the shopkeeper act. If the utterance was not the utter-
ance of an order his actions would bemisplaced. (As they
would be if, say, his daughter came in to show she could
pronounce the words. If she came in 'playing shop', he
would go through the motions.) So the words do not direct
the shopkeeper to act, the speech act of ordering goods does.
The words merely dictate what he does, how he complies
with the order. It is therefore essential to the example that
someone goes shopping. 
In the early part of PI too much stuff has been freighted from
the speech act domain towards the semantic one, Wittgen-
stein talks sometimes as if words do not have a specific lim-
ited set of meanings, but as if they have many, as many as
the ways they are used. I believe this is a mistake, (but given
what I have suggested goes on in those remarks, I can
understand why the text gives that impression). Most, if not
all, words certainly have more than one meaning, but occa-
sionally none are operative, as they would be in our exam-
ple, if the words were uttered by the shopkeeper's daughter.
However, when the meanings are not idle, then the words
bring with them, into the situation, definite, relevant mean-
ings.
People might think that I, in my estimate of the shopping
example, grossly underplay the stress put by Wittgenstein
on the speech act character of that incidence, and of linguis-
tic intercourse in general. But that is not my complaint at all.
As a matter of fact, I believe it is natural to give Wittgenstein
two reasons for putting the words on a slip of paper, (1) it
gives a commonsense look to the situation, as if the shopper
is, say, a mother sending a child carrying the slip, (2) hand-
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ing over a piece of paper seems more of an action than utter-
ing a few words. (Wittgenstein's stress on actions can also be
seen in the important place given to bedrock (§ 217), when
we turn the spade after reaching the end of justifications.
This has taken the place occupied in Tractatus by the concept
of interpretation not being applicable to elementary sen-
tences.) What I really complain of is thatwe are given no
explanation of how the speech acts themselves came to be.
The picture theory explained meaning because of its own
structure, the speech act aspect in PI doesn't explain mean-
ing because it doesn't explain itself, it lacks the self-explana-
toriness of the picture theory. By that, I mean we will not
have accounted for the speech act of ordering goods, or the
language game of shopping, or what not, by saying that it is
a game we play, or by saying that the utterance of the words
is integrated into activities. By saying this we haven't
explained why, or rather, how, we came to perform such
actions, or be involved in such activities. This is what we do is
no explanation. So, what would an acceptable explanation
look like? 
The replacement
Is it possible to replace the discarded part of the picture the-
ory? And, doesn't he himself argue against the necessity,
and possibility, of a replacement? I shall not enter the debate
whether Wittgenstein argued thus, apart from what I have
said earlier about the absence of science in PI and its replace-
ment by grammatical statements. (It is of course boringly
true that they replace the elucidations.) I shall restrict myself
to two claims: one, a replacement is needed, languages exist,
people communicate, how this came to be is explainable;
two, I believe an explanation exists, at least one on the right
lines. This brings me to the theme of this conference, because
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the explanation I shall mention for you belongs in modern
American philosophy of language: in the works of Ruth Mil-
likan, first and foremost in her book Language, thought, and
other biological categories. At the outset Millikan has an excel-
lent question: "If we can understand why singing fancy
songs helps song birds, why emitting ultrasonic sounds
helps bats, why having a seventeen-year cycle helps seven-
teen-year locusts, why having ceremonial fights helpsmoun-
tain sheep, and why dancing figure eights helps bees, surely
it is mere cowardice to refuse even to wonder why uttering,
in particular, subject-predicate sentences, subject to negation,
helps man. Surely there is some explanation for this helping
that is quite general and not magical." (pp 7-8) 
In order to find an explanation Millikan sets up, among
other things, a system of theoretical concepts, which, by
trading on analogies between biological and sign devices,
are meant to cover both. Her strategy, then, is to identify, at
least some of, the proper functions such devices serve. The
usefulness of these functions then accounts for the prolifera-
tion of devices capable of carrying out these functions. All
this enables her, among other things, to explain the forma-
tion of content within an historical, evolutionary framework
(content as in mental content and propositional content),
and to account for intentionality in naturalistic terms. It is,
however, my intention not to discuss Millikan's work here,
only to introduce her as someone who does do what Wit-
tgenstein's metaphilosophy advises us to do: deliver state-
ments conforming to science. But, let me throw you one
morsel. Millikan's theory is opposed to the figure of the
meaning rationalist, she calls meaning rationalism a syn-
drome, and claims that virtually every thinker on the topic
of meaning suffers from the syndrome. Tractatus might be
called the typical meaning rationalistic work. A meaning
rationalist sees meanings as a Cartesian sees ideas, they are
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available for introspection, virtually infallible introspection.
The exploratory work into them is armchair work. In short a
meaning rationalist, though admitting that we may have
false beliefs, utter false statements, nails to his mast the
claim that we cannot err in thinking that we think. Accord-
ing to Millikan, this is precisely what we may, on occasion,
be doing. Millikan believes that one may, quite literally,
engage in what one believes is thinking about the world, and
be mistaken in that belief. For herfalse beliefs, or false
thoughts, or propositions, relate to true ones as a defective
heart is related to a healthy one. This is a view of the relation
between the true and the false very different from that of the
meaning rationalist, which comes out like this: "The sense of
a proposition is determined by the two poles true and false."
(Notebooks, page 97) 
For Millikan, Wittgenstein is as I said, a representative
meaning rationalist, but this refers mainly to the author of
the Tractatus, what about the so called later Wittgenstein? As
far as I can judge, he seems fairly unimportant. At the same
time, some consider Wittgenstein to have had basically a
naturalistic project. Is Wittgenstein at all thinking along such
lines? Darwin is mentioned once in Tractatus: "Darwin's the-
ory has no more to do with philosophy than any other
hypothesis in natural science." (4.1122) This is rather cryptic,
slightly better is "Everyday language is a part of the human
organism and no less complicated than it." (from 4.002). But
I am afraid that the context of the remark removes any
punch it might otherwise possess. In later works, the refer-
ence to Darwin, in Culture and Value, is less then helpful:
"What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the
discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view."
(p 18) And, in the powerful passage Part II, xii, when Wit-
tgenstein says "But our interest does not fall back upon these
possible causes of the formation of concepts; since we are
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not doing natural science; nor yet natural history – since we
can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes",
one feels that he has gone off the boil. Surely this is precisely
what he should be doing, – if he wanted the truth. 
There are some other remarks I ought to mention, even
though I, in the final analysis, do not believe they are rele-
vant against the above estimate. Earlier I referred to the
paragraphs where Wittgensteinintroduces the concepts of
machine, game and calculus. Well, late in part I of PI he has
some remarks where he touches on what I believe to be very
much the same topic, but which might give a different
impression, the remarks are §§ 490-8. 
"To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument
for a particular purpose on the basis of laws of nature (or
consistently with them); but it also has the other sense, anal-
ogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game."
(§ 492)
"We say: "The cock calls the hens by crowing" – but doesn't a
comparison with our language lie at the bottom of this? –
Isn't the aspect quite altered if we imagine the crowing to set
the hens in motion by some kind of physical causation?
But if we were shewn how the words "Come to me" act on
the person addressed, so that finally, given certain condi-
tions, the muscles of his legs are innervated, and so on –
should we feel that that sentence lost the character of a sen-
tence?" (§ 493). The answer to the last question is, I take it, no.
"Grammar does not tell us how language must be con-
structed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have
such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes
and in no way explains the use of signs." (§ 496) 
"When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar" and "Bring me
milk" make sense, but not the combination "Milk me sugar",
that does not mean that the utterance of this combination of
words has no effect. And if its effect is that the other person
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stares at me and gapes, I don't on that account call it the
order to stare and gape, even if that was precisely the effect
that I wanted to produce." (§ 498)
Wittgenstein is probably doing quite a few things here. First,
I read the passages as giving a natural law governed com-
pulsion, as an alternative to the machine rails from § 218.
And that passage is, of course, a part of the debate about
rules and the way they can be saidto direct and govern
meaning and behaviour. Secondly, I read him as saying that
if we were said to react in this way, no matter, because the
rigidness of the natural law rule is perceived in comparison
with our language. The concept of language is strong
enough to hold together both the idea of game and the idea
of natural law governed processes, they are compatible. So
Wittgenstein thinks he is disarming the attack he presents
and replies to in these paragraphs.
Perhaps I ought also to mention a paragraph in the middle
of the debate about rules, viz. § 198, the second part of which
reads: "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular
way, and now I do so react to it.
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has
come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this
going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have
further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so
far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom."
Wittgenstein is quite clear here that meaning is not a one-off
happening, that it requires training into customary behav-
iour. But this is still far from what, I claim we need to look
for. And, the reason why I am, finally, not too impressed
with Wittgenstein here is that the crux has not been touched:
content and intentionality have not been explained natural-
istically. To say that individuals are trained into meaningful
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behaviour is not to say anything explanatory about how
such meaningful behaviour arose. Meaningful behaviour,
linguistic or otherwise, doesn't come into being because it is
behaviour people are trained to do, much nonsensical
behaviour is of such complexity that it takes practice to mas-
ter it. If linguistic devices are to operate meaningfully in
behaviour, it is because they are meaningful devices, most
likely operable over a broad spectre ofcontexts. For Millikan,
it is possible for something to be a meaningful device
because the device has stabilizing functions, functions
evolved over time. The linguistic devices have proved their
usefulness, so over time they have become standardized and
stable. There is a tag in biology: ontogeny recapitulates phy-
logeny, but in linguistic matters the training an individual
goes through to become a speaker does not carry that
speaker through the stages his words have been through,
nor are his word tokens carried through those stages. But his
words, the words he uses, are meaningful because they have
been through those stages.
Why didn't he come closer than he did? My final suggestion
is that something held him captive, and to indicate what, I
should like to read you two passages from someone he so
misquoted, St Augustine. The passages come from Book X of
the Confessions, on memory, which for Augustine meant
much more than the faculty for remembering. By the way,
God is referred to by the expressions "Power of my soul" and
"Truth".
Paragraph 1. "May I know you, who know me. May I 'know
as I also am known'. Power of my soul, enter into it and fit it
for yourself, so that you may have and hold it 'without spot
or blemish'. This is my hope, and that is why I speak."
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Paragraph 65. "Truth, when did you ever fail to walk with 
me, teaching me what to avoid and what to seek after when I 
reported to you what, in my inferior position, I could see 
and asked your counsel?...... Without you I could discern 
none of these things, and I found that none of these things 
was you. Nor was I you, though I had made these discover-
ies. I traversed everything, and tried to make distinctions 
and to evaluate each entity according to its proper rank. ... 
you are the abiding light by which I investigated all these-
matters to discover whether they existed, what they were, 
and what value should be attached to them. I listened to you 
teaching me and giving instructions. ....And sometimes you 
cause me to enter into an extraordinary depth of feeling 
marked by a strange sweetness. If it were brought to perfec-
tion in me, it would be an experience quite beyond anything 
in this life. But I fall back into my usual ways under my mis-
erable burdens. I am reabsorbed by my habitual practices. I 
am held in their grip. I weep profusely, but still I am held. 
Such is the strength of the burden of habit. Here I have the 
power to be, but do not wish it. There I wish to be, but lack 
the power. On both grounds I am in misery." (I have used 
the translation by Henry Chadwick, Oxford 1991.)
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The Duality of Wittgenstein's Phenomenological 
Actuality
The question for me today is whether something like a Wit-
tgensteinian phenomenology exists or not. The way in
which I'll try to answer this is to show that the works of Wit-
tgenstein do indeed bear evidence of phenomenological
questionning. Now, one must acknowledge that there are in
fact two paradigms of what is termed "phenomenology". The
first task then is to determine the difference between them.
However, as the two paradigms will appear irreducible to
one another, we'll have to face a new question – and this one
is very arduous: how are we to state the consistency of Wit-
tgenstein's thought through its own evolution?
It is worth noting, in the first place, that Wittgenstein him-
self answered the question (at least formally) in a well
known sentence in Remarks on Colours (1950): "There is no
such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phe-
nomenological problems" (I, § 53). This assertion, taken in its
litteral sense, should compell us to admit that Wittgenstein,
at the time he was interested in the foundations of psychol-
ogy (that is from 1945 to 1951), even if he used to title parts
of his work "phenomenology", wasn't in fact setting out to
establish what one might consider phenomenology in its
proper sense. For his ultimate position (the sentence just
quoted was written one year or less before he died) gives
evidence of a stubborn resistance to phenomenology.
And yet, this is a very surprising fact. For what Wittgenstein
did first and foremost when coming back to philosophy
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(1929) was to turn to phenomenology in order to overcome
the difficulties inherent in the Tractatus.
The main reason for him to settle once again in Cambridge
was – as he disclosed it to Schlick – the opportunity to "make
a study of visual space" (Letter to Schlick, 18. 02. 1929). This
question is in fact a critical point which we ought to scruti-
nize, in the first place, because Wittgenstein's concept of
phenomenology in its primary form (that is in the earlier
thirties) – namely the idea that "phenomenology is gram-
mar" – is somewhat enigmatical.
As far as I can see, the reasons for such a lack of clarity are
three in number. First: Wittgenstein, while planning a phe-
nomenological way of thinking, didn't refer at all to the Hus-
serlian one, which however the fellows of the Vienna Circle
were at the same time criticizing.
A second feature of the enigma, and not the least one, is the
fact that Wittgenstein, at the very moment he was entering a
phenomenological way, retrospectively characterised the
logical symbolism of the Tractatus as "primary language" or
"phenomenological language". A very surprising fact, in my
opinion, not to say a groundless one (at least at first sight).
Finally, after 1932 – and this is one more ground for us to be
puzzled – any mention of phenomenology suddenly disap-
pears from Wittgenstein's writings. Philosophical Grammar
scarcely hints at the notion (except for one appendix to the
first part of the book), and as for the subsequent texts, they
simply ignore it.
We may note that, the term itself (phenomenology) is
re-introduced many years later, especially in Remarks on
Colours; the connotation of it however is then quite different
from what it was in the formertexts. In fact, the new mean-
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ing of "phenomenology" precludes the possibility of setting
up any phenomenological theory whatsoever.
 
– I –
If we want to understand where the difficulties came from,
which Wittgenstein met with on his phenomenological way
in the earlier thirties, the main point to take good note of will
be the prominent part which visual space already plays in
the Tractatus, although it is mentioned only three times.
Indeed, the very possibility of solipsism and mere realism
coinciding – in other words, the possibility of determining
the world (die gesamte Wirklichkeit) as being my world (als
begrenztes Ganzes); cf. Tractatus, 2.063 and 6.45 – hinges on
this notion of visual space.
The fact that visual space is the crucial point for the philo-
sophical purpose of the Tractatus also results from the Note-
books 1914-1916, where we see Wittgenstein, first puzzled
with the infinite divisibility of space, getting round the diffi-
culty by means of a new concept of infinity – this one consis-
tent with the principles of logical atomism. For, by setting
forth in the Notebooks the existence of minima visibilia, Wit-
tgenstein gets rid of the "continuous space", now regarded
as a "secondary construction", which he intends to replace
by a space which we can't divide ad infinitum. Patches in our
visual field are supposed to be the elements of such a space.
And even if every patch is further composed of points, it
nevertheless functions as a "simple object" (cf. Notebooks, 18.
06. 1915). 
Now it's worth noting that the theory of visual space as it is
set up here makes it possible for the Tractatus to conclude as
it does – namely "mystically". All I need to produce proof of
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this assertion isthe fact that Wittgenstein, the first time he
introduced "the mystical" (May 25th 1915), did so in order to
warrant the idea of an indivisible minimum visibile. For, if it's
true that science rests on the thesis of infinite divisibility, it's
also true that "the urge towards the mystical comes of the
non-satisfaction of our wishes by science" (Notebooks, ibid.). 
The project however which Wittgenstein carried out at the
beginning was put back in the melting pot as early as 1929.
Philosophical Remarks shows that we are not entitled to
reduce the paradox inherent in visual space in the way the
Tractatus tried to do. For, even if "the existence of a smallest
visible difference is contradictory to continuity", it's still nec-
essary that the minima visibilia on the one hand and the conti-
nuity on the other must be "reconcilable with one another",
since continuity is in fact what we see from the very moment
we reach the "limit of the distinguishable (an der Grenze des
Unterscheidbaren)" (cf. op. cit., XII, §§ 136-137).
Now the criticism of the first conception of space and the
denial of the independance of elementary propositions have
a tight connection with one another. And it is a matter of fact
that this denial is one of the main arguments Wittgenstein
calls upon against the Tractatus, in the mean time. What he
was indeed aiming at during this period was to demon-
strate: 
(1) That his first way of questionning was misleading for
two reasons: because he believed it possible for propositions
to be infinite in number, just as though an "infinite number"
were something conceivable (cf. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cam-
bridge 1930-1932, "Miscellaneous Notes", p. 119), and because
he believed that logic deals with an "ideal" language, not
with the ordinary one (cf. Philosophical Remarks, I, § 2).
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 (2) That both the conception of the proposition – including
its logical space – and the conception of space in proper
sense were concerned in such a twofold mistake. That isn't
to be wondered at, since from the beginning Wittgenstein
had a perfect knowledge of the complexity of the latter as
"logical complexity" opposed to the Cartesian partes extra
partes. What he had overlooked – blinding himself to the
faults of logical atomism – was only that space, in accor-
dance with such logical complexity, must also be continu-
ous.
One may easily verify, that in 1930, as well as in 1915, the
conception of the proposition within a logical space on the
one hand, and the theory of visual field on the other, share in
fact one and the same destiny. Thus, at the time of the Note-
books, Wittgenstein was asserting – in response, so to speak,
to the conception of the infinite as number – that "a proposi-
tion can [...] quite well treat of infinitely many points with-
out being infinitely complex in a particular sense", and
similarly that it is "perfectly possible that patches in our
visual field are simple objects", though the "theoretical visual
field" is composed of "infinitely many points" (cf. Notebooks,
18. 06. 1915). A thesis to which, after 1930, he replies that in
fact "we can see or experience but finite fragments", so that
our visual space, even if it's boundless, still remains finite
(cf. Philosophical Remarks, XII, § 136).
Besides, while the Notebooks drew from the non-infinite
divisibility of visual space the conclusion that beyond the
essentially fluctuating sphere of "what is the case", "there is
some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a
thing" – in other terms the "substance of the world", as the
Tractatus put it – Philosophical Remarks for their part try to
show, in consequence of the new conception of the visual
space, that the signs we use could hardly refer to "really sim-
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ple objects" (a kind of "Ding an sich", to speak with Kant; cf.
PhilosophicalRemarks, XXII, § 225). For all they need to have a
meaning is to be related to immediate experience.
Obviously, the main purpose of this round of corrections is
to remove any possibility of understanding the world as
being my world – an indirect means, in fact, of depriving
"the urge towards the mystical" of what it was avowedly
resting on. To produce proof of what I am asserting here, I
might mention the fact that the analysis of visual space in
1915-1916 resulted in the discovery of the subject as "limit of
the world" (an astonishing limit to tell the truth, since the
subject is nevertheless supposed to be present within the
visual field itself), while, on the contrary Philosophical
Remarks later asserts as a principle of the new approach that
"the visual space has essentially no owner", cf. Philosophical
Remarks, VII, § 71).
The main point in all this is that Wittgenstein introduced the
famous axiom "phenomenology is grammar" for no other
reason than to get rid of his former solipsism. For what is
meant by this axiom is that phenomenology can't be reduced
to psychology – even not to a rational one – so that one has
no right to fill up the logical structure of visual space with
raw contents, the way Wittgenstein himself did in fact in the
Tractatus, when he left the subject abashed at the unfathom-
able "daß sie ist".
For instance, the difference between hallucinating and per-
ceiving, which Wittgenstein sets forth in a section of the Big
Typescript (the title of which is precisely "Phenomenology is
grammar"), is intended to show how essential it is to make a
sharp distinction whithin the visual experience between (1)
what belongs to the constitution of the subject, for instance
the light-spots I "see" if someone strikes my head – an expe-
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rience through which not the least parcel of the world gets
unveiled –, and (2) what on the contrary makes it possible
for me togather together all I feel, giving it the form of a
world. On this distinction, I quote Philosophical Remarks, I, §
1: 
"An octahedron with the pure colours at the cor-
ner-points provides a rough Darstellung of
colour-space, and this is a grammatical Darstellung,
not a psychological one. On the other hand, to say
that in such and such circumstances you can see a red
after-image is a matter of psychology. The later may,
or may not, be the case; the former is a priori; [...]
using the octahedron as a Darstellung gives us a
bird's-eye view of the grammatical rules."
Thus, Wittgenstein came to the point of understanding that
it is of no use to call upon a subject conceived of as the cen-
tral point for visual images. If we are really to question
really the visual space – that is, the possibility of it – we must
first of all bring out the grammar at work therein, in other
words, the network of internal relations proper to the colour
phenomenon. For, in this period, it's still the "colour patch in
the visual field" that functions as the paradigm of visibility –
just as it was at the time of the Tractatus.
Now the process of its becoming grammar requires phe-
nomenology – formerly confined to silently "contemplating
the world sub specie aeterni" – to reform the very conception
of "logical grammar" or "logical syntax" as set up in the Trac-
tatus. For, Wittgenstein now ought to deprive the truth func-
tions of the general significance they had been given in the
Tractatus in order to insert them in a "more comprehensive
syntax", namely "the inner syntax of propositions". He is
indeed perfectly aware of the fact that not only the form but
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also the content of a given proposition is bears witness to a
secret accordance or pre-established harmony between
thought and reality. Hence the extensively revised concep-
tion of the propositional image,now developed into a "prop-
ositional system" or compared to a "ruler" all of whose
"graduating lines" [not only the end-points of these lines as
at the time of Tractatus] "are laid against reality" (cf. Wittgen-
stein and The Vienna Circle, "System of Colours", 25. 12. 1929).
Hence also the wide ranging program of a "philosophical
grammar" in the form of a book that wouldn't be a series of
chapters side by side, [but] would have a quite different
structure", since it was intended to draw the line "between
phenomenological and non phenomenological", in other
words "between the logic of content and the logic of the
propositional form in general" (Philosophical Grammar, I,
Appendix V).
– II –
Nevertheless we have to face the difficulty I mentioned at
the beginning, namely the fact that Philosophical Grammar is
precisely one of the last texts to discuss phenomenology. In
later years, Wittgenstein simply gave up any idea of a
pre-established harmony between language and the world.
Thus the phenomenological theme too disappears, as well as
the project of a philosophical grammar in the form of a syn-
opsis, just as though the phenomenological chapters of the
book Wittgenstein was planning to write during the years
1931-1932 had only ever been a metaphysical dream. 
Thus it's easy to understand why Wittgenstein, when later
on he meets again the very same questions he had believed
for a while to have answered thanks to a phenomenology of
his own invention, then asserts that there is nothing of the
70
kind – no "ideal representation of what is seen" at all – and
that "a phenomenological use of the word 'see'" is but a lure.
For such an ideal representation leads us to the following
dilemma: Either it has to be a"photographicaly (metrically)
exact reproduction in a picture of what is seen" – say, fea-
tures and colours of a given dog –, but in this case the pic-
ture is totally unfit to make the expression seen (the joy of the
dog, which I can only "somehow notice"). Or if we want the
picture to convey accurately an expression (for instance a
smiling face), how is it supposed to do so? Through "the cor-
responding lines and shapes of the parts of the face"? But
"corresponding to what"? Should we say: to the ideal truth of
the smile? How are we to see something like that? (cf.
Remarks on The Philosophy of Psychology, I, §§ 1066-1071).
Obviously there is something wrong on either side of this
dilemma. The lesson we ought to draw from it is that the
only "ideal" or "truth" we are entitled to pursue, is to
describe things in their aspects – granted that every descrip-
tion does consist in bringing into play a set of artificial
means. This is indeed the main thesis of Remarks on Colours
(1950). According to this very last text, to believe in a "phe-
nomenology" is held to be a "temptation", for instance the
temptation to assume the existence of true colours, free from
"any spatial or physical interpretation of visual experience".
(Wittgenstein called them "the colours of places in our visual
field", cf. op. cit., I, §§ 60-61). This ultimate thesis deserves
close attention, for it invalidates in fact the basic assumption
of the so-called "phenomenological theory of colours" which
Wittgenstein had outlined in the twenty first section of Philo-
sophical Remarks (1930). For he intended in this section to
found the metric of colours on a "phenomenological investi-
gation of the sense data". His starting point was to assume
"simple colours, existing simply as psychological
appearences" as a basis for a theory of colours dealing only
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with "what is really perceptible", in opposition to "any hypo-
thetical object, like waves, cells, etc."
By laying out this approach in his own "Farbenlehre", Wit-
tgenstein intended to set himself up as a rightful heir to
Goethe, whom in fact he was reading at the time, as it
appears from a fragment of Culture and Value of 1931: "I
think that what Goethe intended really to find was [...] a
psychological theory of colours". Now it's precisely the same
Goethean Farbenlehre which Remarks on Colours tries, twenty
years later, to refute by showing that Goethe, instead of giv-
ing us a genuine phenomenological approach, could just
afford "remarks [that] couldn't be of any use to a painter;
they could be of hardly any to a decorator". A hard judg-
ment, no doubt, not only towards Goethe but also – and this
is our point – towards the first "phenomenological" attempt
Wittgenstein himself made in 1930. For if, at that time, he
could write: "What I need is a psychological theory of
colours, or rather a phenomenological one, not a physical or
physiological theory" (Philosophical Remarks, XXI, § 218), in
1950 he lays down the basic but contrary principle of his
new method of analysis as follows: "We do not want to
establish a theory of colour (neither a physiological nor a psy-
chological one), but rather the logic of our colour concepts.
And this accomplishes what people have often unjustly
expected of a theory" (Remarks on Colours, I, § 22).
On the whole, it appears very clearly that, between the first
Wittgensteinian statement about phenomenology and the
latter, there is a gap, just as though the former distinction
between a psychological (or phenomenological) theory on
the one hand and a physical (or physiological) one on the
other were found to be null and void. As a result, any possi-
bility of connecting the grammar of colours with a theory of
colours is also denied. For the true opposition is not between
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theories of different kind: it is between a theoretical way of
thinking (whatever it may be) and a logical one. Now what's
the meaning of this latter position of the philosopher, if not
the very same statement he made at his beginning, –
namely:"we feel that even if all possible scientific questions
are answered our problem is still not touched at all" (Notebooks,
25. 05. 1915) – or, to put it as it is in Remarks on Colours: "we
stand there like the ox in front of the newly-painted stall
door" (II, § 12).
From all these texts, we may conclude, in my opinion, that
the former concept of phenomenology – not only as a
method but also as so-called "phenomenological data" – has
finally been rejected by the later Wittgenstein. All the more
reason for us to scrutinize closely, in respect both of its
method and its object, what Wittgenstein regarded as "phe-
nomenology" at the time of Philosophical Remarks.
According to the first paragraph of this text, the possibility
of the "phenomenology" is "the immediate representation
(Darstellung) of the immediate experience". An untoward
redoubling of the immediate, one might say. Maybe. And
yet one has no right to infer from this insistence upon the
immediate, that the "phenomenological" paradigm used in
the Remarks is but mere phenomenalism. This supposition
could hardly be possible, since it is precisely by means of this
paradigm that Wittgenstein intends to refute the Tractarian
solipsism.
We can set forth the basic thesis of Philosophical Remarks in
the following form: it is perfectly possible for phenomenol-
ogy to spare the phenomenological language; there is no
need to call upon a "direct and exact description". All Wit-
tgenstein needs in order to carry out his 1930 project is to
find out the "wheels turning idly" in the ordinary language
(cf. Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle, "Wheels turning idly",
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22. 12. 1929). Thus the only one method which is appropriate
is no longer the so-called "phenomenological description": it
is grammar (cf. Philosophical Remarks, XXII, § 229).
That's why we have now to ask: what is the deep-seated
meaning of the axiom 'Phenomenology is grammar'? For all
we have done so far is to state its cathartic effect on the Trac-
tatus. But if we interpret this famous axiom in the light of the
beginning of Philosophical Remarks, we'll see that Wittgen-
stein doesn't intend to define grammar and phenomenology
through one another (as a strictly phenomenological method
would require him to do), but rather to insist on the gram-
mar's being able to accomplish all the duties which fall on
phenomenology.
Does this mean that the idea of "phenomenological lan-
guage" had in fact been revoked as early as 1929, that is, at
the beginning, not at the end, of the phenomenological epi-
sode, and that consequently the usual way to conceive this
quaestio disputata is the right one? I don't think so.
It is true that § 2 of Philosophical Remarks could put us on the
wrong scent. For, in this paragraph, Wittgenstein is setting
forth that logic ought to deal with "our language", not with
an "ideal" one. Thus one could believe that he already
admits the thesis which The Blue Book will later regard as the
basis of the "new thoughts", namely: "Ordinary language is
all right" (op. cit., p. 28). But if we consider the question care-
fully, we soon realize that such a reading isn't the right one.
For it is out of the question for Wittgenstein in Philosophical
Remarks to give up the primary language, which is still (and
which will remain until the end of the intervening time) the
very foundation of his philosophical project.
In truth, Wittgenstein's position on this question at the time
is somewhat difficult to unravel: 
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(1) He is cutting off, so to speak, the phenomenological lan-
guage (as we saw).
(2) Instead of entering the labyrinth of the phenomenologi-
cal description, we can reach our goal by means of grammar
– not only an easier way, but also a philosophical gain for us.
(3) Nevertheless, Philosophical Remarks still regards the phe-
nomenological language as the ultimate warrant (at least de
jure).
In brief, the way in which Philosophical Remarks propounds
what I might call a structural equation between the synopti-
cal representation through grammar and the immediate rep-
resentation given by phenomenology, means that
Wittgenstein is using again – only with reversed arms – the
good old strategy of the Tractatus, in which he inferred from
the so-called "general form of the proposition" that "we have
a concept of the elementary proposition apart from its spe-
cial logical form" (5.555).
Thus, to believe that there is a contradiction in Philosophical
Remarks between the passages in which Wittgenstein intends
to avoid using the phenomenological language and those in
which he calls upon it, would be but a mistaken opinion.
Now, if we want to determine the real meaning of the phe-
nomenological paradigm still at work in the Remarks, we
have to state the following question: what was it that forced
Wittgenstein to maintain a void place for phenomenological
language? The answer is in § 53: 
"There is not – as I used to believe – a primary lan-
guage as opposed to our ordinary language, the 'sec-
ondary' one. But one could speak of a primary
language as opposed to ours in so far as the former
would not permit any way of expressinga preference
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for certain phenomena over others; it would have to
be, so to speak absolutely matter of fact34."
A statement somewhat involved in style. Nonetheless it
appears clearly from it that, if the philosophical analysis
must still refer to a primary language as opposed to the ordi-
nary one, it is no longer possible to regard the latter as sec-
ondary language. For what Wittgenstein has in fact
discovered, between 1915 and 1930, is that primary language
can't be isolated from the ordinary one. So that what is at
stake is a new conception of the relation between the two
languages. What has shifted indeed is the way to conceive
the logical elucidation of the language: the former pattern
was a kind of Begriffsschrift, the new one is built on the idea
of an "absolutely matter-of-fact" language.
Once again: does all this mean that in 1930 Wittgenstein, in
his search for the "ideale Darstellung" would have found a
quite different way from the one he was following at the
time of Tractatus? The answer is "no" – however paradoxical
it may sound. For what he was looking for, in 1930 as well as
in 1915, by invoking a primary language, was the possibility
of a merely objective "Darstellung" of the world. In the Note-
books, for instance, the "symbolism of generality" enjoyed the
privilege of an "impersonal representation of the world"
(Notebooks, 27. 10. 14); and we read in Philosophical Remarks
(VII, § 71) that "the essential thing is that the Darstellung of
visual space is the Darstellung of an object and contains no
suggestion of a subject".
34. The German “sachlich” has been translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White
by “impartial”. I have found this translation inappropriate and prefer “mat-
ter of fact”.
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Thus the middle period texts tried to bar the way of solip-
sism and its mystical train by shifting visual space towards
pure objectivity.
Now there is of course a price to pay for this – a high price,
in fact. See for instance § 72 of Philosophical Remarks, accord-
ing to which nothing in the "structure of visual space [...]
forces me into interpreting the tree I see through my win-
dow as larger than the window". Moreover, Wittgenstein in
this text agrees with the statement that "what corresponds to
the tree in visual space is, surely, obviously smaller than what
corresponds to the window".
An odd "phenomenological" analysis, one might say. For
what it means is that the theoretical objectivism overcame at
last the grammar, so that the true name of "phenomenology"
at the time was neither "grammar" nor "phenomenological
description", but "theory of knowledge" (See, Philosophical
Remarks, VI, § 57). Besides, this theory of knowledge was
supposed to be able: (1) to "constitute" the "physical object"
on the basis of "sense data" – that is, in a merely "objective"
process; (2) to interpret consequently the "phenomenological
statements" as "individual cross-sections through hypothe-
sis", namely the hypothesis of physics (cf. Wittgenstein and
the Vienna Circle, "Hypotheses I" and "Hypotheses II"). In
other words it was a physicalist and positivist theory of
knowledge. No wonder then that Wittgenstein, after reading
"Physikalische Sprache als universale Sprache der Wissen-
schaft", got so angry that he accused Carnap of plagiarism.
Thus, the lesson we have to draw from this period is the fol-
lowing: Whether the elements of the so-called phenomeno-
logical language are elements of being or elements of
representation – accordingly, whether the "ideal representa-
tion" is "the absolutely general description of the world", as
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in the Notebooks, or "the direct and exactdescription", as in
Philosophical Remarks – it doesn't make any significant differ-
ence. For in both cases there are still ultimate elements, to
which the description is supposed to reduce its "descriptum".
In other words, in both cases the analytical description,
which necessarily involves a theoretical construction, is sub-
stituted for the descriptive analysis, which on the contrary
ought to be a naked description.
Wittgenstein is becoming aware of this situation in The Blue
Book. This is why he tries (after 1933) to get rid of any remi-
nant scientism, (1) by introducing a sharp distinction
between causes and reasons, (2) by giving up the "ideal lan-
guage" as a norm for the usual one, (3) by an unprecedented
criticism of the "immediate" as such.
Now it remains to be seen how such multifarious overturn-
ings offered a golden opportunity for the very last phenome-
nological project of Wittgensteinian thought – this time, a
genuine one.
– III –
To give evidence of the authentically phenomenological
character of the description in Remarks on Colours, let us read
III, § 50: 
"The bucket which I see in front of me is glazed shin-
ing white; it would be absurd to call it "grey" or to say
"I really see a light grey". But it has a shiny highlight
that is far lighter than the rest of its surface part of
which is turned toward the light and part away from
it, without appearing to be differently coloured.
(Appearing, not just being.)"
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The last sentence is touched up in III, § 246 as follows: 
 "But it has a highlight that is far lighter than the rest of its
surface, and because it is round there is a gradual transi-
tion from light to shadow, yet without there seeming to
be a change of colour."
What is here the lesson Wittgenstein is giving us? As far as I
can see, the lesson is the following: 
The bucket appears as it is: if I see it white, it's because I'm
seeing it in its colour (and in its form too) without having to
go through any isolated sheet of "impressions" in causal
sense. For: 
"It is not the same thing to say: the impression of white or
grey comes about under such and such conditions
(causal) and: it is an impression in a certain context of
colours and forms." (I, § 51)
To talk of the perceptive context instead of a supposed
"cause" means that perception has nothing to do with the
classical – say: the Cartesian – "intellect at work", collecting
and interpreting multifarious "sense data", nor with the
Husserlian scheme of composition between "hylè" and "mor-
phè".
Nevertheless the perception always refers to an articulation
internal to what comes into sight. Appearing therefore is now
acknowledged as the measure of being.
The latter conclusion is particularly important for the Wit-
tgensteinian thought. For the perceptive context – in the first
place the "system of colours" – is a logical net, so to speak, in
which our colour concepts are always already inserted. It
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has nothing to do with a "nature" of colours. What is it, then?
The answer is to be found in Zettel, § 358:"It is akin both to
what is arbitrary and to what is not arbitrary". Better to
quote the whole passage: 
"We have a colour system as we have a number system.
Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of
things? How are we to put it? – Not in the nature of num-
bers and colours.
Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes
and no. It is akin to what is arbitrary and to what is
non-arbitrary." (op. cit., §§ 357-358)
What is meant here, in my opinion, has nothing to do with
any pragmatism or relativism whatsoever. Wittgenstein's
thought here is still what it has ever been: mere logic. For he
tries to demonstrate: 
(1) that the system is "arbitrary" in so far as it is deprived of
any rational ground, since its constituent rules do not reflect
anything: neither so-called "immediate data", nor rules
seated beyond the language; 
(2) that the system is "non-arbitrary", because, in spite of the
fact that it can be modified, applications of it, whether they
are real or imaginary, obey "the laws of appearence".
For instance it's a logical law – not an empirical one – that
"white water is inconceivable" (Remarks on colours I, 23), in
the same way in which "we can't imagine four-dimensional
colours, that is, colours which, besides degree of saturation,
hue, and brightness, allowed of a fourth determination."
(Zettel, § 269). 
Now this notion of logical context (or contexture, or even
simply texture) of perception helps us to understand the
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famous statement of Remarks on Colours (III, § 73): "There is
no such thing as the pure colour concept". Such concept
doesn't exist because there is no colourwithout the logical
game appearence is playing with itself. Only in the context
of the rules of this game are we able to find out a determined
identity of colours. Such identity is of course a conceptual
one, there is nothing substantial in it.
Thus, according to the "last" Wittgenstein, the only possibil-
ity for us to bring "phenomenological problems" to a suc-
cessful conclusion (and to avoid being caught in the trap of
substantialism) is to know that description will never meet
with "ultimate elements". If we see phenomenological
description in its true perspective (like in Remarks on
Colours), we must acknowledge that there is neither any
"immediate data" nor any possibility of considering colour
as referring to an undetermined "x". For the very same rea-
son, there isn't anything like "direct and exact description",
nor a fortiori any so-called "objective" description. All those
metaphysical fictions are now replaced by "interpretation".
For visual experience does always involve an interpretation.
I have asserted that Wittgenstein's last conception of phe-
nomenology was a genuine one. As a proof, I might quote
Remarks on Colours: 
"Isn't similar to the fact that we often see a distant object
merely as distant and not as smaller? Thus we cannot say
"I notice that he looks smaller, and I conclude from that
that he is farther away", but rather I notice that he is far-
ther away, without being able to say how I notice it." (III,
§ 171)
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As you have certainly noticed yourselves, this is exactly the
same exemplification as in Philosophical Remarks (§ 72),
except in this particular, that it has been reversed.
I might lay stress on the fact that the very possibility of a
truly phenomenological thought rests on synthetical a priori
being acknowledged. And it too is a reversed process. Let it
be remembered for instance, that Wittgenstein, in an
"addendum" to a conversation with Schlick and Waismann
(Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, "Anti-Husserl", 30. 12.
1929), simply refused to admit synthetic a priori judgement.
At the question of Schlick: "What answer can one give to a
philosopher who believes that the sentences of phenomenol-
ogy are synthetic a priori judgments?", Wittgenstein's answer
is the following: 
"Now suppose the statement 'An object cannot be both
red and green' were a synthetic a priori judgement and
the words 'cannot' meant logical impossibility. Since a
proposition is the negation of its negation, there must
also exist the proposition 'An object can be red and
green'. This proposition would also be synthetic. As a
synthetic proposition it has sense, and this means that the
state of things reprensented by it can obtain. If 'cannot'
means logical impossibility, we therefore reach the conse-
quence that the impossible is possible." 
On the contrary, we read in Lectures on the foundations of
mathematics (1939), that the very same statement: "An object
is not red and green at the same time" is a synthetic a priori
proposition (cf. Lecture XXIV).
Now the last step towards phenomenology in a proper sense
is to take the word "phenomenon" itself in a phenomenolog-
ical sense. This is precisely what Remarks on Colours does, by
putting it as a main principle that "...we can speak of
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appearence alone, or we connect appearence with
appearence" (III, § 232) – "we", that is to say "wephiloso-
phers", as opposed to the psychologists, who only connect
appearence with "reality".
Accordingly, Philosophical Investigations peremptorily
affirms: 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and nei-
ther explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything
lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is
hidden, for example, is of no interest to us." (I, § 126)
and: 
"We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena; our inves-
tigation, however, is not directed towards phenomena,
but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phe-
nomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind
of statement we make about phenomena." (I, § 90)
Thus Wittgenstein revokes his former conception of possibil-
ity as shade of reality, and of grammar as frame of phenom-
ena. That's why we have a right to speak of the "new
thoughts" as a truly phenomenological approach to philo-
sophical questions. A method, not a theory.
At this point we have reached the possibility of comparing
accurately Wittgenstein's achievement with both the Hus-
serlian and the Heideggerian thought. A task which would
take, of course, a long time – too long for me today, anyway.
Just one word on this point, by way of conclusion: In my
opinion, Wittgenstein's phenomenology could fairly free us
from the fundamentalism, in which Husserl has been caught.
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And as for Heidegger, I'm not quite sure he had taken an
exact measure of the risk.
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Comment on Rigal's Paper
The following remarks will deal primarily with questions of
clarity and translation, and only secondarily with questions
of content.
(1) E. Rigal wants to handle the problem "whether some-
thing like a Wittgensteinian phenomenology exists or not."
She writes that "there are in fact two paradigms of what is
called 'phenomenology'", which are irreducible to one
another. Let us call them "phenomenology-1" and "phenom-
enology-2". I take the "there are" in the sense of "there are in
Wittgenstein's writings". Otherwise the question we next
have to face, according to E. Rigal, would make no sense as a
question we have to face: "how are we to state the consistency
of Wittgenstein's thought through his own evolution?".
Now, if we accept that Wittgenstein held both phenomenol-
ogies at different times, say phenomenology-1 at the begin-
ning and phenomenology-2 at the end of his philosophizing
(after 1929), then there arises a question of continuity, but not
of consistency. Only if phenomenology-1 and phenomenol-
ogy-2 are irreducible to one another, and contradictory
would there be a question of consistency.
(2) E. Rigal writes: "In after years, Wittgenstein simply gives
up any idea of pre-established harmony between language
and the world." To give something up at a special time, one
must have accepted it before. To give up any idea of ... pre-
supposes that there are, or could be, more than one. Which
idea was accepted by Wittgenstein, before it was given up
by him? If the idea was that of a philosophical grammar,
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expressing the essence of things, then it is not clear howE.
Rigal could remark that "the project of a philosophical gram-
mar in form of a synopsis" disappeared in Wittgenstein's
later writings in accordance with, for instance, PI § 371:
"Essence is expressed by grammar." (See also PI § 373) If the
idea of a "pre-established harmony between language and
the world" consists of the idea that our use of language is
based on conventional rules (is a rule-following behavior)
and that these rules would not be how they are if the world
were not how it is, then it is also not clear, why this idea is
given up by the late Wittgenstein. It seems that there is more
a continuity, consisting in further development, elaboration,
criticism, etc. of former concepts than a break. Furthermore,
what does "pre-established" mean? Pre-established with
respect to whom, or what? Here some clarification seems to
be necessary in my view.
(3) E. Rigal writes: "All these metaphysical fictions are now
replaced (by Wittgenstein – R.R.) by 'interpretation'. For
visual experience is always involved in an interpretation."
(Note the quotation-marks in the first sentence, and their
absence in the second one.) Then she quotes from Remarks on
Colours (III, § 171): "Isn't it similar to the fact that we often
see a distant object merely as distant and not as smaller?
Thus we cannot say 'I notice that he looks smaller, and I con-
clude from that that he is farther away; but rather I notice
that he is farther away, without being able to say how I
notice it." In my eyes this Wittgensteinian remark is just one
in favour of our not interpreting while making visual experi-
ences. We do not conclude anything, we simply see some-
thing as merely distant. We are not able to say how we notice
that he is farther away. Interpretation, at least in some cases
of the word's use, is characterised by concluding, being able
to say how we come to a special experience, and the like. At
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least at first sight there is here a contradiction in E. Rigal's
remarks that should be clarified.
(4) E. Rigal quotes Remarks on Colours III, § 73: "There is no
such thing as the pure colour concept." She continues: "Such
concept doesn't exist because there is no colour without the
logical game appearance plays with itself." Wittgenstein's
text goes as follows: "There is no such thing as the pure
colour concept." The difference is clear, I think. With the last
sentence it is compatible that there are more than one pure
colour concept. Wittgenstein aside, do there exist one or
more pure colour concept(s)? Of course there are or is such
(a) concept(s), as we see in the example of the sentence "Red
is a pure colour, but grey is not." Wittgenstein's quoted
remark is not denying that we are right in using the phrase
"pure colour" in sentences like this.
(5) Finally a remark on translation. E. Rigal writes that one 
aspect of the difference between Wittgenstein's position in 
1930 and in 1950 was the later repudiation of theory-con-
struction. She quotes a sentence from Philosophical Remarks 
(XXI, § 218) and a passage from Remarks on Colours (I, § 22). 
Whereas in the German original of the latter quotation Wit-
tgenstein really uses the phrase "Theorie der Farben", in the 
German original of the first quotation he uses the word "Far-
benlehre". Both expressions need not have the same mean-
ing, and indeed have not, otherwise the following German 
sentence would be a contradiction: "Die Farbenlehre Goet-
hes ist keine Theorie, sie ist vielmehr der Harmonielehre 
vergleichbar." This sentence is not a contradiction. So Wit-
tgenstein's later remarks on his aim of finding the logic, or 
grammar, of colours (colour-words) need not stand in con-
tradiction to his earlier remarks on his search for a psycho-
logical, or better phenomenological, "Farbenlehre". 
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The Failure of Wittgensteinian Therapy and the 
Philosophical Law of Truth
Wittgenstein wanted to cure us, as philosophers, from our
unilateral and para-scientific cramps that arise when we
strive for certainty in the face of conceptual confusions
(begriffliche Verwirrungen). These confusions are produced
by misunderstandings, by social contradictions, and by the
failure of our communication with others. Our solution is to
seek security by coming to agreement with ourselves, by
reducing the subject-matter of our troubles to a problem of
coherence within ourselves. Thus our problem is reduced to
a psychological one or to a problem of agreement with our
partners which could be produced by argumentation; in
other words philosophically. 
In Wittgenstein's diagnosis this means that we try to find a
theoretical solution for a practical problem. The urge for cer-
tainty by theoretical means cannot but strengthen our con-
ceptual confusions. Therefore, we have to look in another
direction, to another context for our problems: These prob-
lems must be solved within language-games and by the lan-
guage-games themselves without the intervention of our
chronic reflection and cramps. Only then can we recognize
that our social contradictions and our disagreement arise
from the fact of not being able to apply our words to our sit-
uation in order to be aware of what we have to perceive, to
know, to desire, and to do. When we look for a theoretical
solution to these problems, we forget the way language-
games work and become forms of life.It would be enough to
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remind us of the multiple ways language-games work in
order to be able to dissolve these theoretical cramps and to
stop idle thought. The sign that we have succeeded in curing
ourselves would be that we become able to stop this chronic
use of thinking when we want to do so. 
Against this diagnostic and this wishful thinking, I wish to
affirm the following theses: The Wittgensteinian way of
describing the use of language is the only one which dooms
us to be what he wanted to prevent us from being. If we
believe it, we are obliged to privatize our language-game in
such a way that it cannot be cured anymore. It is the only
way which obliges us to let the language-games go idle. The
reason is that we try to do what we are unable to before we
submit ourselves to this therapy. 
The Wittgensteinian therapy is based upon a dynamical
view of language which is both similar to and opposed to
the logical view of language in Tractatus. The concept of lan-
guage-game is founded upon a harmony between words
and perception, words and action and words and desire.
When the language-game is working, this harmony makes
up the consensus with our partners, with ourselves and with
the world. In this way the harmony between our words and
our life is presupposed in much the same way as the logical
harmony between our propositional pictures and the
depicted facts was presupposed. As you may remember, this
presupposition was necessary in order to state the factual
truth of propositions and on this basis to calculate their
molecular truth. But to state those factual truths and to
achieve a complete logical determination of the world, was
impossible. And this mainly for two reasons: First, the facts
of the world – and not the scientists – had to judge the truth
of the elementary propositions. Second, this was only possi-
ble if the world had been completely analyzed. Of course,
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such an analysis couldnever be achieved because we do not
have epistemological criteria which could allow us to iden-
tify the end of analysis. 
Analogically when the language-game is working, it is sup-
posed to produce an agreement between the thoughts or the
words emitted and the phenomena of life which are
"answering" it in the right way. When we are rightly using
our language-game, we have to be the same good listeners to
ourselves that we had to be in the Tractatus as we had to see
the visible answers of confirmation or refutation that the
world was supposed to give. Granted this theory we may
feel that we are able to stop thinking about philosophical
problems; the language-games, when we imagine that they
are functioning as they should, are dissolving them for us.
But this way of escaping our problems can only be achieved
in a psychological sense: It is impossible to find in a magical
way the proper use of language which gives the answer to
our problems of life in a way that assures the agreement
with our social partners and ourselves. The acceptance of
this feeling to be able to stop thinking when we want to, is as
much psychological as the acceptance of the contingency of
the world by the willing subject was. When we accept to be
able to stop thinking, we also accept to be unable to give the
solutions of life that our use of language-games was unable
to give us. Our peace is only psychological, but our prob-
lems remain unsolved. 
Wittgenstein, however, is unable to recognize that these
effects remain psychological and private because he cannot
recognize that his theories are false. Although they are still
good railings against the psychological and private intui-
tions of the cognitivists (as if they could be objective results
of anthropological inquiries), they transform the use of lan-
guage-games and of thought into a psychological short-cir-
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cuited circle of speaking and listening to oneself without the
intervention of reality. My argument is that themetaphysical
and anthropological premisses leading to such an effect are
false and that Wittgenstein was unable both to solve the log-
ical problems of science as well as the philosophical prob-
lems of life because it was impossible for him to realize this.
I will now try to show why. 
Human beings are not endowed with extra-specific instincts
like the other well-formed living beings. A human being is
not programmed to perceive stimuli and to link this percep-
tion to the "right" reactions and answers in order to get the
consummatory actions that it needs. Confronted with the
impossibility of perceiving the world and of answering its
own perceptions in a pre-formed manner, a human being is
obliged to feel itself in a kind of hiatus with the world. It
cannot link its organs of perception with its organs of action,
and, as a consequence, it cannot but feel itself as possessed
by an indeterminate fear, by a phenomenon of anguish. In
order to overcome this anguish, a human being has to learn
a language; that is, it has to use language as an apparatus of
both emitting and receiving sounds and of linking the per-
ceptual apparatus of the ear with the apparatus of action.
The reason is that language – the sounds being simulta-
neously emitted and received – creates the only bridge
between a human being and reality; this means the reality of
the world, the reality of its social partners, and its own real-
ity. 
This adjustment of language to reality (and to perception)
occurs as an adherence to verbal representations endowed
with a cognitive power manifesting itself by the phenome-
non of belief. The adjustment of language to action expresses
itself in the adoption of the intention of acting and the
adjustment of language to consummatory actions manifests
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itself through the identification with desire. When the lan-
guage-game is working, these adjustments are as given as
the world we breathe within. They are therefore nosubject of
reflection. But as soon as the language-game does not work,
beliefs, desires, and intentions disappear. Then it produces a
"social contradiction"; mutual disagreements as well as con-
ceptual confusions following from this situation. In this way
the original hiatus appears again and again. 
But we are still not in a position to understand this situation.
From the metapsychological standpoint (which is common
to users of language and to Wittgenstein) everything looks
as if the use of language can be described in terms of project-
ing sounds towards the world in order to give it meaning
and in order to give meaning to others and to ourselves. A
second step seems to be the following; one has to recognize
the actual occurrence or lack of occurrence of the facts corre-
sponding to our descriptions. One has to recognize oneself
and others as listeners which are in agreement with us as
speakers when our words organize our actions, desires or
feelings. Then one would only have to confirm the agree-
ment with ourselves by the agreement of our words with
reality and with our social partners, because this intersubjec-
tive agreement occurs independently of our will to produce
it and is therefore as objective as the visible world is an
instance of an objective judgement. However, it is not as
simple as this. 
As speakers or thinkers, we cannot recognize the meaning
we give to our words without presupposing and posing the
truth of the proposition which we are thinking. We cannot
identify anything we speak about without thinking our
proposition to be true. Truth is prior to sense or meaning
and is a condition for the use of language. Both Peirce and
Prior have stated; "every proposition affirms its own truth",
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or "to use a proposition is to affirm its truth". Wittgenstein
could not see this point because he believed (like the cogni-
tivists today) that language comes after visual perception
and builds itselfas a copy of perception. But it is the contrary
which is the case; as a living being born one year too early
and as thus being an aborted being, it has to utter sounds in
order to see its environment and in order to do what it does
and what it has to do. 
This priority of truth in what we say and think, implies that
we are not allowed to give the visible facts the power to
judge our proposition instead of judging it ourself. For in
order to affirm a proposition we must think it as true. This
means that we must judge it as true as we have to think it as
a true one in order to be able to think it at all. The occurrence
or non-occurrence of the described facts is not sufficient for
certifying the truth or falsity of our propositions. To know
that snow is white, is to know that for the snow to exist is for
it to be white. If we believe in the priority of the visible facts,
we are obliged to believe that for the snow to be white is for
it to be what it is for the eyes. But we know what snow is if,
and only if, we can identify the specific process of crystalli-
zation which produced the snow and its whiteness. In order
to be able to do that – to identify the snow with this process
– and in order to be able to recognize the truth of the propo-
sition that is describing that, we must think of it as true and
judge that the reality of the snow has among all its appear-
ances one and only one "property" that gives it its existence
(such and such a process of crystallization). 
In Wittgensteinian terms, my point could be put in the fol-
lowing manner: The common logical form between proposi-
tions and facts cannot be something which can be
presupposed as a preexisting harmony. Instead, "the inter-
nal logical form" that Wittgenstein was looking for in the
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Notebooks, is this harmony of objectivity which is posed by
the predication, the use of referring expressions and the
affirmation of the proposition which judges itself as true, as
if it was thought of as a true proposition in order to be
thought at all. But thisinterpretation is excluded by the inter-
pretation Wittgenstein gave of propositions of the kind "Fa".
One can no longer analyze it by writing: "$x (fx) ¨ x=a",
reducing it thereby to a conjunction of the predicate of a
property to an undetermined thing and of the use of the
proper name referring to this thing. By affirming "Fa", we
are indeed affirming the objectivity of the identity which we
are thinking between the thing (we are referring to) and the
mode of existence we are attributing to it by the use of a
predicate. This necessity of judging the truth of our proposi-
tion without being able to found this truth upon preexisting
facts, was declared impossible and "philosophical" by Wit-
tgenstein when he declared that his own propositions were
nonsense. But in doing so he was obliged to judge his own
propositions – as every language-user must do – and to rec-
ognize them as "true", as "definitively true". 
This philosophical judgment was excluded by Wittgenstein.
It is nonetheless what is presupposed in every utterance and
as such is something that nobody can prohibit. Everybody
who utters or thinks a proposition must judge its objectivity
by judging the objectivity of its truth. This law of truth is
valid not only for the cognitive propositions – the so-called
"descriptive" propositions – but also for the prescriptive
ones and for the propositions expressing feelings or mental
states. The time of judgment by which we submit our propo-
sitions to the law of truth is indeed necessary if one wants to
escape this short-circuited use of our phono-auditive sounds
by which we invoke a preexisting agreement with the facts
or with the others as a kind of preexisting auditive echo,
transcendent to every use of language and as such some-
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thing that every picture and every language-game is judged
by. 
By reducing truth to correspondence with facts or to consen-
sus with our social partners and with our life, Wittgenstein
transformed theuse of every proposition into an experience
of confusion or doubt; begriffliche Verwirrung. The reason is
simply that he excluded the only move which allows us to
leave our biological, original and chronic disarray. By
declaring this move a nonsensical one, he could not judge its
objectivity, and for the same reason it was impossible for
him to recognize the falsity of the propositions he had
declared definitively true; that is, his own philosophical
propositions. Thus he was unable to see that this philosophi-
cal move defines our ordinary use of language as well as
every illocutionary speech-act. This move – the philosophi-
cal law of truth – by means of which we judge the truth of
the proposition in order to think it at all, can only be avoided
at the following price: We are necessarily privatizing our
language-games as well as our therapeutical efforts to dis-
solve our cramps. Wittgenstein was indeed unable to judge
the reality of these cramps and for the same reason unable to
judge the objectivity of their dissolution. 
Wittgenstein's denial of the philosophical law of truth
implies not only a privatization of the use of language that is
repeated blindly by his followers. What is more, it gives
every use of language – intended only to be "a move in a lan-
guage-game" – an autistic character. He thereby prohibited
himself and others to speak because he could not under-
stand what happens when we speak; that which is given in
every speech-act, the philosophical use of judgment.
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Comment on Poulain's Paper:
Propositional Truth and Agent's Knowledge
From Poulain's paper several charges against Wittgenstein
can be extracted: Wittgenstein's therapeutic strategy against
conceptual confusions (which allegedly arise when lan-
guage-games go idle)1 is misconceived and turns on his dis-
missal of the theoretical-philosophical moment of judgment
of (universal) truth. In Poulain's view, Wittgenstein's diag-
nosis leads mistakenly to an attempt to show the flies the
way back into the pregiven practical or transcendental set-
up (which has to show itself) and to an exorcising of validity-
claims. This, however, must lead (against Wittgenstein's
own concern) to a privatization of language beyond cure.
Furthermore – and not unconnected – Wittgenstein seems to
disregard the acts of the philosophical subject or interlocutor
quite generally, acts like affirming or judging propositions
(to be true). He misconstrues speech acts, their illocutionary
forces and validity-claims. The pertinent kind of judgement,
Poulain says, "was excluded by Wittgenstein. It is none the
less what is presupposed in every utterance and as such
something that nobody can prohibit. Everybody who utters
or thinks a proposition must judge its objectivity by judging
the objectivity of its truth. This law of truth isvalid not only
1. I take Poulain's reconstruction to something like this: According to Wittgen-
stein "confusions are produced ... by the failure of communication with oth-
ers" and are (traditionally and mistakenly) seen either as a psychological
problem or as a lack of that kind of agreement with our partners "which
could be produced by argumentation, in other words philosophically." To
activate philosophical reflection at this point, however, would be, in Wit-
tgenstein's view, "to find a theoretical solution for a practical problem".
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for the cognitive propositions – the so-called 'descriptive'
propositions – but also for the prescriptive ones and for the
propositions expressing feelings and mental states." 
I think these allegations are hardly warranted as they stand
in Poulain's paper, although they are not quite arbitrary
either. In what follows, I will try to make clear my own view
on these questions, having recourse to Poulain's account. 
1. Logical harmony. Let me start with Wittgenstein's therapeu-
tic ambition (in Philosophical Investigations) and its parallel in
Tractatus, the condemnation of his own statements as sense-
less. According to Poulain, "[t]he Wittgensteinian therapy is
based upon a dynamic view of language which is both simi-
lar to and opposed to the logical view of language devel-
oped in the Tractatus. The concept of language-game is
founded upon a [idea of] harmony between words and per-
ception, words and action and words and desire. When the
language-game is working this harmony makes up the con-
sensus with our partners, with ourselves and with the
world. In this way the harmony between our words and our
life is presupposed in much the same way as the logical har-
mony between our propositional pictures and the depicted
facts was presupposed [in Tractatus]." 
It is true that Wittgenstein postulates a kind of preestab-
lished "harmony" between propositions and facts in Tracta-
tus, a harmony which is indeed a presupposition for truth
(and falsity). But this harmony, viz. the correspondence
between objects and names, and the sameness in logical
form between the world of facts and language, is not so sus-
pect as Poulain suggests. It is, of course, not meant as any
apriori determination of which propositions are, in fact, true.
On the contrary, it is a precondition for propositions' open-
nessand bipolarity as to "yes" and "no". (2.201, 4.023f.) So,
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when Poulain counts as a shortcoming of the Tractatus that it
disregards the judging subject, that "the facts of the world –
and not the scientists – had to judge the truth of the elemen-
tary propositions" (which could at most be done "if the
world had been completely analyzed")2 he is in my view
much too hasty and overlooks that the transcendental "har-
mony" does not compete with the business of science, which
is to ascertain contingent truth, but is its precondition. Of
course we must have it both ways, and according to Tractatus
we do have it both ways: the subject projects a picture (of a
possible state of affairs), asserts a proposition (as true); and
it depend on the world (and in so far the world decides
("judges")) whether the proposition is true. But the transcen-
dental set-up ("harmony") is the precondition for both
"judgements".
It might indeed seem as if Poulain's picture of Wittgenstein
lacks one dimension, such that a certain necessary multiplic-
ity collapses. It overlooks that both in Tractatus and in Philo-
sophical Investigations the "harmony" makes out the logical
frame on the basis of which we can project or claim contin-
gent matters, it is not as such already a true-or-false theory, it
does not compete with science.3 
2. Linguistic harmony. If we turn to the Philosophical Investiga-
tions, the preestablished "harmony" essentially includes a
kind of agreementbetween language-users. The social and
2. Cf. also: "The occurrence or non-occurrence of the described facts is not suffi-
cient for certifying the truth or falsity of our propositions." [The scientific
subject and its judgement is also necessary]
3. The obliteration of the distinction between empirical theory (truth) and tran-
scendental preconditions is, of course, no specialty of Poulain (if he makes
himself guilty of it) but rather a general feature of recent holism, e.g. in
Quine. (Cf. my essay "Die Verabsolutierung des Begriffs der empirischen
Theorie – der Fall Quine" in Böhler/Kuhlman (eds.): Kommunikation und
Reflexion, Suhrkamp 1982.) 
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institutional character of language, its essential non-private
character, is stressed. Poulain links this up with anthropo-
logical considerations clearly reminiscent of Arnold Gehlen.
"Human beings are not endowed with extra-specific
instincts like the other well-formed living beings. A human
being is not programmed to perceive stimuli and to link this
perception to the 'right' reactions and answers in order to get
the consummatory actions that it needs. Confronted with the
impossibility to perceive the world and to answer its own
perceptions in a preformed manner, a human being is
obliged to feel itself in a kind of hiatus with the world. It ...
cannot but feel ... anguish. In order to overcome this
anguish, a human being has to learn a language." The adjust-
ments of language [which mediates between our inner
world, our actions, our social partners and the world] are
normally "no subject of reflection". "When the language-
game is working, these adjustments are given as the world
we breath in. ... But as soon as the language-game does not
work, beliefs, desires and intentions disappear. Then it pro-
duces a 'social contradiction'; mutual disagreements as well
as conceptual confusions following from this situation. In
this way the original hiatus appears again and again."
So far Poulain seems to agree with Wittgenstein (as he pic-
tures him). But then Poulain goes on to announce his dis-
agreement and to show that Wittgenstein misses the remedy
or the only move which can relieve us in this situation: the
law of truth. Wittgenstein misses the role of truth as it is
inescapably involved in acts like affirming "because he
believed ... that language comes after visual perception and
builds itself as a copy of this one. But it is the contrary which
is the case; as a living being born one year too early and as
thus being an aborted being, it has to utter sounds in order
to see its environment and in order to do what it does and
what it has to do." 
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The point seems to be once more that Wittgenstein over-
loads preestablished harmony. Against the Wittgensteinian
recourse to given harmony "in practice" (which may be
threatened by theoretical/philosophical ambitions) Poulain
again and again stresses what he considers to be the decisive
move: the submission of our pictures or moves in language-
games to the obligations deriving from their inescapable
character of being validity-claims. "The moment of judge-
ment by which we submit our propositions to the law of
truth is indeed necessary if one wants to escape [the] short-
circuited use of our phono-auditive sounds by which we
invoke a preexisting agreement with the facts or with the
others as a kind of preexisting auditive echo ..." 
By barring this move, and "reducing truth to the correspon-
dence with facts [Tractatus] or to consensus with our social
partners and with our life [Philosophical Investigations] Wit-
tgenstein ... excluded the only move which allows us to
leave our biological, original and chronic disarray." Wittgen-
stein was "unable to see that this philosophical move defines
our ordinary use of language as well as every illocutionary
speech-act". He neglected or did not understand "what hap-
pens when we speak, what is in act in every speech-act: the
philosophical use of judgement". But, says Poulain, the
philosophical law of truth can only be avoided at the price of
giving every linguistic move an autistic character and of
privatizing whatever efforts we make to reach out toward
others and even our therapeutic efforts to dissolve our
cramps.
3. Alternative or supplement. I feel sympathy with much of
this. There is, however, also the feeling that things are not
sorted out properly and put in their right place (with the
right kind of limitation). Or – again – I feel that Poulain's
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account suffers from a lack ofdifferentiation which may nul-
lify his good points. Let me try to sustain this somewhat.
First, it is not quite easy to say what Poulain's position is
with regard to the "Gehlen" point. At times he obviously
seems to side with it. The way out of man's original (dis-
tressing) "openness" has to pass by (linguistic) socialization
and institutions. This would then be in perfect harmony
with the Wittgensteinian attacks against the illusions of
some kind of sovereign "inner", mental instance (the intend-
ing subject) which is not anchored in and (also) constituted
through the essentially public and "outer" medium of lan-
guage. And this crucial point has of course to be recognized
– as far as it goes. At other times, however, Poulain seems
rather to be stressing a post-conventional (post-traditional)
universalist, anti-rhetorical point, in particular the tran-
scending and idealizing character of validity-claims (say
along Apel-Habermasian lines). 
Now, these two moments are certainly compatible. Indeed,
in my view they both need to be emphasized. The trouble
with Poulain's statement is, however, that when the latter
moment is stressed, it is done in way – or so it looks to me –
which refuses to give Gehlen (i.e. Wittgenstein) his due; the
argument seems to be directed against "Aristotelian" tradi-
tionalism and Gehlenian institutionalism tout court. That is,
it seems to neglect a distinction between what we could call
(the) language-independence of reason "before" and "after"
the advent of language; i.e. between methodic-solipsistic
illusion and post-conventional universalism, or between (the
idea of) "pre-social" subjectivity and (the conception of a lan-
guage-dependent or language-generated) "post-social"
reflexivity.
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So, it is not clear to me what exactly the charge is when it
comes to (Wittgenstein's ideas about) social (linguistic-prac-
tical) harmony andpara-scientific (philosophical-theoretical)
cramps. The phrase "as soon as the language-game does not
work" is e.g. ambiguous, not least on the background of
Gehlen's perspective and Wittgenstein's possible deplorable
"Gehlenianism". Does it mean the (imagined) distressing
primitive state of hiatus "before" language and institutions
("uses") –, or does it mean the situation where the language-
game is indeed working, only that we (in Wittgenstein's
view) are stupid enough, or too lazy, not to stick to it but
rather leave it and take language to some kind of theoretical-
philosophical holiday (§ 38)? Of course we might say – along
with Gehlen – that the difference is not that important, the
important thing is the sting against free-floating intellectual-
ism and the admonition: go back to work! (An attitude
which Poulain wants – or so I believe – to counteract in the
name of "the law of truth".) However, in Poulain's epistemo-
logical context the distinction is important, because he does
not seem content with adding something to the working of
language-games as a logical precondition, completing the
picture, as it were (in this case we could agree to the Wit-
tgensteinian-Gehlenian handling of the primitive state as far
as it goes and only criticize its insufficiency). Poulain seems
to want to replace it. But this throws us back into the primi-
tive "state of nature" and the question: what is Poulain's
alternative to the Wittgensteinian-Gehlenian styling of
human intentional life through institutions and language-
games?   
At this point, strangely enough, Poulain seems to offer the
law of truth as his solution: "The moment of judgement by
which we submit our propositions to the law of truth" –
allegedly neglected by Wittgenstein – seems to be offered as
"the only move which allows us to leave our biological origi-
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nal and chronic disarray". But this is confusing. Firstly, it
claims far too much from the law of truth, and it conflicts
with Poulain's Gehlenianism when we read the remark
made in the beginning that to overcome the original anguish
"ahuman being has to learn a language". Nevertheless Pou-
lain seems to insist, as when he writes: "The common logical
form between propositions and facts cannot be something
which can be presupposed as a preexisting harmony.
Instead ... this harmony of objectivity ... is posed [my empha-
sis, AØ] by the predication, the use of referring expressions
and the affirmation of the proposition which judges itself to
be true ..." It seems, indeed rather clear that Poulain's rem-
edy against the anguish of the "state of nature" is not logical
form or language as a form of life, but the positings or (valid-
ity) claims inherent in human speech acts. This, however,
must be a rather extreme overloading of the illocutionary
force of human statements. It isn't that strong. 
4. Agreement. A further point concerns the notion of agree-
ment and Wittgensteinian therapy. Throughout Poulain's
paper, I have the feeling that he levels the difference
between agreement in opinions and agreement in language
or form of life. At times one has the impression that he wants
to replace "preexisting agreement" of the latter kind with
agreement on truthclaims and other validity-claims. (This
would be a kind of reverse to the move of Heidegger, when
he somehow dismisses the trivial, apophantic "correspon-
dence" truth and favours a notion of emphatic truth, truth as
destiny of being, the advent of which is an "opening up" of a
world (Lichtung, logical space, meaning-universe).4) Or per-
4. My position would be once more that we must have it both ways. The
emphatic notion concerns the preexisting space within which apophantic
truth is possible (and necessary). (Cf. E. Tugendhat: Der Wahrheitsbegriff
bei Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin 1970 and G. Skirbekk: "La vérité chez
Heidegger", in: Rationalité et Modernité, Paris: L'Harmattan 1992)
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haps he rather makes too much out of the Quine-Davidso-
nian denial of the distinction between whatbelongs to
language (meaning) and what depends on matters of fact.5
In any case, we have to distinguish between harmony,
agreement ("Verständigung") as a logical and hermeneutical
presupposition of sense (and thus for the seeking of agreement
through linguistic-argumentative exchange generally), and
harmony, agreement (Verständigung) as a result of discus-
sion etc. The first kind of agreement is a precondition for
that kind of "agreement with our partners which could be
produced by argumentation" as well as a precondition for dis-
agreement. We can have a lot of disagreement of the latter
kind without destroying language (indeed, language is a pre-
condition of disagreement), whereas disagreement at the
first level equals – if Wittgenstein's argument against private
languages is valid – the disappearance of language. 
In PI § 242 Wittgenstein talks about the agreement between
language-users which belongs to linguistic meaning, as an
agreement which is not only an agreement in "definitions"
"but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements." But Wit-
tgenstein does not really by this move obliterate the distinc-
tion between presuppositions for linguistic exchange (what
belongs to the language-game, to the rules, as it were) and
possible results of such exchange. His point does not "abolish
logic". Let us recall § 241: "'So you are saying that human
agreement decides what is true and what is false?' – It is
what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree
in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions
but in form of life."
5. At least from the speaker's point of view this distinction has to be presup-
posed: the speaker uses language to say something. 
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It is, of course, crucial not to abolish the distinction between
linguistic agreement as something (if private languages are
impossible) beyond which there is nothing – i.e. agreement
as something which opens up the "space" in which our opin-
ions move – and on the other hand agreement as synchroni-
zation of opinions, as parallel moves or the like. The first is a
condition for the possibility of having opinions, converging
or diverging, for the very possibility of agreement and dis-
agreement. To overlook this would indeed be to abolish
logic. And it would be to destroy the good sense of Wittgen-
stein's game metaphor: we agree on the (constitutive) rules
of the play – which is a precondition for playing – but within
the play we have options and different players make differ-
ent, opposite moves (we can disagree in our moves in a lot of
ways, even if we may agree in the last resort in our evalua-
tions or judgements on the moves (which ar good and which
are bad)). Of course, we must – and we can have – both
things simultaneously: agreement in language and a vast
variety in what we say. Acceptance of a "law of truth" should
be no problem either. Poulain, however, seems to me to sim-
plify the picture and to put us before a dilemma where both
horns are equally impossible: to accept the logical necessity
of some preestablished – quasi-transcendental? – scaffolding
or harmony (agreement in language) and deny the law of
truth; or to deny the mentioned necessity and having
recourse to the law of truth exclusively. 
True, Wittgenstein says that we follow rules blindly, but this
does not make him an authoritarian conservative which
denies autonomy and the role of argument. The blindness
pertains to the constitutive rules. Even when we follow the
rules of chess blindly, we do not play it blindly (the rules do
not prescribe the play). We do follow the constitutive rules
of the language-game of giving orders (and obeying)
blindly, but we do not give and follow orders blindly (atleast
105
we should not, and Wittgenstein does not claim that we
should). The language-game of asking questions and
answering also has its constitutive rules, which we follow
blindly (when we master the language); but we do not
answer questions blindly, as a rule we try to be truthful. (A
question does in a sense prescribe some answer, but not its
content.)
5. (Cognitive) Acts. As for validity-claims I will not defend
Wittgenstein to the bitter end. I do in fact believe that some-
thing has to be added. Even if there is a considerable
progress in his views on this point from Tractatus to Philo-
sophical Investigations there is something left to be wanted
(which concerns the "law of truth" and which has indeed to
do with Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophy). But let me
confine myself to the mentioned progress. The saying/
showing thesis of Tractatus, according to which the miracle
that language – and we in using language – perform cannot
be said, but has to show itself (in that use). Logical form,
which is common to world and language and which makes
depicting or saying possible, cannot itself be said, i.e.
depicted. But Wittgenstein's attempt to save the transcen-
dental form or limit of the world which makes logical pic-
tures of facts possible from being a depictible fact in the
world, is in a way overdrawn or too radical. 
For one thing, it keeps from being verbalized those "forces"
and acts through which logical pictures are projected. If
"epistemological" verbs (think, say, know ...) have a place at
all in the Tractatus theory, then either purely "transcenden-
tally" in the act of projecting (in the first person, as it were) –
or (in the third person form) as a part of natural science, i.e.
(psychologically) as depicting something happening in the
world (not in logic) (4.11). Thanks to the "either" part one
cannot simply say that truth and the thinking of proposi-
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tions as true do not have a proper "transcendental" role in
theTractatus. (But one can in a sense regret that truth is abso-
lutized and "acts" and forces other than those of describing
states of affairs are suppressed. See below.) But first of all
there is no mediation between what shows itself in the use of
language (in the first person) and what is stated or said in
the third person. In the third person form our thinking and
saying ("A thinks p") has to be analyzed either as illegitimate
sentences of the form "'p' says p" or somehow as (behaviour-
istic?) statements within natural science. This lack of media-
tion would in a sense dissolve our (natural) language into
two languages; one (behaviouristic) observation language –
with associated theoretical language – in which other sub-
jects are depicted – along with the rest of the world, a lan-
guage in which I can say (i.e. depict) what they do and say,
and one language in which I form/ articulate my conscious-
ness (my intentions) and/or my acts and possibly show
myself in colloquy (through my speech acts).
However, perhaps we are not entitled after all to state the
"either" part. Perhaps all we can say is that Wittgenstein – in
talking about the "philosophical" subject – marks the place
where epistemological verbs would belong; that he, in con-
tradistinction to Kant, does not assert that an "I think" has to
accompany all our propositional pictures.6 If we distinguish,
along with the saying-showing-doctrine, between two kinds
of consciousness: consciousness of objects and act-conscious-
ness (Tugendhat, E.: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die
sprachanalytische Philosophie, 1976: 82f.) it is clear that the lat-
6.  We could put it this way: When it comes to verbs for the (spontaneous)
actions of our understanding Wittgenstein does not even provide a room for
an "I think" which has to accompany all my "pictures". But, contrary to Kant,
he does make an attempt to analyze "A thinks p". His analysis can, however,
hardly be accepted. And no wonder if he doesn't succeed; in his perspective
the first person present tense form is lacking!
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ter doesn't really have any language according to the Tracta-
tusconstruction. Rather we must say that an act-constitutive
language is missing in Tractatus. A language, in which the
transcendental (philosophical) I can form its "agent's knowl-
edge" (Ch. Taylor) is left out or somehow reduced to the log-
ical power itself, which directs language – as depicting –
toward the world. (Tractatus 5.54ff.) Maybe this is so, while
the use of language is "one-dimensional" in Tractatus: all act-
forming verbs, which might have differentiated the use of
world-depicting propositions, reduce themselves to this sin-
gle one: the thinking of the sentence meaning (as descrip-
tion), and so such verbs become redundant.7 According to the
picture-theory of Tractatus language reduces itself to the
"p"s, the propositions which depict possible states of affairs
and the facts of the world. The act itself is not articulated,
apart from its pictural content. 
All of this is thoroughly amended in Wittgenstein's later phi-
losophy. The ("transcendental"-act-)monism of Tractatus is
exploded. We are now told that there is no fundamental
canonical logical form (or force), but a multitude of kinds
("countless" kinds says Wittgenstein). Acts and act-verbs are
now abundant, and first of all, he now envisages a (anti-Car-
tesian and anti-Kantian) mediation between the performativ-
expressive act-constituting use of verbs in the first person
(which do not depict the act) and depicting non-first-person-
present-tense uses which say who does what. The "doctrine
of showing" certainly recurs somehow in Philosophical Inves-
tigations too, but it is now a matter of course that act-verbs
have a role in the first person present tense as act-constitut-
ing forms of consciousness, most conspicuously as perfor-
7.  That is, one could imagine at least a distinction between "I think (assert,
judge) that p" and "I consider (hypothetically) that p" corresponding to the
distinction between states of affairs (Sachverhalte) and facts (Tatsachen).
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mative or expressive utterings in language-games, as well as
descriptive roles. We can link this up with Wittenstein's new
theory of the constitution of "psychological" verbphrases
generally. These predicates (their meanings) are now con-
ceived of as having essentially two roots. Accordingly, "A
thinks that p" is now treated quite differently from what it
was in the analysis of the Tractatus. In Tractatus it was inter-
preted as an illegitimate statement which tries to say what
cannot be said but has to show itself. Now, the first person
perspective (the "own case", including the performative
intention-in-action: "I think that p" (the thinking of p)) and
the third person perspective (including observation of think-
ing and speaking people) are both considered as necessary
for the meaning of the verb. 
To sum this up: Substitution of the first person must be pos-
sible (against objectivism/scientism), declination must be
possible (against dualism) and paralogisms must (and can)
be avoided! 
A last word: I still think that Poulain is right in claiming that
there are some deficiencies in point of universalism in (the
later) Wittgenstein. 
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Words and Objects
I shall talk about words and objects, but at some point it will
turn out that I have also been talking about concepts and
practices. The concepts and practices I will be talking about,
will be the concepts and practices of practical work. I shall
be doing so by discussing one example at some length, and
since I have spent the last two months in a fishing village in
Northern Norway, trying to learn about the world of coastal
fishing, I shall take my example from that world. But the
scenes I describe are drawn from my first visit to a fishing
village, several years ago. And the one long conversation is a
construction out of several short ones.
A short exchange
It's a winter morning in a fishing village in Lofoten. There is
a gale blowing and it is ten o'clock. I have just come to the
place to try to capture the gray winter light with my camera,
following in the footsteps of Matti Saanio, in a humble way.
I am not a photographer. I am a philosopher and a towns-
man, and I know very little about fishing villages, except
that there is where most of our coastal fishermen live, that
most of them fish from boats less than 40 foot long, and that
their catches are processed in the village. The drying racks
are to be seen all over the place. I also know that the fisher-
men leave the village harbour early in the morning and
return with their catches late in the afternoon or early in the
evening. And that is about all I know about fishing villages.
 I am in the village shop buying some bread and a few other
articles that I shall need for the next couple of days. While I
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am about to pay for my purchases, an old man manouvres
into the shop, fighting with the gale about the door. Walking
towards the counter, he darts a quick glance at the dog lying
in the corner, wagging its tail at him, and addresses the
shopkeeper: 
– I see Fidel is already in.
– Yes, it had its mast broken the other night.
– So that was Fidel.
And that is all. What do I make of the short exchange
between the old man and the shopkeeper? I take it stepwise,
as I hear it, bracketing the second remark while working on
the first, etc.
I see Fidel is already in. Who is Fidel? Is it the dog? I noticed
that the old man took notice of the dog before he spoke. And
what he then said, did seem to have been drawn upon some
observation that he had just made. If Fidel is that dog, then
that dog does not usually appear in the shop until after 10
o'clock. But Fidel is also a man's name. A few sixty-eighters
called their sons and daughters after the revolutionary
heroes, such as Fidel, Rosa, etc. So Fidel may well be a young
fisherman that the old man had observed between the
houses on his way to the shop, a great many hours before
any fisherman should be in. But a fisherman will not be back
in the harbour before his boat is back in the harbour, so Fidel
might also be the name of a boat. Whatever "Fidel" is the
name of, be it animate or inanimate, it is the name of some
individual mobile something, the has come in, wherever in
is, from some place without, wherever out is, and has done
so somewhat sooner than expected.
That's all the old man's remark tells me. There is more to be
read from the remark about the situation between the old
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man and the shopkeeper, but not, I think, about whatever
the two of them are talking about.
Not knowing who or what the proper name "Fidel" refers to
does not perhaps count as not understanding the remark.
But it is not only that I have not as yet identified the bearer
of that name. I do not even know whether it is the name of a
dog, a man, a boat, or what. And not knowing that is an
obstacle to knowing what division between in and without
the remark draws on, and therefore also to knowing what
manner of movement the movement from without to in is.
And not knowing either does count as not understanding
the remark, or as not quite understanding it.
Yes, it had its mast broken the other night. Fidel must be a boat.
Of all the mobile objects that I know of, only boats have
masts. Sailing boats certainly have masts, but so do many
motor boats and most fishing boats, for whatever reason. So
the boat Fidel had its one mast broken the other night, and
that is why it has come in sooner than expected. And so the har-
bour is probably the place where Fidel is already in, and with-
out is the sea, or more accurately the village fishing grounds,
if Fidel is a fishing boat.
The shopkeeper seems to have heard a question in the old
man's remark: "I see Fidel is already in. Do you know why?"
The shopkeeper knows why and tells him: "Because it had its
mast broken the other night."
But if Fidel is a motor boat, which it most certainly is at this
time and place of the year, why should having its mast bro-
ken be a reason for breaking its schedule, whatever that
schedule was, and head for the harbour? There obviously
was a schedule of some sort, be it a timetable, if it is a ferry,
the regularities of the working day,if it is a fishing boat, or
what. But why break it for a broken mast, when the boat is
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driven by engine? I see no connections. I cannot make head
or tail of it, though I understand that the boat Fidel had its
mast broken the other night.
So that was Fidel. I take it that the old man has already heard
that a boat had had its mast broken the other night, but that
he hadn't been told until now that it was Fidel. Which
implies that the old man has not himself seen Fidel in the
harbour this morning, or at least not enough of it to see its
broken mast. But his first remark did present itself as being
based on some observation of his own. What he has seen,
then, is either just enough of Fidel to identify it as Fidel, or
Fidel's owner, about in the village at this unlikely time of the
day.
And that is about as far as I come, trying my very best.
I understand each of the three remarks of this short
exchange. If I did not quite understand the first remark until
I had heard the second, I certainly did upon hearing the sec-
ond. I know what the talk is about, the boat Fidel, and I
understand what is being said about it. There is no single
word or phrase, in any of the three remarks, that I do not
understand well, and the grammar of each one of them is
equally perspicuous. And should there be more to the
understanding of a remark, something that cannot be
pinned down to grammar or vocabulary, then that some-
thing more will surely be present in my ability to translate it
into some other language that I also know well. I do not
know that I had any trouble, with either of the three
remarks, in translating it from Norwegian into English.
And yet I cannot make head or tail of the exchange. What is
it that I cannot make head or tail of? I understand that the
shopkeeper's remark is in answer to (what I understand he
understands to be) theold man's implied question. I under-
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stand that the old man is enlightened by that answer and so,
unless he be a fool, that it does answer his question. It is only
that I myself do not see how it does so, that is, how it
explains why Fidel is already in, and a great many hours
before schedule, if Fidel is a fishing boat. (Fidel had had its
mast broken the other night. So, if Fidel is a fishing boat, it
had been heading for the fishing grounds this very morning,
with a broken mast – before it returned because of the bro-
ken mast. Either Fidel is not a fishing boat or I am quite lost.)
Remarks and explanations
We should perhaps make a cut between the remark and the
explanation and say that I understand the remark but not
the explanation (that it gives). The remark that I understand
is "Fidel had its mast broken the other night." (I take it to be a
wooden mast, and not an aluminum one, since it is said to
have been broken, not bent. And I take it that it broke at some
vital point, and not for example 5 cm. below the top, with
only ornamental consequences. That it is a wooden mast,
and that it broke at some vital point, I count as parts of what
I understand when I understand the remark.) The explana-
tion that I do not understand is what that remark implies (or
what that remark being given in reply to the old man's
implied question implies): that is why Fidel had to head for the
harbour. And here it is the that is why bit that I do not under-
stand, whereas the old man does. But what I do not under-
stand, then, is not those very words, "that is why", or
"therefore", or "so", etc., but what it is about Fidel, or about
fishing boats, or about ferries, or about boats, or about what-
ever, that makes it necessary, or wise, or at least intelligible,
that having had its mast broken, Fidel should head for the
harbour.
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So it is my knowledge of the world that is somewhat lacking,
not my mastery of my own language. There is consolation in
that, because that short exchange turned out to be only the
first of a series of exchanges, between villagers, that I could
not make head or tail of. Though I am quite sure that I could
have produced a good translation of every single remark of
each one of the exchanges.
The cut between (our understanding of) remarks and (our
understanding of) explanations seems to parallel the cut
between (our knowledge of) language and (our knowledge
of) the world. As a speaker of my own language I under-
stand the remarks made in it, not any and every remark, but
any remark made in everyday language, with only everyday
words in it. But when a remark is made in explanation of
something, then I shall not understand the explanation
unless I am knowledgeable about those affairs of the world
that the explanation draws on. So it seems that explanations
make up no part of what I understand when I understand
what is said in my own language. Understanding explana-
tions is no part of what I learn when I learn to speak. But in
learning about the affairs of the world I also learn to explain
and to understand the explanations that others give, as
much of it, that is, as i have learnt about the affairs of the
world. Learning to speak, though it prepares us for the
affairs of the world, is something else. Or so it seems. But is
it so?
The basic question of the philosophy of language can be
framed like this: What is it that we learn when we learn to
speak? (What makes the voices that we are surrounded with,
as infants, come alive as talk? What prepares us for that?
And for what does it prepare us? I see the whole of Wittgen-
stein's Philosophische Untersuchungen as being addressed to
that question.) I shall ask a less basic question. When we
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have learnt to speak, part of what we have learnt is tomaster
a stock of everyday words. My question is: When we have
learnt to master this or that everyday word, what is it that
we have then learnt? That is, what is it that we master when
we master a word? I shall only talk about words that refer to
objects, in the simple sense of solid objects, though what I
say about such words will have implications for any word
that can be said to refer to something, be it an object, an
action, an activity, a situation, an institution, etc. My exam-
ples will be of words that refer to artifacts, whether complete
artifacts, such as a boat, or incomplete artifacts, such as a
mast or a rudder.
One very everyday word of the fishing village is the word
"boat". And the boat that is closest to the 8 or 10 year old
child is the rowing boat. That's the boat that it can handle all
by itself. What has the child learnt when it has learnt to mas-
ter the word "rowing boat"? It has, for example, learnt to
handle that word as a substantive, whatever it is that it has
then learnt. It has learnt to distinguish rowing boats from
boats that are not rowing boats, and also from rafts, which
are not boats, but float on water and high enough to carry
people or cargo. That is, the child has learnt to recognize
rowing boats, those objects, as the objects that we call "row-
ing boats". Or (is that the same?) it has learnt to use the word
"rowing boat" to refer to such boats and to such boats only.
How does the child recognize a rowing boat when it sees
one? By its shape, perhaps, or by its shape being one of three
or four distinct shapes. But its shape, then, is not simply the
shape of the hull, but also its being equipped with thwarts
and rowlocks, at least two of them, one for each oar, and two
tholepins for each rowlock. That's how the child tells that it
is a rowing boat. Saying that, I take it that the two rowlocks
are properly placed relative to the each other, that the pair of
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rowlocks are properly placed relative to the thwart, andthat
the arrangement of thwart and rowlocks is properly placed
within the frame of the hull. And "properly placed" now
means: placed so as to make the boat fit for rowing, with the
rower seated on the thwart, each of his two hands on each of
the two oars, the oars on place in the rowlocks, etc. So in the
child's (or in our) preception of the rowing boat as a rowing
boat, with the oarlocks etc. in their proper places, there is an
understanding of what it is to row it, and of what it takes to
row it.
There is a stage in the building of a rowing boat, where the
hull has been completed, but where it has not as yet been fit-
ted with thwarts, rowlocks, etc.. That is, the hull has been
completed but not the rowing boat, since it cannot as yet be
rown. That is, the child who masters the word "rowing
boat", has not only learnt to distinguish rowing boats from
other boats, but also to distinguish complete or completed
rowing boats from rowing boats that still lack some equip-
ment before it can be rown.
In the child's, and in our, perception of the rowing boat there
is an understanding of what it is to row. But there is more to
that than understanding how the thwart, the rowlocks, etc.,
are placed to fit the rower's rowing. There is also this, that if
you loose your oars, you cannot row. If the foremost thol-
epin breaks, you cannot row. If the thwart is not there, row-
ing will at least be awkward, in calm weather, and
impossible in rough weather. If there is a hole in the hull,
below the water line, the boat will not sink, if it is a wooden
boat, but it will be impossible to row. All this, and more,
enter into our understanding of what a rowing boat is, and
so order our perception of it, or make us perceive the order
that there is to it.
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To master the word "rowing boat" is to apply that word
right, and that implies recognizing a rowing boat when you
see one. That, inturn, implies recognizing the order that
there is to it, or enough of it to see that it is in order, ready
for rowing, or that it is not in order and not ready for row-
ing. And the order that I have sketched, if only a fraction of
the order that a boatbuilder could tell us about, is perhaps
enough for that recognition. It is also enough to make us
understand that the recognition of that order is also the rec-
ognition of a great many possibilities of explanation. If the
rowing boat is in order, it projects the possibility of what-
ever action or activity that it takes a rowing boat to execute.
If it is not in order, some or all of those projections will be
severed, depending on the way in which it is not in order.
And the recognition of those projections, or of those severed
projections, is built into our recognition of a rowing boat as a
rowing boat, and so into our mastery of the word "rowing
boat", and so into our understanding of remarks where that
word is applied.
For example, if someone says, speaking about a particular
boat, "Two of the tholepins broke", or "... are broken", then, if
you understand that remark, you also understand that (with
the appropriate context supplied) it works as an explanation
of either of these situations: The boat came adrift. Peter had
to come to the rescue. John is making a new pair of thol-
epins. Peter could not join the regatta. John had to ring Mary
to tell her he would be an hour late. Etc., etc.
In learning to master this or that word, we also learn to rec-
ognize the object that the word refers to. If that object is an
artefact, but not perhaps a work of art, recognizing that
object involves recognizing its place in our activities and
what that place requires of it as to its material and design.
An oar is not simply a wooden pole that is broadened and
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flattened towards one end. It is one of a pair, and the pair of
them is for rowing with, in a rowing boat. It is only when
you know what rowing is and how it is done that you know
enoughof what an oar is to recognize an oar when you see
one. And then you also know enough to understand that a
child may be too week to handle the oars, that if one oar is
lacking you cannot row, that a non-swimmer may keep
afloat with one oar under each armpit, etc. That is, if you
master the word "oar", you also know enough about oars to
make them enter into explanations of this or that.
The distinction between understanding a remark, simplic-
iter, and understanding the explanation that it gives, still
holds. For example, I still do not understand the explanation
that the shopkeeper gave, though I understand his remark
(the remark that, in that exchange, is that explanation). The
parallel distinction between language and the world also
holds, for example in the simple sense that the word "rowing
boat" is not at rowing boat, that the word "oar" is not an oar,
that the remark "One oar is missing" is not itself the situation
it describes, etc. But the distinction is not a distinction
between two distinct realms, so that we may be at home in
one without being at home in the other. We make ourselves
at home in language through making ourselves at home in
the world. And we learn to explain as we learn to speak. The
common understanding that lies beneath our common lan-
guage is not only a common understanding of the rules of
language. It is also a common understanding of the way the
world works. That is what the rules of language attach to.
A word and its object
A couple of days after the short exchange, I was still in the
village, I came across an advertisement in a newspaper that
might well be called a "coastal newspaper". Not only is it
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printed in a coastal town, it also addresses itself mainly to
coastal matters. The advertisement  caught my eyes because
it displayed the name of some object in large, capital letters
and a picture of that object underneath. 
That is how I used to picture objects
and their names, the objects below
and the names above, and the
arrangement showing which object
belongs to which name. 
The advertisement is an offer, from
some firm or workshop, to make a cer-
tain article upon request and cut to
measure. The word naming the article
is "MESAN", and the picture under-
neath that word is a picture of a
MESAN. But now I am really only
deleting the quotes from the word
naming the word to arrive at the word
naming the object (that that word
names). I really do not know what a
MESAN is, and the picture of it does
not help me a lot.
I had not come across this advertise-
ment, or this word even, in any of our
national newspapers. So I took it that
the word "MESAN" is a word of the
coast. And wanting to learn about the
coast, I set myself the task of learning
that one word, that is, of learning
what object it refers to. It is my experi-
ence that learning one thing well gives
you knowledge of many things. And
it does not matter much where you begin. 
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My question is not: What does the word "MESAN" mean?
But: What is a MESAN? That is the more natural question.
And at least with words that refer to objects, I do not think
there is anything to the first question that an answer to the
second question does not answer.
Though the word "MESAN" does not occur in the short
exchange between the old man and the shopkeeper, it
turned out that when I had learnt that word I understood
how the shopkeeper's remark answered the old man's ques-
tion, and I understood it because I had learnt that word. So a
word may well be operative in a remark without occurring
there.
Let us see what the text together with the picture can tell us
about what a MESAN is. The heading is a question: "Do you
need a new MESAN?" Then there is the picture, and it is the
black, trapezoid shape that is the picture of a MESAN. 
The arrows belong to the text. But all that that black, trape-
zoid shape tells us about a MESAN, is that it is a (black?)
trapezoid shape of something, with that angle to that corner
of it. It says nothing about the material of the thing and
nothing about its size or sizes. Is the picture drawn in the
scale 1: 1, 1: 100, or what? But the question "Do you need a
new MESAN?" does indicate that, whatever the thing is, it is
subject to wear and tear.
The text below the picture, the first eight lines, says: Order
now – for delivery when it suits you. First class workman-
ship. Made in extra strong, plastic covered nylon cloth. Stays
soft in cold weather. Write down the measurements and
send the advertisement to us, with your name and address.
(The next seven lines of text tell us what else the firm JOH.
LØVOLD can do for us.)
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This text tells us that the thing comes in different sizes, but it
does not give us the scope of variation. Or is the thing a
MESAN whatever the size? The material is nylon cloth, plas-
tic covered nylon cloth. Can it come in other material and
still be a MESAN? We are told that with that material the
MESAN stays soft in cold weather. So I take it that staying
soft in cold weather is a requirement, or at least a virtue.
And likewise with the extra strong cloth. But then, perhaps,
whatever strong or extra strong cloth that stays soft in cold
weather will do. But what is strong or extra strong cloth? A
strong thread for sowing may be weaker than a rope that is
too weak for climbing. So what counts as a strong cloth
depends on what sort of wear and tear a MESAN is sub-
jected to. And that we do not know. Except that its staying
soft in cold weather indicates that its use is out-of-doors.
There is a practical air about the advertisement, in particular
to the wear and tear bits: extra strong cloth, stays soft in cold
weather. So I take it that a MESAN is a practical thing, for
practical use. In that case its shape is not simply a geometric
shape, that can be folded around any of its edges, or turned
any number of degrees around any one of its points, without
loosing any of its properties. It is a practical shape, that is, it
is an oriented shape, that perhaps looses all of its non-geo-
metrical properties upon any such transformation. If so, that
oriented shape does look like a sail, and everything that is
said about the MESAN, in the advertisement, fits well with
its being a sail. But it does not look like the sails I have seen
on the sailboats in the town habour. They are, all of them,
rightangled triangles. It looks like a sail from a picture book
of nineteenth century sailing crafts. There are a few such
sailing crafts still around, but probably less than 10 in the
whole of Northern Norway, and most of them are owned by
nautical museums, who will have their own sailmaker.
There can be no market for sails for old sailing crafts, and if
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there isno market for them, they don't exist in the market.
And there will be no advertisements offering such product.
When it comes to the making of the more utilitarian artifacts,
such as sails, we should add a fifth cause to Aristotle's four:
the market. Such things will not be brought into existence if
there is no market for them.
And that is about as far as I come, trying my very best. A
MESAN is a trapezoid cloth, a trapezoid of the form shown
in the picture, made for some practical use, probably out-of-
doors.
It looks like at sail for a nineteenth century sailing craft, but
being in production and being advertised, it cannot be that.
But if it isn't I don't know what it is.
So, mustering my scattered bits of knowledge has not
enabled me to identify the thing that the word "MESAN"
refers to. It has brought me to an impasse, as did my attempt
to understand the short exchange.
Learning about the object
I cut out the advertisement and pocketed it in my wallet.
That same evening I found the old man from the short
exchange at a table in the coffee house, and I ventured to
approach him about the advertisement. He had seen me
around with the camera, he told me, and asked what I was
doing in life and in the village. I told him, and learnt that he
had just pensioned himself off as the skipper of 78 foot net-
boat. I also learnt that his youngest son had taken over and
that his two older sons already had their own boat.
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– I don't know what philosophy is, but I do know what a
MESAN is. What do you know about fishing boats?
– Not much.
– But you have seen one?
– Yes. I have not been down to the harbour here, but I have seen
fishing boats.
– Do you think you could draw one?
He was asking me to show him what I had seen, or what I
thought I had seen. I produced my pen and drew a picture
on the white space of a newspaper. Like this: 
– All right. That's an old type but still around, with the wheel-
house aft. There is the bent exhaust-pipe coming through its
roof, and the wheelhouse-door to the starboard, so you cannot
see it from here. And the cabin cap is placed before the mast.
But that mast, that's roughly where one-masted sailboats have
their one mast. If a fishing boat has a foremast, it has two mast,
because it always has a mast aft. Also the foremast, if there is a
foremast, will be placed on top of the cabin cap, which has a
very strong frame for that very reason. That gives you a better
working space.
 The old man then drew it like this: 
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– That's the boat you have seen.
– You are right. Now that you have drawn it, I remember.
– Yes, except I haven't drawn the necessary stays, and only one
of the necessary ropes. But now that you remember what a
fishing boat looks like, I shall draw you a MESAN.
– We already have a drawing of it.
– Right, but that tells you only what it looks like, not what it is. 
– All you can draw is what it looks like.
– Let me show you. We begin with a line for the sea and then we
place a fishing boat in it, but one of the more recent types this
time, with a fore wheelhouse and an aft mast only. Like this: 
The wheelhouse has been built in one piece with the
cabin roof, and that one piece is made of aluminum. The
hull is of wood and so is the mast and its two beams. This
boat is, let us say, about 24 foot long, and it is easily han-
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dled by one man alone. It is a very common type around
here. I am sure you recognize the MESAN.
– So a MESAN is a sail.
– Of a sort, yes.
– But why does an engine-driven boat need a sail?
– Well, the MESAN is not for sailing. With only one sail and in
that position, there isn't much you can do, sailingwise.
– I am afraid you have me confused. I know now that a
MEASAN is a sail, or a sail "of a sort" as you said. So it needs a
mast and a couple of beams. I can also see the point of two of
the ropes. The upper short rope is to hold the upper beam in
position, and the long rope is to hold the lower beam in posi-
tion. 
– The lower short rope is to fasten the lower beam to the stern.
Without that rope, the lower beam would be swinging to and
fro, sidewise, as the wind blows, and the whole construction
would be of no use.
– That's what confuses me. If that sail is not for sailing then what
is the use of that whole construction?
– Remember this is a fishing boat, and it lies still when fishing.
Say there is a strong breeze blowing, and that's still fair
weather, but it's enough to turn your boat sideways as soon as
you stop to fish, if you have no MESAN. And lying side-ways
to the waves, there will be a great deal of sideways rolling,
which makes for quite uncomfortable fishing, even if it's only a
strong breeze.
– That I understand.
– Perhaps you do. Think of yourself seated at your writing desk
writing a letter, but with the floor and everything on it heav-
ing to and fro. That's about the situation of the fisher-man at
work in a strong breeze without a MESAN.
– Then he better not be without it. But how does it help?
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– I'm not quite sure how it does it, but I know what it does. It
prevents the waves from turning the boat sideways.
– Is it the waves that do it? I thought it was the wind, the strong
breeze.
– It's the waves, helped by the wind. We use the same words,
"strong breeze", "small gale", etc., to describe both the force of
the wind and the size and manner of the waves. In fact, it's
from the manner of the waves that we read off the force of the
wind. When there are strong breeze waves, there is a strong
breeze wind. In the old days, in the days of the sailing boats, it
was the force of the wind that was important. Nowadays, with
boats like this, it is the manner of the waves that matters. So I
don't know why we still speak about reading off the wind
from the waves.
– Thank you, you just gave me a fine example.
– I'm not sure that I know what I gave you a fine example of, but
you are welcome to it.
– But how does the MESAN prevent the waves from turning the
boat sideways?
– When you stop to fish, or when you are about to do so, you
point the boat straight against the wind and the waves. The
bow will then cleave the waves and they will affect the boat
the same on each side of it. With the boat in that position, the
wind will just pass the MESAN on each side of it. Like this: 
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As the effect on the boat, by the waves, is only roughly
the same on each side of it, the boat will soon be turned
towards one side or the other. And as the boat is turned
towards one side, the MESAN will be edged into the
wind, so that there will be a weather side to it and a lee
side. Like this: 
And now comes the bit I'm not sure about. Some say that
the wind on the weather side will push the MESAN back
again and so turn the boat up against the wind. Remem-
ber that the MESAN is held in a fixed position. This is the
explanation that I understand, and well enough to see
that that is not how it works. If this were the true story,
the MESAN should have been made of cardboard, that
stays flat, and not of cloth, that curves and so weakens
the pushing of the wind. It is not the pushing that
straightens the boat, though it does slow down its turn-
ing towards sideways. The other story is about pulling
rather than pushing. It tells us that the wind rushing
along the lee side of the MESAN creates a vacuum there,
which sucks the MESAN towards lee, and so turns the
boat up against the waves again. The way the boat sud-
denly gains momentum and straightens itself fits well
with this story. The trouble about it is that I don't quite
understand it. If a "vacuum" means no air or very little
air, I don't understand how that can come about. So there
you are. The story that I don't believe in, that's the one I
understand. And the story I believe in, that's the story I
don't understand. 
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But whatever the explanation, this movement to and fro
will go on for as long as you are lying still, but with the
MESAN up the boat will always straighten itself and
never be brought into the very awkward sideways posi-
tion. 
– That story about the vacuum on the lee side, that's the story I
have been told about sailing against the wind. Like you, I don't
quite understand it, but the man who tried to instruct me is
very knowledgeable about such matters. So the MESAN is a
sail after all. At least it works as a sail each time it straightens
the boat.
– Yes, it works as a sail for a few seconds, and then again five
minutes later, and so on. That's why I spoke of it as a sail "of a
sort". And now you know what a MESAN is, don't you? The
English word, by the way, is "mizzen".
– Yes, now I know what a mizzen is. You have taught me thor-
oughly. I have one more question though, if you permit me.
– Go ahead.
– When the boat stops to lie still, will it not then be driven back-
wards by the wind and the waves? And the more so since the
mizzen prevents it from being turned sideways?
– It's the boat that you stop, not the engine. The propeller is still
working, just enough to keep the boat in position.
– Thank you. I now see what the contribution of the mizzen is,
to this type of fishing. The engine, or the propeller, keeps the
boat in position, while the mizzen secures the boat's orienta-
tion in that position, so that it will keep its bow headed against
the waves, or roughly so.
– Right. And without a mizzen, fishing will not only be uncom-
fortable, it will be dangerous, and certainly in a gale. You were
in the shop yesterday, when I asked the shopkeeper about
Fidel. May I ask if you understood our short exchange.
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– I understood every word of it and yet I couldn't make head or
tail of it.
– I thought perhaps that was so. I have noticed that townspeople
often know less than eight year old children about fishing and
fishing boats, less than eight year old children of a fishing vil-
lage, I mean. And so often you don't understand the simplest
remark about such matters.
– So it is.
– It must be quite strange to hear your own language spoken
and not understand it. In my youth, I worked on a Scottish
netboat from Ayr. I didn't know five words of English when I
first came on board, but two weeks later I was a native speaker
of netboat-English, I mean the English that you speak when
working on a netboat. When we were seated in the mess room,
and not working, the talk could be about anything and every-
thing, and then I was lost, for a long time. But not on deck. For
the same first two weeks we had man from Glasgow on board,
as a tourist. He was a bank clerk, if I remember rightly. He was
often on deck, standing aside so as not to be in the way, but
looking at us working. I wonder what he saw. I should have
liked to hear him try to describe it, though he couldn't have
done so in netboat English. He told the skipper that he
couldn't make head or tail of what we were saying. That was
on his first day, but he wasn't much better off on his last day.
Of course we didn't have time to teach him, but then I didn't
receive any instruction either. So there he was, among his own
countrymen, and after two weeks he still didn't understand
much of what we were saying, while on deck, working. I have
thought about that. What I think is that you cannot learn the
name of a thing if you don't know the thing it is the name of.
He knew nothing about the gear and how to work it, and so he
didn't know what our words were about, or what there was to
say. I knew the gear and the work as soon as I set my eyes on
the deck. A Scottish netboat is not so different from a Norwe-
gian netboat, not on the West coast of Scotland it isn't. So I
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knew what there was for the words to be about and what there
was to say. I didn't know one English netboat word when I
first came on board, but they rushed into their right places as
soon as I heard them spoken. At least, thatis how I remember
it now. When I was told to do something, to tighten a rope, to
look up for something, etc. I knew at once what I was told to
do, or not to do. It would have worked as well had they said
"hey" each time. But then I wouldn't have learnt the language.
– You said you didn't know what philosophy is. You have just
given a lecture in philosophy. And a fine lecture it was, you
don't mind my saying so.
– I don't mind. I enjoy talking to people who enjoy listening.
When I come home, I shall read what my dictionary says
about philosophy.
– If it says anything about the philosophy of language, then that
is what you have lectured on, with that story about you and
the bank clerk.
– Well, I have met a few bank clerks since then. You are only the
last in a long series. I sometimes feel like that bank clerk
myself, when I listen to the young people talking.
– I am a little less of a bank clerk now than before you explained
the mizzen to me. Now that I know what a mizzen is, I under-
stand why Fidel had to return to harbour before time. There
was a gale yesterday. But why did Fidel set out for the fishing
grounds in the first place, with a broken mast?
– I am not sure why he did it, but there was no gale when he set
out, at 6 o'clock, only a moderate breeze. The gale blew up all
of a sudden around 8 o'clock.
At this point, but only at this point, did I congratulate myself
upon having understood, at last, the short exchange from
the day before. My understanding of what it is to fish in a
gale, in a 24 foot boat, and alone, was still somewhat lacking.
131
But I counted my understanding of that particular exchange
as complete.
To honour my teacher, the only gesture at hand, in that cof-
fee house, was to offer him another cup of coffee. But two
weeks later I was able to send him a few of my twilight pic-
tures from that fishing village, together with two lucky shots
of Fidel's mizzen at work in a gale, as seen from its weather
side.
Concluding remarks
When Arild Utaker asked me to talk to this seminar, he also
told me that he wanted me to expand on a particular point
that I make in the essay The two Landscapes of Northern Nor-
way (Inquiry; no.3, 1988) I make that point in examining the
constitution of the concept of a natural harbour, or perhaps of
that object. The concept of a natural harbour is the concept of
a particular landscape formation, like the concept of an
island, or that of a bay, but it is not quite on a par with them.
Whereas we can teach someone the concept of an island by
pointing to a few islands, and to a few non-islands such as
promontories and skerries, we cannot teach someone the
concept of a natural harbour without introducing ships and
boats. In a world where there are no boats, or only boats that
can easily be drawn ashore by their own crews, there is
nothing to yield the concept of a harbour. Though nothing is
lacking of that which, in our world, goes to make up so
many natural harbours.
After a short discussion of the concept of a natural harbour, I
write, in The Two Landscapes: 
The method of investigating the concept of a harbour,
therefore, is this: Situate yourself within the practice
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that this object belongs to, and then investigate the
object and its contribution to that practice.
 .............
Of a word that refers to such an object, there is not
much to say beyond that it refers to that object, point-
ing to it.
I apologize for quoting from my own writing, but those are
the lines that Arild Utaker wanted me to expand on.
As I understand myself, I have already complied with Arild
Utaker's request. I first did it, in a negative way, in my anal-
ysis of the short exchange between the two villagers. (The
style of that exercise is at least reminiscent of the style of
Arne Næss' exercises in what he calls "occurrence analysis",
in Interpretation & Preciseness.) The point of that first exercise
is to show that our everyday language does not constitute a
realm of its own. It is in every bit of its existence tied to our
everyday world, with its diverse activities, artifacts, weather,
terrain, etc.
To the understanding of a remark, there belongs both an
understanding of the situation in which it is made, the occa-
sion for its making, etc., and an understanding of that which
the remark is about. In all four of my examples, I speak
about our understanding of that which a remark is about,
when it is about an artefact. If, for example, the remark is
about a coastal fishing boat, then my understanding of that
remark is no better than my understanding of coastal fishing
boats, that is, of their design, the point of this or that piece of
equipment, etc., which, in turn, draws on my understand-
ing, or knowledge, of the world within which they operate,
the world of coastal fishing. I make that point in each of the
four examples. 
It is not grammatical to speak about understanding, or not
understanding, a stone. And yet I speak about our under-
standing, or not understanding of a coastal fishing boat,
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which, grammatically, is on a par with a stone. But an arte-
fact, such as a coastal fishing boat,or its mizzen, is not only
for something. That which it is for is embodied in its very
design, as its raison d'être, in its material, in the equipment
attached to it, etc. The point of an artefact, that which it is
for, is internal to it. It is that which is recognized in the rec-
ognition of it. So, when I speak about our understanding of a
tholepin, that is awkward only if you are not able to see the
point of the tholepin embodied in the tholepin. If you still
find it awkward, there is a simple way out. Every place
where I write "our understanding of x", where x is an arte-
fact, you just take it as a shorthand for "our understanding of
the point of x".
Next, I complied with Arild Utaker's request in my analysis
of what it takes to recognize a rowing boat as a rowing boat,
and so what it takes to master the word "rowing boat" (after
you have already learnt to speak). When I speak about an
artefact, such as a rowing boat, then I speak about an object
that has its own, internal ramifications to artifacts and activi-
ties that the remark is not about. There will be the inward
ramifications to tholepins, thwarts, etc., and the outward
ramifications to rowing, rowable water, landing places, etc..
if I say about a rowing boat, for example that it lacks a thol-
epin, I do not then speak about its thwarts, or about its oars,
or about rowing it. And yet, you will not understand what
my remark is about if you do not know what rowing is, that
you need oars to row, a thwart in its proper place, etc. So in
the very recognition of that which a remark is about, when it
is about some artefact, there is a recognition of its standard
place in our activities, of what we can do, if it is in order, or
of what we cannot do, with that particular exemplar, if it is
not in order. That is, in the very recognition of the object,
there is a recognition of a great many explanatory schemes,
The object is loaded with them, with its being made of that
material, its being of that design, in that position, etc.
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We are about to launch the rowing boat when I notice that
there is a tholepin lacking, and say so: "There is a tholepin
lacking". Insaying that I say, or imply, that we cannot row
that boat (until we have found another tholepin (to replace
the one that is lacking). I also imply that otherwise that boat
is in order (or enough so for us to launch it and row). The
last implication is of the sort Grice calls a "conversational
implicature". It is detachable. But the first implication is not.
We are about to launch that boat, but I cut short my launch-
ing motions with the remark "There is a tholepin lacking".
That remark explains why there is no point in launching that
boat. It cannot be rowed, not for as long as there is that thol-
epin lacking. If you don't see that that is what I am saying, or
that that is implied by what I am saying, then you don't
understand what I am saying. That is, if that remark of mine
is not understood as that explanation, then it isn't under-
stood. That is, with no understanding of the world of row-
ing, with its network of implications between its gears and
its activities, and between gear and gear, there is no under-
standing of that remark either.
Can the existence of one object imply the existence of another?
Oars come in pairs and the existence of one of a pair implies
the existence of the other. If the other has been destroyed, it
must be replaced. If not, the one that is left will loose its exist-
ence as an oar. Within a given rowing technology, the exist-
ence of one tholepin implies the existence of three more. It
takes four tholepins to make up the necessary pair of pairs,
one pair to each side of the gunwale of a rowing boat (and in
their proper position with respect to rowing the boat, etc.) In
that way, the existence of one tholepin implies the existence of
a rowing boat, and so of a boatbuilder with a boatbuilder's
tools and materials, and so, within a given technology, of trees.
That one tholepin also implies the existence of rowing, and so
of a rower. If there are none of these things, within that world,
then that tholepinlooking object is not a tholepin, not within
that world.
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Within a given realm of human activities, or within a given prac-
tice, there is a network of implications between activities and
activities, between activities and artifacts, between artifacts and
their natural surroundings, and between artifacts and artifacts.
Within that realm,each such implication exhibits a necessary
truth. What is not necessary, is the existence of that realm. But that
contingency does not disturb any of the local necessities within
that realm. There might have been no rowing boats. Yes. And then
that network of implications teaches you what else there would
not have been, and what else there might not have been.
Are these necessary truths truths of language? That is, truths by
definition? Only if you incorporate a good understanding of what
a rowing boat is, and of what it is to row one, into our understand-
ing of the words in question, "rowing boat", "oars", "rowing", etc.
We can do that. But that is not what lies behind the standard
examples of truths of language, or behind any of the standard
analyses of such truths. So, within a standard understanding of
what a truth of language is, they are not truths of language.
Third, I complied with Arild Utaker's request when I
reported to you how I learnt what a mizzen is (as far as i
learnt it, that is) or what I had to learn to learn that. When
philosophers of language speak about the meaning of a
word, they don't say, or not anymore, that it is what the
word stands for. Perhaps because that formula has (been
thought to have) lured us into searching for objects where
there are none, or worse, into finding objects where there are
none. But also because, even when the objects are there, such
as mizzens, we don't seem to be on the right track if we say,
for example when I am hoisting the mizzen, that I am hoist-
ing the meaning of the word "mizzen". Meanings are not
made of for example cloth, not even of cloth that stays soft in
cold weather. The standard formula, nowadays, is that the
meaning of a word is its contribution to the sentences in
which it is applied. I have not applied this formula, though,
and I am not sure that I know how I could have let that for-
mula guide me in my search for the meaning of the word
"MESAN", or the word "mizzen".
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In the Blue Book Wittgenstein replaces the question "What is
the meaning of a word?" with the question "What is an
explanation ofthe meaning of a word?" For any particular
word, Wittgenstein's question is, I think, "How do we teach
someone the meaning of that word?" And for a particular
teaching situation that question should, in turn, be taken to
say; for example: "What do I have to teach him to teach him
the meaning of that word?" The answer to that is, it depends
on what he knows already. It also depends on what word it
is, and on what he needs it for. 
Fidel is in the harbour, together with most of the other fish-
ing boats. You are looking for Fidel but you are not quite
sure what it looks like. I tell you it's the only one with a yel-
low mizzen, but you don't know what a mizzen is, and I tell
you it's the sail on the aft mast. And that's enough for you to
find Fidel. It is perhaps also enough for you to think that you
have learnt a new word. And so you have, since now you
know what the object called by that name looks like, or what
that object is called. But you may still be lost in most conver-
sations involving that word, at least in the fishing village.
That's because you still don't know what a mizzen is. So
many remarks will draw on implications that do not float
from that object as you know it. Your mizzen is still too
much of a stray object. It has not as yet found its place within
its proper network of implications.
There isn't more to be said about the word "mizzen" than:
"that is what that word refers to" – pointing to a mizzen, or
perhaps drawing one, in the manner of the old skipper. If
that does not bring you far, it is your understanding of that
object that is lacking. And so it is with all the words that refer
to artifacts.
137
Explaining such words, the very first move is to point to
their objects. That may not achieve much, not even a clear
delineation of the object. Never mind, the work has just
begun. The real task is to teach you about that object. Wit-
tgenstein's question about explainingthe meaning of a word
must be transformed into a question about explaining the
point of an artefact, the artefact that the word refers to: What
do I have to teach you to teach you the point of that artefact?
And the question about the point of an artefact, is the ques-
tion: What does that artefact contribute to the activities in
which it is applied?
With the mizzen, and a little more than halfway through my
lesson, I tried to sum up its contribution in this way: "The
engine, or the propeller, keeps the boat in position, while the
mizzen secures the boat's orientation in that position, so that
it will keep its bow headed against the waves, or roughly
so." When we have understood how the mizzen secures that
orientation, and the point of its being so secured, then we
have understood what the mizzen contributes to that type of
fishing. And only then have we recognized that object in its
place within its proper network of implications. Only then
do we see that object as the repository of possible explana-
tions that it is, i.e. among the fishermen, i.e. in reality.
Permit me one last question. Someone asks you about the
word "mizzen", about what it means or what it refers to.
What do you have to teach him to teach him the meaning of
that word? Part of the answer is, of course: It depends on
what he knows already.
Setting out to teach me, the old skipper's first move was to
find out what I already knew, and that's where he began.
With a five year old girl from some inland town, he might
have had to begin with teaching her about boats, about the
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fish that swim in the sea, about various ways of catching fish
and why we try to catch them, etc. They might both have a
long way to go, passing a great many words and a great
many explanations, before they arrive at the point where the
skipper can teach her what a mizzen is, or the meaning of
theword "mizzen". What, then, is the meaning of the word
"mizzen", if it is what you have to teach someone to teach
that someone that meaning?
Does all that the skipper has to teach the child to teach her
the meaning of the word "mizzen", belong to the meaning of
that word? Or should we make a cut somewhere, between
that part of the teaching that prepares the child for being
taught the meaning of the word "mizzen" and that part
which is the very teaching of it? If you say yes, clearly we
must make that cut, then where do we make it? I am not sure
that we need to answer that question, or that we need to ask
it.
Whatever the child has already learnt about the sea, about
objects that float and objects that sink, and perhaps about
swimming and drowning, she brings all that with her when
the skipper teaches her about rowing boats, sailing boats
and motor boats, in that order, and she brings all that with
her when she learns about fish, fishing, fishing boats, etc.
But what is it that she will bring with her, from one chapter
to the next, if all that she has to go by is what the skipper has
told her? How do we learn what it is that she has learnt, if all
we have to go by is what she can reproduce of what the skip-
per has told her? To secure her knowledge of what a rowing
boat is, for example, and to secure his own knowledge of her
knowledge, the skipper had better teach her to row – first in
calm weather and then in a moderate breeze, so that she will
learn what the wind and the waves do to a rowing boat,
about her own strength and so about the strength of the
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wind, etc. One day, when she is rowing against the wind
and the waves, the skipper should ask her to pull in the oars.
That will teach her about sideways rolling, and with a little
explanation, the skipper will teach her how the boat is
turned sideways. Etc. And even the smallest of rowing boats
can beequipped with a mast and a sail. Etc. The skipper will
now be teaching the inland town child the same way as the
children of the fishing village are being taught. He will learn
from seeing her at work what she has learnt and what she
has yet to learn, and he will know what skills and under-
standing she has to bring with her to the next stage.
There will be an interplay of contingencies and necessities in
this story, and as the child gets a firmer hand with the oars
and a sharper eye for the space of handling them, some of
the contingencies will transform into necessities. E.g. the
oars, the oarlocks and the thwart will connect into one group
of objects and places, internally connected via the activity of
rowing. That group is hardly detachable from the rowing
boat, or the rowing boat from the sea, etc. With what she
learns when she learns to row, the child will also learn to
recognize such internal connections. Objects will connect
with their proper activities into groups, and groups will con-
nect with groups. She will learn such truths as: You cannot
row with one oarlock missing. It is stupid to place the thwart
on line with the oarlocks. The boat must be in the sea before
you can row it. Etc. She will perhaps learn some such truths
Meno-wise, so that it may take a Socrates to teach her some
of what she already knows. 
When she comes to the mizzen, the mizzen will connect with
the mizzen mast, with the position of the mizzen mast
within the construction of the boat, with the sort of weather
and the sort of fishing that requires a mizzen in that sort of
weather, etc. With the mizzen securely placed within its
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proper network of internal relations, and a few strong con-
tingencies, why try to detach it from that network, in order
to get a simple, one-piece object for the word "mizzen" to
refer to, or to mean? Cut loose from its proper network, that
object is not a mizzen. It cannot, cut loose, work as a miz-
zen,and it is not, cut loose, intelligible as one. That object
derives all its intelligibility from that network. As that intel-
ligible object, the mizzen implies its proper network and is
implied by it.
The geometrical terms "point", "line", "angle", etc., may be
said to be defined by the axioms pertaining to points, lines,
angles, etc., and so also by the theorems that we derive from
those axioms. We may perhaps venture an analogous view
of words that refer to artifacts. For example, that the word
"mizzen" is defined by the necessary truths pertaining to
mizzens. Only it is through our experience with mizzens, in
our working life at sea, that we learn the truths about miz-
zens. After several years of fishing we may still discover
new truths about mizzens. (It hasn't been in that weather
before.) As we understand more about what the mizzen con-
tributes to what, and about what it takes for a mizzen to do
so, some of the truths we have learnt transform into neces-
sary truths. Those truths, that is my proposal, go to define
the word "mizzen", or rather, the object that that word refers
to.
The realm of those truths is identical with the network of
internal relations within which the mizzen has its place. As
it takes a great deal of experience to come to see those truths,
and to see them as necessary truths, it takes a great deal of
experience to come to see the mizzen for what it is. And so
all that we have to learn to learn what a mizzen is, belongs to
the concept of a mizzen, or to that object.
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But the very first step, learning about the word "mizzen", is
simple: you just point to a mizzen and say: that's what the
word "mizzen" refers to. That's all you have to do to intro-
duce the word. And that's all we can do by way of explaining
a word: introduce it. It does not take you far, either in your
understanding of what a mizzen is or inyour understanding
of exchanges about mizzens, among fishermen. But now that
you know what object that word refers to, you can go on
from there to learn about that object.
142
Claus Huitfeldt
University of Bergen
Multi-Dimensional Texts in a One-Dimen-
sional Medium
The paper discusses one of the tools which may be used for repre-
senting texts in machine-readable form, i.e. encoding systems or
markup languages. This discussion is at the same time a report on
current tendencies in the field. An attempt is made at reconstruct-
ing some of the main conceptions of text lying behind these ten-
dencies. It is argued that although the conceptions of texts and
text structures inherent in these tendencies seem to be misguided,
nevertheless text encoding is a fruitful approach to the study of
texts. Finally, some conclusions are drawn concerning the rele-
vance of this discussion to themes in text linguistics.
– * –
My aim in this paper is to show one of the ways in which
information technology opens the door to an entirely new
approach to text studies. That computing provides us with
powerful tools for manipulating and analyzing texts is a
well documented fact. My claim, however, is that the use of
information technology in textual studies may also help us
explicate traditional concepts of text by way of stimulating a
new kind of text analysis.
If possible, I would have liked to start out by suggesting
possible answers to questions like: What is a text? What is
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the ontological status of the text? What is the epistemologi-
cal status of texts? However, I have come to think that these
questions do not represent a fruitful first approach to our
theme at all.
The answer to the question what a text is depends on the
context, methods and purpose of our investigations.
Texts have been studied by many and diverse disciplines –
in so-called analytical bibliography [Kraft p 77-79] or codi-
cology texts are studied as physical objects with physical
properties. In classical, medieval, and biblical philology and
text criticism the physical objects containing texts are called
text witnesses, the text being an abstract entity. In linguistics
texts are sometimes regarded as discourse events, some-
times as strings of sentences [de Beaugrande and Dressler,
Halliday and Hasan].
– * –
Our concept of text has to a large extent been shaped by the
limits and possibilities of the media which have traditionally
carried texts. In this perspective, the computer is a new
medium which will create new kinds of texts, i.e. change the
subject matter of our study, thus changing also our concepts
of and ways of dealing with texts.
My main concern here is that adapting our traditional con-
cepts of texts to the use of the new medium may also help us
explicate our traditional concepts of texts and give us a bet-
ter understanding of existing ways of dealing with and relat-
ing to texts.
This effect becomes particularly clear in attempts to transfer
texts from traditional media to the new medium, a process
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which may be seen as an attempt to represent multi-dimen-
sional texts in a one-dimensional medium.
– * –
Why I call texts multi-dimensional will hopefully become
clear from the discussion further below. But what is the rea-
son for calling the computer a one-dimensional medium?
After all, computers display text on screens and in paper
printout, which may look exactly like traditional printed
text.
Internally, a computer represents a text as a long string of
characters, which in turn will be represented by a series of
numbers, which in turn will be represented by a series of
binary digits, which in turn will be represented by variations
in the physical properties of the data carrier. 
For the present purpose, we may regard the conventional
data text file format as essentially a one-dimensional string
of characters. This format is significantly different from the
traditional book or printed paper. It is even more different
from handwritten material. Handwritten material is structur-
ally more informal then printed texts. Variations which in
print will be discrete and easily identifiable may in manu-
scripts be gradual and hardly discernible. 
If the means of representation placed at our disposal is
essentially only a long string of characters, how can all the
information contained in a written manuscript page be
mapped on to this one-dimensional format? The answer is
simple enough: 
We insert special, reserved character combinations, so-called
codes, into our long character string. These codes indicate
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features such as line endings, page brakes, start of underlin-
ing, end of underlining, and so on. 
Still, there is only one way of reproducing all the informa-
tion, and that is by the production of an exact duplicate. First
of all, we haveto ask: Which parts of the information con-
veyed by a document are to be retained? How do we distin-
guish between form and content, between the ("relevant")
information contained in the manuscript and the more acci-
dental traits of its actual appearance on paper?
The very fact that questions like these are asked, and that
attempts are made at both asking and answering them in a
systematic manner, is perhaps one of the most promising
and fruitful outcomes of recent discussions on text encoding. 
There are several different kinds and uses of text encoding.
The purpose of descriptive text encoding is not to prepare for
some specific mode of presentation or analysis, but to repre-
sent as accurately as possible the textual information, the
logical structure of the text, and the internal relationships
between different text segments. In this way, modes of pre-
sentation and analysis may be decided on afterwards, inde-
pendently of the initial preparation of the text.
In order to facilitate exchange of computerized texts and text
software, there is an urgent need for standardization, not
only of hardware and internal representation formats, but
also of markup languages. (In the following, I will use the
terms 'markup language' and 'markup' interchangeably with
'encoding systems' and 'text encoding'.)
In 1986, Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML)
was established as an international standard by the Interna-
tional Standards Organization [ISO 8879-1986].
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SGML is, strictly spoken, not itself a markup language, but a
formal grammar for the design and specification of markup
languages.
 In SGML, a text is associated with a Document Type Defini-
tion (DTD). The DTD defines a document type, declaring
which basic constituents a document may have, how they
should be marked up, and how these marked-up elements
may be combined. 
An SGML-encoded text is a hierarchy of serially ordered text
elements, the structure of which adheres to the declarations
given in the associated DTD. 
Since the DTD is specified in a highly structured formal lan-
guage it is possible to design computer programs to check
whether any given text adheres to the specifications and def-
initions given in a DTD. This has several advantages and
increases control over composition, analysis, and manipula-
tion of texts.
The "father" of SGML, ... Charles Goldfarb of IBM Corpora-
tion, suggests that from now on, "...the techniques available
for processing rigorously-defined objects like programs and
data bases can be used for processing documents as well."
[Goldfarb, p 60]
SGML was not only launched with a great deal of optimism,
but also received with enthusiasm, particularly in bureau-
cratic and administrative milieus. SGML has a strong pre-
scriptive power which makes it well suited for exerting
control over the structure of documents. E.g., SGML has
already been adopted by the US Defence Department and
the EEC's administration.
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This kind of optimism and enthusiasm persists also to day. I
recently received an invitation to an international workshop
on document processing, which says: "...document process-
ing can be fairly assessed as being in a state similar to that
obtaining for programming languages prior to the develop-
ment of syntax- andsemantics-directed compilation tech-
niques, and that obtaining for databases prior to the
development of relational and deductive data models. It is
time to exploit current techniques and ideas from computer
science to raise principles and models of document process-
ing to the same intellectual level as principles and models
for programming languages and databases." [From an
announcement of "The First International Workshop on
Principles of Document Processing" on TEI public discus-
sion list, mid-May 1992]
Surprisingly perhaps, SGML was met with the same kind of
enthusiasm in humanistic research disciplines. Already in
1988, the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) was launched. TEI is
a large cooperation project aiming at the establishment of
standards for text encoding in the humanities within the
framework of SGML.
TEI includes several dozens of text scholars within nearly all
humanities disciplines, – ranging from linguistics over phi-
losophy, literature, and history, to classicists and biblicists.
TEI as such does not commit itself to any particular theory of
texts, neither are the views expressed by TEI necessarily
shared by all members of the project. TEI has actively
encouraged the expression of conflicting views, and has
been an extremely stimulating forum for the discussion of
text theory. 
Nevertheless, there are some basic conceptions of text laying
behind this project which are in my eyes rather dubious.
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Though they still seem to persist, these tendencies were par-
ticularly clear in the early phases of the project. As the
project has proceeded these views have been modified and
diversified. 
For the purposes of discussion, I will allow myself to con-
strue something which might be called an "early prototypi-
cal" TEI view. This view can be expressed in the following
theses: 
1. To mark up texts descriptively means first and foremost to
mark up the logical structure of the texts. In printed or writ-
ten texts, established conventions of typography or paleog-
raphy convey the logical structure. Therefore, we should not
encode the typography, but the underlying feature. 
2. Since traditional typography is inaccurate and unstable,
we may also mark up structural elements which are only
implied by the text and a result of our subjective interpreta-
tion or analysis.
3. In this manner, we will be able to maintain a sharp and
clear distinction between the text itself and the encoding.
Markup is not itself part of the text but tells us something
about it. Markup makes the structural organization and our
interpretation and analysis of the text explicit. 
4. Although details of text structure differ from genre to
genre and from text to text, all texts are hierarchies of lin-
early ordered objects. In this respect, SGML is well suited for
the encoding of texts. Admittedly, some texts contain ele-
ments which overlap. In such cases, however, the overlap-
ping elements belong to different hierarchies, and since
SGML allows for the coexistence of several hierarchies in
one and the same text this poses no technical problem.
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(It should be kept in mind, then, that these views are not
necessarily representative neither of the TEI (at least not any
more), nor of any individual member of TEI. However, see
Coombs et al (esp. p 934 and 942-945), DeRose et al, TEI P1,
and also to some extent Sperberg-McQueen 1991. All of
those come very close to several of the theses above.)
In opposition to the "early prototypical" TEI view expressed
in the above four statements, I will claim: 
1. What is regarded as the structure and what as the content
of a text depends on the purpose of analysis. Any text may
be said to have many kinds of structure (physical, composi-
tional, narrative, grammatical). It is not clear which of these
is to be counted as the 'logical' structure. Thus the definition
of 'descriptive markup' says nothing, unless we also say
what it is that we are describing. 
The identification of the "underlying feature" of typographi-
cal convention is interpretational. Besides, the relationship
between (outer) appearance and (inner) structure is some-
times very close, e.g. in realistic poetry.
2. There are no facts about a text which are objective in the
sense of not being interpretational. However, being interpre-
tational does not mean being entirely subjective – there are
some things about which all competent readers agree, at
least for all practical purposes.
A simple example: We normally regard capitalization and
full stop as typographical evidence of a sentence, which is
the underlying, 'structural' feature. However, when encod-
ing manuscripts, we often have to decide whether we regard
a letter as capitalized or not and a mark as a comma or a full
stop, partly on the basis of the visual evidence, partly on our
interpretation of the text. 
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3. Unless further qualified, the notion of making 'the struc-
ture' explicit in the codes is of little help, because (a) all
structure cannot be made explicit at the same time (there are
endlessly many structures), and (b) as soon as something
has been made explicit ithas become part of the text, which
has thereby changed, and acquired a new structure. There is
a similarity here to Wittgenstein's distinction in the Tractatus
between showing and saying – the structure of the text
shows itself in the text. It is quite symptomatic that the "text
itself" on the TEI view seems to consist roughly of the
encoded elements, i.e. that part of a text which occurs
between tags. 
Taking punctuation as an example once again – although a
full stop is mostly represented not by a tag but rather as part
of a tagged element, it would be highly appropriate to
regard it as an indication of an underlying structural feature
– the sentence.
4. It is a serious limitation that SGML enforces a prescriptive,
top-down approach to text analysis and presupposes hierar-
chical structures.
Any formal language is bound to have its limitations and to
favor certain biases – "...devising a representational system
that does not impose but only maps linguistic structures"
[Coulmas p 270] is impossible.
If not in theory, then at least in practice, any use of SGML,
with its DTDs, invites us to prescribe or predict the struc-
tural order of the elements encoded in a text. Since SGML
presupposes that the entire text is somehow marked up, this
enforces a top-down approach to document design.
Furthermore, SGML presupposes that the design is hierar-
chical, or alternatively that the text is represented as consist-
ing of a number of concurring hierarchies.
In many cases, a prescriptive, top-down approach presup-
posing (one or several) hierarchical structure(s) may be well
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suited to the goals of analysis and composition. In a large
number of cases, however, these features of SGML will be
detrimental to the purposes of investigation and analysis.
There is a notable tendency in TEI to distinguish between,
on the one hand, the information and, on the other, its actual
representation on a physical medium. What we seem to be
searching for, then, is the key, the "mode of representation",
or the specific rules governing the representation of each dif-
ferent kind and feature of textual information on a specific
physical medium.
As soon as we have identified these rules, it would seem like
an easy task to specify their corollaries for the representation
of the same kinds of information on another kind of
medium. 
However, the kinds and features of information contained in
printed texts are probably shaped just as much by the means
of expression at our disposal, as vice versa. Our concept of a
text is partly a product of the historically mediated knowl-
edge of limits and possibilities of expression posed by the
medium carrying texts.
This exemplifies a general point concerning the cultural
impact of innovation throughout the history of information
technology. Sinding-Larsen makes a similar observation in
his studies of the development of musical notation in the
medieval ages: "An improvement of the tools for description
of a certain domain will, in general, also be the starting point
for new design and prescription which will change the
domain originally to be described." [Sinding-Larsen 1988b, p
111.]
When TEI started, I was working on an improvement of the
Norwegian Wittgenstein Project's encoding scheme for Wit-
tgenstein's manuscripts [cf Huitfeldt & Rossvær 1989]. The
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fourth point above, i.e. the prescriptive, top-down approach
and hierarchical structure of SGML, convinced me that I had
to design a quite different encoding scheme for the Wittgen-
stein Archives. This lead to the developmentof what I have
called a Multi-Element Code System (MECS) [Huitfeldt
1992].
MECS is in many respects similar to SGML. As in SGML,
codes may be declared in a separate "document definition".
The syntax of this document definition lacks much of the
expressive power of SGML's DTD. I have therefore found
another name for it: code definition table (CDT). Alterna-
tively, codes may be declared simply by using them in the
text (in-line declaration). MECS allows for the reconstruction
of CDTs (what I have called "minimal CDTs) from encoded
texts. MECS does not presuppose any hierarchical structure
– any element may overlap with any other element. Finally,
MECS includes syntactical means for the representation of
structures which in SGML have to be treated in a more
roundabout way.
One might say that in SGML everything is forbidden unless
it is explicitly permitted or mandatory; while in MECS
everything is permitted unless it is explicitly forbidden or
mandatory.
Paradoxically, perhaps (since SGML is advocated by so
many adherents of so-called "descriptive" markup), SGML is
excellent for prescriptive purposes, where the aim is to exert
strict control over the structure and content of documents
which are still to be created. 
MECS, however, is better suited for descriptive purposes.
When our aim is to describe already existing documents, we
cannot expect to know all about their structure and content
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in advance. A code system which forces us to prescribe an
order in advance may easily lead us to prescribe an order
which is perhaps not there in the document at all.
To sum up, I allow myself to characterize MECS, in contrast
to SGML, as a code system which encourages a descriptive,
bottom-up approach to text analysis, not presupposing a
hierarchical structure of texts. This has lead to some in my
eyes rather illuminating discussions with other members of
TEI. 
For example, on the top-down vs. bottom-up approach to
text structures and the prescriptive vs. descriptive attitude,
my problem with SGML is the following: Designing a regis-
tration standard of a project aiming at a machine-readable
version of Wittgenstein's manuscripts, we do not want to
superimpose a structure on these texts which is not in accor-
dance with a sound interpretation of them. This is precisely
the risk we run by predesigning a DTD to which all docu-
ments have to conform. 
The reaction from other members of TEI has been that I suf-
fer from an illusion that theory-independent gathering of
data should be possible. SGML enforces you to make your
hypothesis about texts explicit. This does not mean that you
may not revise your DTD if you find that your hypothesis
was wrong. 
However, in our project we are not particularly interested in
testing any specific theory about the structure of Wittgen-
stein's manuscripts in terms of possible structural relation-
ships between text elements encoded in certain specific
ways. What we want, is a representation based on a sound
interpretation. Therefore, we want the transcriber, who is a
highly competent reader, to interpret the text and to mark it
in accordance with his interpretation. The transcriber's inter-
pretation is not theory-independent, but it is not couched in
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terms of markup structures either. An exhaustive descrip-
tion of structural relationships between differently marked-
up text elementsmay be an interesting by-product, but can-
not be the starting point of our work.
My problem with (concurrent) hierarchies is similar: Even if
SGML allows me to have several concurrent hierarchies in a
text, I am not convinced that Wittgenstein's manuscripts are
basically hierarchical structures. Potentially, for all that I
know, any feature may overlap with any other feature.
Besides, I do not even know what the hierarchies should
consist of, or whether the identification of such hierarchies
would be particularly illuminating.
Other members of TEI have recently suggested [Renear et al
1992] a very interesting answer to this objection: That two
text elements overlap is in itself a criterion that they belong
to different conceptual frameworks, theoretical perspectives,
or modes of analysis, such as the compositional, the metri-
cal, the physical, the narrative etc. 
This view is difficult to assess, since not much specific has so
far been said about what a theoretical perspective or concep-
tual framework is. I have three comments: 
1. It is still unclear why such a conceptual framework should
demand that the features/elements recognized in a text
must be hierarchically ordered. Is this an empirical or an a
priori observation? Is the possibility of overlap the only cri-
terion that two features belong to different frameworks? If it
did turn out that all analyses based on different frameworks
do yield different hierarchies, this might be an extremely
interesting empirical discovery. But what if it turns out that
the hierarchical order is an a priori truth. Would this then be
a discovery about our concept of a text? 
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2. Admittedly, our experience at the Wittgenstein Archives
seems to confirm the observation to a very large extent, – in
most cases when we find that two features overlap we also
find that they are very different kinds of features, e.g. the
one belonging to the physical organization of the text (pages,
lines), the other e.g. to what we might call the semantic mac-
rostructure (paragraphs, sentences). But this is far from
always the case. Some examples will illustrate this: 
If a deletion overlaps with an underlining, there is no prob-
lem recognizing these features as belonging to very different
"perspectives". However, what if two tokens of the same
type, e.g. two underlinings, overlap? How could we possi-
bly justify that they belong to different "perspectives"? 
Wittgenstein, like many others, used one kind of underlin-
ing to indicate emphasis and another kind of underlining to
indicate uncertainty or dissatisfaction. These features often
overlap. Does that necessarily mean that they belong to dif-
ferent "perspectives"? 
Chapters, sections and sentences are normally regarded as
features belonging to the same "perspective" (the composi-
tional?). Normally, they form nice hierarchies. But what if
we find a chapter break in the middle of a sentence? Should
we conclude that contrary to what we believed, sentences
and chapters belong to different "perspectives", or should
we conclude that what we believed to be one complete sen-
tence divided by a chapter break is really two (perhaps
incomplete) sentences, or not sentences at all?
3. Finally, and most importantly, I am struck by the lack of
imagination in this approach: Why on earth should texts by
all means be hierarchies? No doubt, there are many hierar-
chical structures, and no doubt this is important, but there
are countless other relations between text elements which
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are worth while findingand investigating – overlap, substi-
tution, discontinuity, parallel texts, cross-references, etc. 
– * –
I will not pursue this discussion any further here. Irrespec-
tive of which of the parties are judged to be on the right
track, I believe the discussion serves to establish my main
point: The use of modern information technology in textual
studies may help us reach a better understanding of tradi-
tional concepts of and ways of dealing with texts.
This is one of the relationships between our understanding
of linguistic phenomena and the development of a new tech-
nology. It has been suggested that our language in general
has to a large extent been shaped by the technology of writ-
ing [Ong, Goody]. It has also been suggested that linguistics
draws many of its most basic concepts from features pecu-
liar to written language. [Harris, Coulmas] This is a bit sur-
prising, since at least in the early stages of modern
linguistics speech was regarded as the primary form of lan-
guage. 
Linguists have traditionally concentrated on microstructures
of language on or well below sentence-level. It is therefore
interesting that the recent call (during the last one or two
decades) for a concern with larger chunks of language has
taken the form of an urge for linguists to concern themselves
with texts, and typical that some linguists immediately
started to talk about texts as "discourse events". [cf. de
Beugrande]. The primacy of the spoken seems to persists,
even though most non-linguists would probably regard the
written and not the spoken as the primacy of texts.
One of the alternative approaches is also typical of modern
linguistics – typical, that is, of its concern with sentences as
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primary units: The attempt to study texts as strings of sen-
tences displaying a certain degree of cohesion and coher-
ence. Texts must consist of sentences, since they must be
grammatically well-formed. And since not any arbitrary col-
lection of sentences constitutes what we would like to call
texts, there must be some connection between them – that of
cohesion and coherence. 
Linguists claim that writing is a secondary form of language
– writing represents speech, and does so only more or less
successfully. However, Florian Coulmas suggests that the
prominence of such objects as phonemes, words and sen-
tences as basic units of linguistic analysis is a reflection not
so much of their prominence in speech, but rather of their
prominence in writing. While the earliest alphabetic writing
systems were scripta continua, and thus had no way of rep-
resenting word and sentence boundaries, the later invention
of punctuation and spacing made writing a more precise
tool for the description of these crucial elements of speech.
Coulmas points out that those features of speech which are
typically relegated to appendixes and play subordinate roles
in linguistic text books are precisely those features which
have not found any expression in writing, so-called supra-
segmental or prosodic features like melody, rhyme, rhythm,
and intonation. [Coulmas, p 39-40 and 270]
Linguistics has concentrated on features which have already
found their expression in writing, and at least to some extent
tended to disregard features which have not. It looks as if
linguistics, while claiming speech to be the primary form of
language, gets some of its basic concepts of analysis from
writing: "The units of linguisticanalysis are derivative of the
units of written language" [Coulmas, p 270]
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Comment on Huitfeldt's Paper:
The Dynamic Identity of the Text 
The aims of the Wittgenstein Archives are neatly circum-
scribed. The work is, however, taking place within a vast
area of research, constituted by several different fields partly
overlapping each other. A few of these fields, like textual
criticism, have a long history, others, like the development
of software for different purposes, are a result of efforts
made during the last few decades to systematize theoretical
and practical problems involved in the use of information
technology. If we lump the relevant research fields together
by the designation "textual studies" – or even "textual sci-
ences", a term apparently growing into fashion – we may
discern certain fundamental problems common to the most
diversified disciplinary fields within this large area. In com-
menting upon Claus Huitfeldt's thought-provoking paper, I
should like to point out some problems of particular rele-
vance for future discussions.
The implications of "machine-readability" within textual
studies range from very practical problems in the construc-
tion of databases to complicated speculations on the effects
of using non-linear texts, like hypertext (programmes giving
the possibility to browse in large masses of material and to
construct different textual entities). The international argu-
mentative situation constitutes to some observers a promis-
ing and to others an exasperating condition of "betwixt and
between". I borrow this characterization from the anthropol-
ogist Victor Turner; it is used by him to describe the function
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of rituals in sacralizing contexts of meaningful action by set-
ting them apart fromprofane everyday life. Rituals thus
organize certain interpretations of changes in social life.
Some rituals of the scholarly world are certainly undergoing
modifications, resulting from the strain of adjusting to the
demands for as well as the needs of institutions like the Wit-
tgenstein Archives. New coalitions and new factions pop up
– not in the manner of fungus, rather more often than not as
a result of cumbersome cultivational work. The staff
involved in the real research and footmanship of this kind of
institutional upstarts within the University society has no
reason whatsoever to ask for a more guarded conservatism,
neither in bureaucratic policy nor in common scholarly
modes of thought, than what has hitherto been displayed. It
seems deplorably safe to predict that for some time yet to
come, computerized text analysis or information technology
within the humanities shall not represent major challenges
to the formalized conduct of (Norwegian) University bud-
getary and organizational measures. Like ritualized behav-
iour generally, administrative measures tend to incorporate
new definitions of themselves and their relations to the sur-
rounding world in such a way as to further mythical expla-
nations of practical problems, without bothering to worry
about flagrant discrepancies between what people are sup-
posed to accomplish and what means they are given to
accomplish.
No, the real challenge represented by the automatization of
textual criticism should be sought elsewhere. It should at
least partly be sought in the possible de-automatization of
some scholarly conventions for dealing with textual mate-
rial. 
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I venture to suggest that this "elsewhere" ought to be prop-
erly mapped. Furthermore, that it should be a proper task
for institutionslike the Wittgenstein Archives to contribute
to such a mapping. By the term "mapping" I refer to proce-
dures that are mostly underestimated by laymen (in our
context that is, scholars observing any field of research they
arent originally initiated to), notably the efforts of getting to
know the proper questions to ask in order to get to know the
landscape you are moving in. There is need for a topograph-
ical registration of the cultural geography of these intellec-
tual fields, where viewpoints and itineraries of the people
moving there differ to a considerable degree, according to
their positions as well as to the way they use their particular
field maps. Such "topographical description" is a phase of
research often overlooked in the humanities, which accounts
for much curious eclectisism as well as for some rapid
changes of scholarly fashions in shirts and arm-chairs. 
Generally, the consequences of suchlike scholarly ignorance
are that new theories or methodologies in the humanites
tend to be met either by a dull so-called "sound scepticism"
without much real scientific discussion, or by enthusiastic
great expectations bording on fantasy. (After some time, the
state of affairs within this argumentative discourse tends to
create a certain melancholic frustration in apprentices as
well as adepts suggesting new solutions to a problem.) On
the question of machine-readable versions of different kinds
of textual material, the attitudes towards scientific problems
involved tend to fall into either one of two major categories
on each end of a scale. One end of the scale belongs to the
waiters of traditional disciplines ("Sorry sir, this is not my
table"), whereas the other end is represented by the entre-
preneurs of new enterprises ("This is the future, imagine the
profits, man!"). Somewhere in between, or perhaps alto-
gether outside such a scale, we find some knowledgeable
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people telling us about the actual practical limits and the
theoretical puzzles involved. ClausHuitfeldt's paper cer-
tainly places him and the Wittgenstein Archives in such a
tertium datur-category. 
Huitfeldt himself does contribute to a topographical descrip-
tion of problems within the research field, by describing
practical problems and by pointing at the necessity of
reworking traditional concepts of textual analysis as well as
the philosophical problems evoked in this process. This is
altogether another attitude than that of the above mentioned
waiters and entrepreneurs of the humanities; neither content
to serve nor to rule the field, the Wittgenstein Archives
strive to redefine the framework for the coexistence of differ-
ent fields of textual studies.
Trying, now, to restrict myself to the subject at hand, notably
the transcription and editing of Wittgenstein's texts, I should
like to point at certain areas of questioning. I believe that four
areas are in particular need of being discussed: 
1) the relation of philosophy to philology, 
2) the problem of intentionality in texts, 
3) the relations between orality and literacy, and 
4) the possibility of a critical hermeneutics. 
Consciously, I have chosen to divide my comments into four
subsections, in order to avoid the mythical triade. The divi-
sion in three parts of a story, a lecture or a paper is so often
used for pedagogical and argumentative purposes that it
tends to be taken for granted as an organizational principle
of academic discourse. But beware; the triadic division also
tends to evoke the fairy-tale impression of a well-rounded
and already finished process of thought, as produced by the
narrative scheme of beginning, middle and end. 
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My point of departure is an aphorism by Wittgenstein,
found in the notes published as Philosophical Remarks. I shall
elaborate my understanding of the point made in this apho-
rism before I proceed to my four areas of questioning. Like
so many others I have found the reading of Philosophical
Remarks rewarding, the volume bears testimony to the grad-
ual reformulation of argumentative strategies and perspec-
tives in the transitional phase of Wittgenstein's thinking, in
between the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophi-
cal Investigations. The second period of § 66 reads: 
Philosophers who believe you can, in a manner of
speaking, extend experience by thinking, ought to
remember you can transmit speech over the tele-
phone, but not measles.
By the same token: You can replace the signs of more or less
coherent typescript or handwriting by sequences of codes
that will be seen as offering information when represented
as texts on the computer screen. But you cannot transmit the
experience of having accomplished such a feat! You won't be
able to codify the different kinds of feelings, thoughts, tacit
knowledge or even all the overtly conscious knowledge that
goes into the work. In order to even try to do such a thing,
you will have to construct another text. And in order to
explain what went on in your work on the explanatory text,
the "text of second order", you'll probably find it necessary
to write still another text. And so on, in an infinite regress.
A comparable problem is constituted by so-called "metapo-
etry", the comments directed towards the art of writing or
reading poetry or fictitious texts that might be included in
the text or even made into the major theme or motive. A
writer is not obliged to put into his text explanations of how
and why he came to write the text in the way he wrote it,
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and the general public in our time doesn't expecta poet or a
novelist to do so, either. Still, he might do exactly that, and
by subtle hints or by explicit postulates demask his interests,
his dispositions or his position in the world – in the way
modernists and before them baroque poets incorporated the
Sitz im Leben of the writer. 
Diversified metacomments, for instance in the form of allu-
sions or allegorizations on the writing process or the func-
tion of the text, most often mark the poem or the fiction as
non-realist. Meta-poetry tends to destroy any illusion of the
text being a direct report on occurences in the world, and
implicitly problematizes the function of language. 
Such metacomments should not be regarded as reports on
the poets' experiences in writing poetry or creating fictitious
universes, even though the very term "metapoetry" invites
us to think that the author is stepping out of his text in order
to comment upon it. This view of the text is in itself meta-
phorical, it tends to stear the reader away from the question
of how such constructions of a writer's perspective become
features of the poem itself. These features are part of the
very "texture" whose genesis or function or tendency (etc.)
could be explained and which, therefore, is the result of
reflection upon the experience of reading the poem.
This kind of reflection cannot possibly double or imitate the
experience of the poet in writing the poem, even if the poet's
intention might have been to invoke particular kinds of reac-
tions. This is to say, contrary to popular belief, that a poem
does not transmit the experiences of the poet to the reader,
even when the poem itself gives clues to the principles of its
own creation, and it does not fix the experience of the poet in
writing. Popular belief in how the impact of poetry comes
about is a variant of the positivistview; one imagines that the
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poet calculates his "signals" as if they were arrows hitting
the reader's sensibilities, to make the proper reflexes and
sentiments surge forth. But this kind of vision tends to over-
look how reading is an activity steeped in and dependent
upon other kinds of experience. The study of poetry could
be said to represent a special case of more general investiga-
tions of how awareness of experience comes about.
Traditional hermeneutics used to consider texts as an expan-
sion of the reader's field of experience in the "encounter"
with the text, whether the concern is to reconstruct the origi-
nal "meaning-content" or to explain the "reader's response".
In some respects, the deconstructionist trends in textual
analysis relie upon a similar notion of how texts affect the
experience of the reader: preconceived notions, propositions
presupposed or explicated in texts, figurations of imagina-
tional figments or illusions are broken down by contradic-
tions created by the reading of the text. Strangely enough,
the very basis for discovering homologies between textual
material and experience tend to be overlooked: both are con-
structions. 
The tendency to treat "experience" as if it were something
purely given – individually or collectively – goes with the
view that "reality" is something originally pure and the
experience of it is "tainted" by ideology, theory or bias.
Descriptional procedures derived from phenomenology,
hermeneutics and deconstructivism included, tend to per-
petuate the dualism between "real" life and (illusionary)
"constructions". The ensuing discussions of "realism" as
opposed to "relativism" in their turn tend to obfuscate the
subject matter by diverting into scholastic quarrels on how
to define and thereby confine the opponents' positions as
well as one's own. 
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Instead of clinging to the age-old antagonism between "real"
and "constructed" one might hold that the experience of reality
is constituted by constructions of competing descriptions that are
given explanatory force. This is to say, nothing more and noth-
ing less, that our experience of reality is dependent upon our
perception of conflicts between different ways of describing
the causes and effects of changes. If we are aware of such
conflicts, we may see options and strive to make a choice, if
not, we accept the received views and stand or fall by them.
Becoming aware of conflicts or possible conflicts in the
description of life implies on the one hand to start to ques-
tion the construction of descriptions, and on the other hand
to face the challenge of constructing our own description(s).
 
Accordingly, the said antagonism between "real" and "con-
structed" dissolves. It may be replaced by questions of how
the processes of construction of experience and the construc-
tion of textual understanding may be compared to each
other and how they interweave. 
Huitfeldt's paper wisely calls for reforms in textual studies,
and poses some challenges to certain presuppositions
amongst literary critics on how one should treat the prob-
lems of textual criticism. The paper does so by making clas-
sical problems in textual criticism as well as new methods
for tagging texts relevant to the development of philosophi-
cal problems. It might hold some interest to elaborate some-
what on one of the traditional concerns of textual criticism,
the problem of establishing a textual stemma, a necessary
prerequisite for any kind of textual criticism that compares
older and newer versions of texts.
The philological method stemmatology is the reasoned con-
struction of a tree-like model showing how new copies or
versions of a text arebranches on a common stem. A stemma
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makes for a model, or a map, of "family resemblances" for
texts with common origins ("stemming from somewhere");
these common origins show by correspondancies and
dependencies between different text versions, so that it may
be possible to reconstruct a history of different schools of
copists, or, in certain cases, different traditions of dealing
with the subject matter (for instance, different narratological
patterns). Such is also the general problem outlined by Huit-
feldt for the special case of describing the development of
Wittgenstein's writings. The description is intended to orga-
nize the text material in certain manners, so that programs
for machine-reading makes the search for an origin, a line of
development and the comparison of different versions easier
and more efficient. This is, by the way, congruent to Wit-
tgenstein's own view that description has a logical priority
over analysis. 
Models that systematize stemmas to make tagging coherent
are, like all models, replacements for that which is modelled.
Such models fill similar functions as theories do in relation
to the objects studied, but the assumptions made in the
descriptions aren't always explicated. Models represent sys-
tems of relations between elements, thereby subsuming dif-
ferent elements within categories. This is also the job
metaphors do in the use of language. They tend either to
uphold old categories or to create new ones, and thereby
alter classificatory schemes; the metaphor gives a focus, a
way of regarding objects, themes and problems. In a similar
way, a model prescribes how objects or problems under
study should be regarded.
Stemmatology and other kinds of philological reconstructiv-
ist procedures have old practical uses in different disci-
plines. The construction of a stemma has been employed in
order to date manuscripts and in certain cases printed ver-
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sions of a text (inparticular, incunabula), or to reconstruct an
original version of a text, eventually suggesting a starting
point for diverging manuscript traditions. 
One of the more famous examples of how stemmatology has
been put to use, is the conjecture (not reconstruction) of a
Gospel of "Q", a lost text supposed to be the original main
source (Q = Quelle) for the three synoptic gospels of the
New Testament. Such conclusions are reached by analyses
of structural features of the text, "Gattungen" (genre fea-
tures), markers of "Sitz im Leben" and topics dealt with in
the synoptics, in this case paleographic evidence from differ-
ent manuscript versions has played a lesser role than in most
stemmatological reconstructions. In other cases, external evi-
dence from archaeology or even references in other texts
have proved to be important. Related problems are consti-
tuted by the text material found in Qumran in the period
1947-1956, the texts popularly known as the Dead Sea
Scrolls. To the detriment of many a scholar of ancient Mid-
dle East culture, history of religions, biblical studies etc., the
major part of the Qumran texts never have been published
or been made available for normal research. Thus suspicions
arose, and in recent years blatant accusations, that those in
charge of the Qumran material willfully have delayed the
publication as long as possible and that their published
interpretations of certain texts or text fragments are deliber-
ately misleading, furthermore, that the reason for these
machinations is to prevent a possible fall into disrepute of
"official", that is, Church-sanctioned, theological explana-
tions of how the Qumran material affects interpretations of
New Testament texts. When all relevant texts finally are
made available for philological scrutiny, it will be possible to
construct sound procedures to replace the hitherto more or
less impressionist methods for dating Qumran texts, as well
as the rather haphazard conjectures constructed to explain
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their context. New programs formachine-based analysis are
bound to become the focus of attention in a not too distant
future. 
The Qumran quarrels is only one among a host of examples
of how philological research in our time integrates a critical
examination of handed-down beliefs, or "doxological sys-
tems". The Wittgenstein Archives could be regarded as
another such example of how older notions are being reeval-
uated. The Wittgenstein Archives could, possibly, also
become a test case in establishing sound principles of evalu-
ating doxologically bound traditions, that is, accepted canons
of systematized interpretation, within philosophy as well as
philology. The Wittgenstein Archives prepare a
well-defined material (produced by one individual only) for
machine reading. But by doing this work, they also prepare
the grounds for wide-ranging future discussions on the
interpretation of Wittgenstein's work, as well as on the rela-
tions between philosophical and philological investigations.
The leap from Qumran and the New Testament to Bergen
and the Wittgenstein Archives is not that farfetched. Again I
shall allow myself to get to the point by the somewhat
roundabout way of another historical example. "Comme
chacun sait", as the French say whenever they feel that an
audience ought to be reminded of what they should know,
the starting point of early modern textual criticism was the
exposal of a forgery. The problem of forged manuscripts, as
well as the subcategory of plagiats, has represented an intel-
lectual and moral challenge to philological disciplines ever
since the celebrated Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla attacked
the supposed "Donation of Constantine" in the first half of
the fifteenth century. It was the intimate knowledge of Latin
usage of different epochs that made possible the most
important features in Valla's deconstruction of this letter,
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which stated that the Emperor Constantine donated the Lat-
eran Hill to the Church. The authenticityof this document
had been questioned before, but Valla analysed the linguis-
tic forms as well as certain anachronistic descriptions, such
as terms referring to ecclesiastical positions that didn't exist
in Constantine's time. He concluded that the "Donation" had
been written in the early part of the twelfth century. Thus
Lorenzo Valla established the basic principles of textual crit-
icism. Ever after, the examination of textual authenticity has
been an integral part of philological research.
Somebody might think that the mention of Valla's demask-
ing of a mediaeval forgery could be a kind of unsubtle hint
at a registered dissatisfaction with the actual condition of
some of the published Wittgenstein works. Somebody might
be right. But this is not to say that any of the published Wit-
tgenstein works are tampered with or falsely reconstructed –
as were the case of Nietszche's Nachlaß, for instance. I just
want to point at the obvious possibility that in some cases
editors have been guided by particular interpretational per-
spectives in their choice of how to render different versions
of Wittgenstein's original manuscripts. Whereas this is a
quite honourable and has generally been considered an
acceptable practice, the problem remains that the published
texts by their form and selectiveness constitute the availabil-
ity for the reader to a certain set of possible questions. The
organization of the text material favours certain kinds of
interpretations.
One rather obvious question to ask, is: during the process of
making the authentic versions of Wittgenstein's texts –
whether they are fragments or interpolated manuscripts,
available to a general academic public in the form of
machine-readable versions – what might the Wittgenstein
Archives do to develop discussions about the interpretations
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presupposed in already published versions? And the most
obvious answer to this question is that the WittgensteinAr-
chives cannot but leave these publications in their present
state, but may nevertheless contribute to an evaluation of
them. The less obvious question to ask, perhaps, is: what
might the Wittgenstein Archives do to focus the question of
how biases in interpretation are affected by the new kind of
availability of Wittgenstein manuscripts? This question may
be rephrased to give it a more general scope: what might be
done to further the awareness of relations, or rather affilia-
tions, between philological criticism of texts and philosophi-
cal understanding of texts on the basis of this particular
collection of manuscripts?
I quite agree with Huitfeldt when he sticks to the pragmatic
dimension, without launching a quest for ontological defini-
tions. Such questions as "what is a text?" tend to create too
many impractical definitional boundaries for the concept of
text. A pragmatic approach to the understanding of texts is
to stress the question of how rather than the question of what
a text is. The only feature common to every text is that it is a
part or a specimen of discourse fixed in writing by conven-
tional signs. I do insist that spoken discourse, video record-
ings, films and even untranscribed tape recordings should
not in their primary manifestations be regarded as texts,
even though such material may be analysed by the same or
similar methods as those employed in textual analysis, and
even though they might be transformed into texts. 
The reason for using a minimal definition is that it concerns
the means by which discourse is fixed – by writing – and
therefore poses particular problems in the understanding of
how writing and reading functions. It might be that the pro-
posed minimal definition of text is somewhat fuzzy. I tend
to regard this kind of fuzziness as an advantage. It gives the
possibility to search for principal problems in understand-
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ing the practices of writing and reading, whereas startingoff
with the grand question of how to distinguish essential fea-
tures of "the text itself" tends to make us jump to conclu-
sions. The ontological question doesn't allow for the study of
how a text is formed and how it transforms the subject mat-
ter. 
Philosophers are keen readers, trained to discern the argu-
mentative possibilities given in a text, often with a very high
degree of sophistication. Unfortunately, quite a few philoso-
phers also often seem to be oblivious to what goes into the
constitution of the texts they are reading. This forgetfulness
seemingly results in a desire to leap directly at the Sachlage,
the theme or subject dealt with in the text. This desire to
make the grand leap is manifested in the theories of herme-
neuticians like Gadamer and Habermas. Gadamer, in his
Wahrheit und Methode, explicitly relegates the questions on
form to the realm of technicalities and methodology, and
considers the search for die Sache to be the real philosophical
quest. Habermas, in his Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns,
systematically overlooks any kind of linguistic and philolog-
ical evidence to counter his grand theory of how civilization
developed, and brushes away rhetorical theories of lan-
guage use as being irrelevant. 
By the Gadamerian and Habermasian moves, philology (in a
broad sense, textual criticism as well as literary criticism) is
relegated to the position of philosophy's hand maiden, pre-
paring the field for the real action. One could imagine worse
positions, of course, and since the middle of the eighteenth
century, when philologists became selfconscious and taken
up with the task of defining the scientificity of their endeav-
ours, they have usually been content to forsake what they
regarded as metaphysical speculation – with some major
exceptions, like the speculative work of Herder and the later
historicists. After the time when Schleiermacher had
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laboured towards the unification of philosophy and philol-
ogy by the joiningof hermeneutics and rhetoric, a new
divorce process was conducted by Schleiermachers pupil
Boeckh in the 1880'ies. Ever after a mutual suspicion has
strained the relations in these disciplines' cohabitation
within the faculties of arts. The genesis of these uneasy rela-
tions may be followed backwards in history to the humanist
quarrels of the Renaissance, when Lorenzo Valla, in his
usual sarcastic mode, characterized the practice of philoso-
phers, "who", as he put it, "restrict to themselves the name of
friends of wisdom". Well, on the other hand it might be justi-
fied to say that since the late eighteenth century philologists
often have been too happy to remain "friends of words". 
This division of labour between disciplines, and the division
of world-views it entails, becomes untenable when one con-
siders the implications of preparing a critical machine-read-
able edition of the writings of such a philosopher as Ludwig
Wittgenstein, in particular when the code system (as
described by Huitfeldt) is designed to serve multivariate
purposes. 
Doesn't this very classical philological work of reconstruct-
ing and reflecting upon the many different versions of Wit-
tgenstein's formulations, examples, aphorisms and
elaborations of thought patterns imply a challenge to certain
philosophical presuppositions about how ideas, thoughts
and arguments are developed by their mediation in writing?
I now introduce my second area of questioning, that of
intentionality. Doesn't the transcriptional work in itself beg
the question of how to get at, describe or understand the
author's intention? Transcription is not so menial a task as
some would have it, but implies serious considerations on
what is more and what is less important, and careful
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employment of signs, codes and explanatory devices.There-
fore, transcriptional work also implies a question of how to
interpret the author's intention.
Wittgenstein claimed, in Philosophical Remarks, § 20: "If you
exclude the element of intention from language, its whole
function then collapses". §§ 23-24 read as follows: 
§ 23: If, when learning a language, speech, as it were,
is connected up to action, can these connections possi-
bly break down? If so, what means have I for compar-
ing the original arrangement with the subsequent
action?
§ 24: The intention is already expressed in the way I
now compare the picture with reality. 
"Picture" in this context must be related to the kind of visual
pattern that Wittgenstein in another context calls "para-
digm", when discussing the appearance of contradictions in
mathemathical calculations. I quote the very last periods of
F. Waismann's shorthand transcript of Wittgenstein's talks
and conversations 1929-1931 (placed by the editor as Appen-
dix 2 in Philosophical Remarks, Oxford 1975 edition, pp.
317-346): 
What are we supposed to be afraid of? A contradic-
tion? But a contradiction is given me with the method
for discovering it. As long as the contradiction hasn't
arisen, it's no concern of mine. So I can quite happily
go on calculating. Would the calculations mathemati-
cians have made through the centuries suddenly
come to an end because a contradiction had been
found in mathematics? If a contradiction does arise,
we will simply deal with it. But we don't need to
worry our heads about it now. 
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What people are really after is something quite differ-
ent. A certain paradigm hovers before their mind's
eye, and they want to bring the calculus into line with
this paradigm. 
To start the reasoning backwards: This last statement seems
to imply something very much alike the point that Thomas
Kuhn later was to develop into a criticism of Karl Popper
(especially in a few of the essays in The Essential Tension): It is
simply not true that scientists normally adjust their way of
reasoning to the experiences they gain in discovering falsifi-
cations. On the contrary, scientists tend to force their find-
ings into the paradigm they have adjusted to, that is, to the
way (Greek: methodos) in which they are used to deal with a
problem. Therefore we have problems in analysing real
change when writing the history of science, as opposed to
the linear description of how one solution to a problem
neatly fills the place of an older one.
Such paradigms, or exemplary ways of dealing with a prob-
lem, constitute objects of "the second order" for research, of
how to evaluate the outlook of the analyst. This brings me
back to the question of how already made interpretations (or
ready-made interpretations) and presuppositions (or biases)
determine the edition of textual material of this kind. The
point I am trying to make is not that editions are "tainted" by
the editors' biases, but that the critical examination of schol-
arly presuppositions is a necessary prerequisite for assessing
the value of new suggestions. And that such an examination
has some rather intriguing implications for the analysis of
intentionality.
It is a question of how "the picture of Wittgenstein" in "the
mind's eye" of the editor affects both the possible intentions
that an editor may recognize in himself, and the recognition
of possible intentions in the writings of Wittgenstein. On the
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one hand, this is to say thatthe intentions of an editor aren't
entirely his own, but that he in the very process of acquiring
intentions and putting them into action by necessity must
depend upon his training, his intellectual field of work, his
position in this field, his colleagues (perhaps) or his public –
and various other elements that might go into the construc-
tion of intentions. On the other hand, this does not amount
to saying that the intentions of the editor (or the in casu text
encoder) does not belong to himself at all, because he takes on
responsibility for the intentions he puts forth in acting – like the
action of editing or encoding. So, intentions belong at one
and the same time to the acceptable and recognized moves
in practice (in the same way as concepts, according to Kjell S.
Johannesen's paper, "can be regarded as a function of the
established use of its expression") and to a personal sphere of
responsibility.
This view of intentions as embedded in action – in this case
the acts of writing, of editing writings and of reading texts –
makes for another and somewhat more dynamic view on the
structure of a text than what is often presupposed. The struc-
ture of a text has by necessity an historical dimension as well
as a social dimension, the merging of these dimensions is
usually shown by distinctive stylistic features, in particular
the genre. The individual work within every genre (for
instance a poem, a novel, a letter, a thesis, a treatise) is
endebted to other texts within the same or even in other
genres (a characteristic feature of an essay is that it quite
freely may use elements from different genre traditions). We
may say that such relations of dependance is the result of a
process of adaption on the part of the writer, we may regard
it as an application on the part of the reader, or we may label
the phenomenon "intertextuality". The point remains that a
text invariably show traces of the impact other texts have
made – in phrasing, in the uses of signs, and – if it's not too
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small a fragment – in genre features. Some genres have a his-
toryof being anti-genres, for instance the novel from Cer-
vantes to Diderot or modernist poetry, their "raison d'être" is
a kind of protest against earlier forms of the genre and by
this mode of existence they are transforming the genre. In a
similar way, Wittgenstein's way of writing is from the outset
negatively dependent upon the earlier way of writing phi-
losophy, and he develops his style of writing into a way of
philozophising against other styles and textual patterns in
the process of establishing his own views. 
The interpretation of the intentionality of a text is to inter-
pret the possible frames given for understanding by the sty-
listic features of the text. We might say that textually
structured intentions live a "double life"; that of the literate
culture they are inserted into and are dependent upon, and
that of the individual contribution represented by the text.
Style as the result of conscious creation is opposed to acci-
dent, style is the individual way of the writer to impose his
will on his medium. 
The double life of intentions fascinated the ancient sophistic
rhetoricians, who put their knowledge into more or less
effective use by seeking to influence their contemporaries to
choose between possible patterns of intentions. Unfortu-
nately, Platonic philosophical tradition always tended to
dismiss such choices on the grounds that to place people in
such situations was an immoral way of trying to exploit peo-
ple's faith as well as their bad motives. This moral pointer
distorts the problem of understanding how we acquire
intentions. 
In everyday life we do feel free to say that this or that person
doesn't understand what he is saying, or even to claim that X
and Y doesn't know what they are doing. Such talk is, under
certain circumstances, held to be quite literally true, as for
instance by some of the participants in the discussion on
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whether or not Knut Hamsun,Nobel laureate in literature,
really understood what he said when he condemned the
dying KZ-prisoner and Nobel Peace Prize winner Carl von
Ossietzky as a traitor, or what he later wrote in his necrology
on Hitler. 
Far less dramatic examples, and more intellectually intrigu-
ing ones, are given by different kinds of authors returning to
their own text; revising it, dismissing it entirely to later
extract and use parts from it, reappraising the text and inter-
polating sections to it or even commenting upon it. The
point made by the old and worn joke that makes someone
saying "I won't know what I have written until I've read it,
will I?" comes to mind, a more pertinent comment could per-
haps be "I don't know exactly what I meant until I have
rewritten it". When asked about what he meant to say in this
or that work of his, the novelist and poet Tarjei Vesaas used
to answer: "I meant what I wrote". But he also is recorded to
have commented upon the papers of a conference on his
writings, that he had never before thought of many of the
meanings now attributed to his works. Such a comment is
not necessarily ironic, I should rather think it refers to a com-
mon experience for many a writer: the text not only takes on
new meanings or loses some of its old meanings as the
world changes around the text, but it also unfolds new kinds
of possible meanings – or even new kinds of meaningless-
ness. What is at one period of time regarded as redundancy
of meaning in a text, might later on be considered as con-
structive elements or destructive clashes of contradictions.
And thus we arrive at the problem of "the first order" when
asking how intention is established in writing, notably the
question of how to understand the intention of the original
author who wrote these texts that are being edited, encoded,
regrouped and generally put under the scrutiny of textual
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criticism. Please allow me repeat thequotation from § 24 of
Philosophical Remarks: "The intention is already expressed in
the way I now compare the picture with reality". Note that it
is the question of how the comparison is made, the methodi-
cal features of the comparison, that is underlined. 
What is, then, to be compared in the process of transcribing
these particular texts? Different versions of the text, one
would presume. Wittgenstein's collected Nachlaß constitute
a rather bewildering mass of reformulations, cut-up frag-
ments, fragments pasted up in new orders, interpolations,
emendations, slashes and almost any kind of variations on
the original versions that one might dream of – or have
nightmares about, I should think, if one is charged with the
task of organizing this strangely amorphous material. 
Supposedly, a certain temptation to violate the form – or
rather, formlessness – of this given material might present
itself to anyone approaching it. It is constituted by the impa-
tient desire to reformulate any how-question into a
what-question, like: "Oh, bother, what is Wittgenstein's aim
here? What is he talking about? What is his subject?" Of
course, a concordance (as, for instance, arranged by a pro-
grammed search through the files) may relieve the reader of
most of an elsewise painstaking job of contextualizing
expressions, concepts and subjects. Working along the lines
of identifying "key words" is to choose a method of reading
that mediaeval exegetes used to call "lectio brevio potior",
representing the view that the simplest interpretation is the
best, we may somewhat inexactly translate the scholastic
slogan into: "the best way is a shortcut". 
The resulting new conceptualizing of Wittgenstein's manu-
scripts might lead to perspicuous analyses of his concepts.
The essentialist temptation in such cases might, however, be
to recreate Wittgenstein systematically as a kind of con-
cept-maker, a filigree word-smithhammering out his con-
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ceptual universe, one tiny bit after another. One would then,
in a way, have access to "the way I now compare the picture
with reality", that is, if one really presupposes that Wittgen-
stein's concepts and ways of expressing himself are to be
considered pictures of reality. And one has then made the
feat of reconstructing Wittgenstein into his very opposite. – I
mildly suggest that in the adoption of essentialist proce-
dures resides at least a certain danger of misrepresenting the
material.
A more exciting and comprehensive approach to this bulk of
manuscripts is, I do believe, to adopt the competing scholas-
tic principle of "lectio difficilior potior"; the most difficult
reading is the best. We should accept the very formlessness –
apparent or actual – as an invitation to examine how Wit-
tgenstein conducted his own investigations into his own
philosophical language. By comparing different versions,
could these versions be said to have different clues to under-
standing, could their patterns of construction be discerned to
be distinctively different in any way? Could rhetorical
points be differentiated by their stylistic or aesthetic fea-
tures, and do such features have determinate functions in
Wittgenstein's recorded second thoughts and reformula-
tions? In particular, what could be done to give access to a
comprehensive study of Wittgenstein's examples? The way
this philosopher stresses and elaborates on different types of
examples is a constitutive part of his philosophizing, it is
probably the one most important methodical feature of his
argumentative strategy. 
Marcus B. Hester discussed, in The Meaning of Poetic Meta-
phor (The Hague/Paris 1967), how figurative language con-
stitute ways of seeing. It is the stylization of the metaphor that
defines what possible intentions could be discerned. Hester
underlines the Wittgensteinian point that intention must be
defined by the way in which the poetexpresses himself. His
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considerations are based on Wittgenstein's understanding of
language use, accordingly, Hester's views could hold some
interest when we discuss the representation of Wittgen-
stein's own uses of language. The use of examples and
counter-examples seems to constitute Wittgenstein's own
critical method. The Nachlaß shows how Wittgenstein inces-
santly returns to his examples, to modify them and comment
upon them from new angles. Contrary to what is often
taught, Wittgenstein does not usually "use" examples as
practical illustrations for some more or less abstract princi-
ple. Instead, he explores the possibilities for thought in the
use of examples, and is always on the lookout for such prin-
ciples as are embedded in an example. In some respects,
Wittgenstein's treatment of examples resembles the kind of
new uses an artist might find for an "objet trouvé": The
impression is sometimes given that he has found the exam-
ple, and then asks what it might be an example of. 
Wittgenstein constructs his arguments enthymemically.
That is, he invites to an analysis of the leading principles and
the direction of the narratives presented in the form of
examples, instead of presenting a syllogistic logical proce-
dure. To proceed by enthymemical argumentation may cre-
ate an impression of nearness when used in front of an
audience, but in a text such procedures often offer a Verfrem-
dungseffekt, a feeling of estrangement in the reader. Biases
and presuppositions are turned inside-out or pursued in
their consequences. 
In this respect, Wittgenstein's Nachlaß has a certain resem-
blance to the sceptical way in which Michel de Montaigne
treated his own book of Essais, the genre he invented in
order to be able to write. Into a copy of the first edition
(1580) Montaigne inserted comments, additional examples,
corrections, afterthoughts in the margins and onpasted-in
pieces of paper. Montaigne continued his revisional work
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until his death in 1592. His personal copy of Essais, with all
the alterations, was the basis for the posthumous sixth edi-
tion of 1595, just as he had ordained before his death. Mon-
taigne stated that he wrote in order to understand himself.
He was, in fact, one of the first moderns to problematize the
knowledge of the self, and he did so by the continuous cor-
rection of his self in his own writings, in which he never
ceased to question the validity of what he had heard, seen
and read – what constituted the validity of his knowledge of
his world.
We have for ever lost the voices of these authors' texts. But
the traces that show how they reflected upon the voices and
texts of their times are there, in the interpolations, the emen-
dations and the comments they made. And it is exactly in
the way such thinkers as these have gone about reworking
their own language, that we may search for the answer to
how subjectivity is constituted in such a way of writing. To put it
otherwise, perhaps somewhat boldly but, as I hope, sugges-
tively: it is actually possible to study how Wittgenstein, like
Montaigne, develops a critical attitude towards the sources of
the subject's own intentionality.
I haste to add that it is not the "author's workshop" of the
romantic historicists that I suggest to look for in Wittgen-
stein's Nachlaß, nor is it the intellectual development of the
historical individual Ludwig Wittgenstein. What I do think
may be an awarding study, is the investigation of how this
text material brings to light the process by which individual-
ity is constituted, how a subject is objectivized in a carefully
constructed manner and being manifested as a textual prod-
uct. 
In Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein remarks on the rela-
tion between subject and object: 
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 § 71: Visual space is called subjective only in the lan-
guage of physical space. The essential thing is that the
representation of visual space is the representation of
an object and contains no suggestion of a subject. 
Well, then: Aren't the texts at hand to be considered as visual
space? Aren't many of the questions raised in Huitfeldt's
paper questions concerning the visual representations of the
text material? In textual criticism, anyhow, it is the visual
appearance of the texts that first comes under scrutiny. More
generally, the question of how readability and visuality is
related in the understanding of texts, is a question of how
the observance of sign patterns is turned into a critical exam-
ination of the uses of language. 
Such a critical examination of the visual patterns of a text
leads to reflections on the difference between representation
and composition: A text is not the visual representation of a
message in a similar way as letters are supposed to be visual
representations of sounds. Writing implies the construction
of interrelated patterns of visual representations and differ-
ent levels of prescriptive rules for organizing complexities of
written discourse. Among these rules are genre characteris-
tics, which presuppose knowledge in the reader of how
other, earlier or contemporary, texts are constructed. To
study the complexity of a textual composition is, therefore,
to critically examine prescriptive rules of how one should
approach, describe, present and represent a subject or an
argument. Such a study implies considerations on the ethos
and pathos which is appropriate when dealing with a subject
and proposing arguments within a certain genre. Such con-
siderations constitute the starting point for the study of col-
lective, that is, culturally determined, intentionality.
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By now, I have already introduced my announced third area
of questioning: the relation between orality and literacy, that
is, of written discourse as opposed to spoken discourse.
Earlier, I quoted Wittgenstein's question: "If, when learning
a language, speech, as it were, is connected up to action, can
these connections possibly break down?" An answer to this
question is that the connections between speech and action
break down whenever writing represents discourse. Writing
is another type of action than talking, reading is another
type of action than listening. The writer is not necessarily
conscious of everything that goes into his writing, but his
construction of the text is nevertheless deliberate, he writes
for some purpose – not necessarily for the purpose of con-
veying a message to someone (one might write diaries, for
instance, to be able to get a clear picture of what has hap-
pened and in order to remember it later on). Anyhow, to put
pen to paper or to open a new file on your harddisk is to go
through motions that are learned and usually practiced for
certain purposes. 
Anyone who has had the experience of collaborating with
another person on a manuscript (or even of writing a contri-
bution to a collection of essays), knows that one adjusts to
certain constraints of how to write on certain subjects – or to
avoid writing in certain manners on certain subjects – as
well as to an agreed division of labour. But this kind of
adjustment – or the efforts made to avoid such adjustments –
to constraints in the production of a text, is also present to
the person writing in solitary confinement. Such literate – or
"scriptural" – constraints are what makes reading learnable,
but the knowledge of them is not necessarily sufficient to
make a text understandable to a reader. 
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The reader may ignore what kinds of constraints the author
was under during the time of the production of the text he is
reading, or he may on the contrary be acutely aware of them.
The reader may even read deliberately at cross-purposes, he
may freely choose to search for other kinds of information in
the text than the writer of the text intended a reader to look
for. The situation of the reader, that he has such a possibility
to choose among interpretational options and to weigh alter-
native ways of understanding the text, already shows that
the act of reading cannot be symmetrical to the act of writ-
ing. 
Reading is no simple decoding of encoded authorial mes-
sages, but implies constructive cognitive work on the part of
the reader. The reader brings his experience of other texts
and of his other practices to bear on what he reads. This is
why many an old text never ceases to surprise readers. The
act of reading may transform the way in which the reader
looks at the constraints in his culture or in his participation
in different fields of practice – different "language games". A
text should, therefore, from the reader's viewpoint be
regarded as a dynamic entity, where meanings in a well-con-
structed text may change over time according to such possi-
bilities as are present to the reader.
Written and oral discourse have different organizational prin-
ciples. This problem is systematically ignored by analytical
philosophers discussing the function of speech acts. Accord-
ingly, they tend to concentrate on single phrases or proposi-
tions and to furnish those with imagined contexts of oral
communication, as if every kind of language use emerges in
speech situations. Their "logocentrism" makes them unpre-
pared or unwilling to discuss, for instance, the function of
texts when read aloud or silently by language users, andit
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creates a blind spot in their analyses of communication in a
literate society. 
One very important feature in any text is that it sets up an
alternative context to the speech situation when referred to
or used by interlocutors in speech. Every phrase in a text is
understood in its relation to other phrases in the text, and
this relation is normally not just given by the linearity or the
series of phrases following each other. The totality of the text
is governed by aesthetic, rhetorical, grammatical and some-
times logical principles, determining the syntax of the
phrases and thereby the semantics. Understanding of a text
also entails knowledge of other texts of similar or different
types, often a whole series of texts within a particular tradi-
tion. This is why texts commonly considered to be "classical"
tend to change meaning over time, as interpreters have
gained knowledge of other texts relevant to understand the
genre or the intertextuality. The Bible, Homer, the fragments
of the sophists, the works of the two Senecas or the works
that were attributed to Duns Scotus are all examples of text
complexes that are quite differently interpreted now than,
say, two or three generations ago. 
In oral communication, discourse is not arrested or fixed as
in written discourse. Semantic determinants of oral lan-
guage use are of other kinds, mostly social: conventions of
how to behave towards people, power relations, the knowl-
edge or the lack of knowledge that interlocutors have of each
other, the actual historical situation, the corroborate pur-
poses of the collective speech situation or the particular aims
of individual participants. The difference in organization of
written and spoken discourse is experienced as soon as we
encounter a thought-figure like irony, where a meaning con-
trary to the explicitly expressed one is conveyed. In a speech
situation, the understanding of ironical comments implies
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an acuteawareness of the positions of the interlocutors,
whereas textually formulated ironical comments cannot be
appreciated without an understanding of how textual ele-
ments are related in the construction of a contrarywise way
of referring to something. 
When speech act theoreticians pick out propositions for
closer scrutiny, they tend to treat spoken phrases as if these
were cut-out text fragments thrown haphazardly into the
world. One of the famous examples of John Searle is: "The
cat is on the mat". Normally, we don't go around telling each
other of cats' whereabouts. If we consider a normal situation
of small-talk, it can be of greater consequence to pay heed to
the way in which we often achieve an ironical effect by met-
aphorizing statements on the scheme of ostensive refer-
ences: "As you know, Peter is a real tomcat. I'm rather
worried about his health, because yesterday he sat on the
mat all night!". This metaphor functions as a deliberately
planned category mistake where characteristics of species
are mixed, the effect being that Peter is classified – perhaps
as admirable, perhaps as contemptible, anyhow as someone
who distinguishes himself by his behaviour. In order to
uphold a conversation, we do not reduce suchlike meta-
phors to their elementary referential properties, we accept
the language game and jumps between classificatory strate-
gies, and new clues may lead us on to new variations on a
theme. In contrast, in a discussion of the metaphoricity of
Baudelaire's sonnet poem Les chats, we are confined to the
stratagems and structure of the poem when we want to elu-
cidate what categorizations the text allows for. Searle's cat
could have found a natural habitate in a nursery rhyme or in
an elementary textbook for the first grade in primary school,
in such cases we should consider how the rhyme is used to
develop children's awareness of distinctive factors in lan-
guage by playing with words.
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In Les mots et les choses, Michel Foucault discussed how the
early classifications of natural science, commerce and litera-
ture organized the world during the emergence of moder-
nity. More generally, one could say that the impact of the
text upon the world consists in the ordering, reordering and
sometimes even desorganizing of our views of experience
and information. 
An obvious difference between oral and written language is
that writing may be introduced into spoken discourse,
whereas spoken discourse cannot be introduced into an
already existing text without altering the text by writing and
thereby creating a new text. The point is not just a banality;
the classical scholar Eric A. Havelock has argued that the
awareness of such a difference was the starting point for the
ancient Greeks' awareness of history as well as for the neces-
sity of logic. A text is an object with a history; there was
something before the text was written, and something has
happened since, there is one situation before reading the text
an another situation afterwards. 
To represent historical development by writing down a
story is to fix the telling of events within a certain represen-
tational pattern, to discuss the interpretation of the story is
to compare the validity of this pattern with the validity of
conventional conceptions or formulas known to the partici-
pants in the discussion. Therefore, referring to representa-
tions of history implies considerations of causes and effects,
not only as presented by a story written down, but also of
any text: A list of objects classifies the objects listed as
belonging to a type or types, a code of law sets some norma-
tive statements into the world, an edict orders people about,
a story may beg questioning or provoke conflicting interpre-
tations.
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Much has been said and written during the last few decades
on differences between oral, traditional societies and literate,
modern societies. I should not want to impose such discus-
sions upon the Wittgenstein Archives, only to suggest that it
might be relevant to consider how the state of much of the
text material in the Nachlaß in some respects resembles
what one might find in a "manuscript culture", like monast-
ries and universities of the late middle ages. The uses of
manuscripts are of other kinds than the uses of print; manu-
scripts have a much more restricted circulation and copying
them invariably creates more or less subtle changes both in
their appearance and in their content. Before the coming of
the printing press, manuscripts were mostly written to be
read aloud, and contributed therefore to the ordering of oral
culture within certain institutionalizations. We have main-
tained similar uses of manuscripts, like reading papers in a
conference or circulating manuscripts for comments, or even
the introduction of a new work into scholarly dialogue by
the doctoral dissertation. In such instances, the texts consti-
tute the agenda and they govern the individual and collec-
tive performances. Such uses of texts often contribute to a
ritualized freezing of the speech situation, conferences seem
to be a mode of existence suspended from the flow of every-
day time. 
But in the case of Wittgenstein's Nachlaß, the author hasn't
allowed his texts to remain fixed entities in well-ordered
series. The author seems to use his own texts as arms in a
struggle between what he once thought and wrote and what
he now wants to write and think. When Wittgenstein
ordained that translations into English of his writings
always should be accompanied by the German original
when published – an ordainment not always respected –,
one of the reasons could have been that the reading then
would allow for a comparison between language games, sty-
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listic nuances and semantic possibilities in the two lan-
guages. 
In the Scandinavian countries ever since the great pedagogi-
cal reforms provoked by Grundtvig in the first half of the
last century, we are wont to praise "the living word", the
liveliness of spoken discourse, as the primary source of
insight and understanding. But there is a distinct possibility
that speech may make it more difficult for us to find truth,
because we are lead to accept intrinsic conventions and
norms that rule oral communication, and the costs of ques-
tioning conventional usage might be so great that we often
refrain from such activities, unconsciously or consciously.
To study Wittgenstein's way of writing could challenge the
presuppositions of such logocentric traditions. By returning
to his own texts in order to alter them, Wittgenstein arrests
conventions and struggles with those thought-patterns that
he wants to free himself and others of. Thereby he shows
how writing gives possibilities to question received views
on how language functions. 
Thus, and finally, my fourth proposed area of questioning
comes up in the guise of a conclusion: the possibility of a
critical hermeneutics. 
Textual criticism implies critical examination not only of the
form of the texts that are present as objects for study, but
often also of beliefs and notions that have guided former or
contemporary interpreters. Literary criticism implies evalua-
tions of the validity of interpretative strategies as well as
particular interpretations of texts. Rhetorical criticism may
be said to imply a critical study of the circumstances under
which persuasion is possible, and this is a tradition that
might be brought to bear on the question of how the uses of
texts contribute to the construction and identification of col-
lectively recognizable intentionality. 
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All these traditions within textual studies have bearings on
the way one treats epistemological problems in the uses of
texts. Therefore, critical philosophical analyses of texts
should pay heed to the lessons to be learnt from philological
investigations, and philological examinations of textual
material should pay heed to the philosophical problems
involved. 
To take into account the interrelatedness between philoso-
phy and philology is altogether another endeavour than to
simply promote collaboration between experts within differ-
ent disciplines which boast their own particularities in prob-
lems and problem solving. It means that we should pose
other problems than those commonly accepted within the
disciplinary matrixes, that is, the paradigms. Analysing the
construction of subjectivity and intentionality in texts
implies considerations on how language unwinds and is under-
stood within time. 
In order to approach the question of how the understanding
of language itself is culturally bound, these bindings or
determinants should be critically studied as productive enti-
ties, patterns being introduced into and guiding the situa-
tions of writing, reading and talking. Such an investigation
of how texts function as dynamic entities constitutes a criti-
cal hermeneutics, taking into account the cultural historicity
of concept complexes. 
My suggestion is that the designation "critical hermeneutics"
could be taken to refer to the study of interpretational
matrixes within particular cultural settings. Perhaps my use
of the notion of "interpretational matrix" is in need of some
elucidation. It could be considered as analogous to Kuhns
"disciplinary matrix" – commonly accepted guidelines, ways
of conducting research and teaching, institutionalizations
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that ensure the production of knowledge withinthe repro-
duction of a common understanding of how a discipline
functions.
 
An interpretational matrix is, then, the ensemble of available
patterns of interpretations, the stratagems for understanding
how to acquire knowledge, the procedures for validating
interpretational possibilities. 
In the comparisons between interpretational clues of avail-
able texts and the clues of interpreting past experience,
reside possibilities for the critical examination of the con-
struction of personal as well as collective identity. 
Willard Van Orman Quine once said, in his much-quoted
work From a Logical Point of View: 
Identity is a popular source of philosophical perplex-
ity. Undergoing change as I do, how can I be said to
continue to be myself? Considering that a complete
replacement of my material substance takes place
every few years, how can I be said to continue to be I
for more than such a period at best?
Quine suggested that we ought to consider how abstract
entities gain their hold upon our imaginations, so that we
too readily commit ourselves to the use of general terms in
descriptions of identity, a procedure which makes us con-
fuse general terms with singular ones. He proposes a prag-
matic view on what he calls our "conceptual scheme", we
can change and improve our eclectic heritage bit by bit while
continuing to depend upon it for support – like Neurath's
philosopher, who is compared to a mariner who must
rebuild his ship on the open sea. Quine flatly declares that
we cannot detachourselves from our conceptual scheme
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"and compare it objectively with an unconceptualized real-
ity".
Quite obviously we cannot un-conceptualize the experiences
which constitute our relations to the social and material
world, we are in need of concepts and symbols to be able to
think. But what we can do, is to compare our conceptual
schemes, or rather our interpretations of ourselves, with
those interpretational matrixes offered by the stories, the
examples and the classifications presented to us by the texts
of our culture. Such comparisons between language games
allow us to break out of the conceptual boundaries of the
particular language games we exist within, and to take on
responsibility for intentions that may go against the inten-
tionality commonly accepted within the practices we par-
take in. This analogous mode of reflection constitutes, I do
believe, an ethical significance in Wittgenstein's encourage-
ment to compare examples. It makes it possible to analyze
and even criticize assumptions integrated into our tacit
knowledge. 
Quine's approach to the understanding of how we pragmat-
ically insist upon being ourselves by being aware of how we
change, seems to me to suffer from his own insistence upon
the methods for identifying objects conceptually. What of
our recognition of the ambiance of a refreshing friendly dis-
cussion, or of the enmity of opponents in budgetary discus-
sions in a faculty board, what about the identification of the
point of a story, the usefulness of an example for an argu-
ment, the stylistic appropriateness of elaborations in a
speech, the pleasure of being surprised by the turns of a
poem read silently or aloud, the annoyance of listening to a
bad singer? These kinds of identifications cannot be pinned
down, neither by general nor by singular concepts. They do,
however, constitute ways of learning and ways of judging
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ourselves and others. And theinterpretations such reading
of identifications entail, may be compared to alternative or
similar patterns of interpretations in texts. By such an
approach to texts, we establish a kind of "participational
objectivation" in our identification of our own selves and of
the possibilities of intentions.
Like the aforementioned scientists in their laboratories or
seminars, we tend in everyday life mostly to comfort our-
selves by reascertaining our experiences. In some respects,
Quine's improved conceptual scheme and the ship of
Neurath's mariner are variations on this theme. One would
suppose that Neurath's mariner would have difficulties in
rebuilding, say, a schooner into a destroyer (and where is
Neurath's lumberer?). Quine's use of Neurath's metaphor
invites us to reassure ourselves that the more we change, the
more we remain the same, as much unaffected by passing
pirates and supply ships as by visits to foreign shores.
Another well-known metaphor, that of the "encounter"
between reader and text, is often interpreted somewhat sim-
ilarly, in that it is taken to mean that the reader assimilates
into his awareness of his own inner being whatever he
enounters when reading. But the trouble is that texts often
prove to be very uncomfortable to our self-consciousness. At
least, the history of reading habits tells us that a self-com-
forting smugness is no necessary result of reading. On the
contrary, texts have been known to alter readers' experiences
of themselves quite thoroughly. 
Thus, a critical hermeneutics implies efforts to understand
how writing and reading might alter self-consciousness and
provoke change in culturally bound contexts. The study of
Wittgenstein's Nachlaß under such a perspective could tell
us something of how consciousness of the possibility to
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compare language games makesit possible to break some of
the boundaries set up for us in language games. 
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Form in Language: Wittgenstein and Structuralism
What kind of object is language? With this question we should aim at an
explanation of language – its conditions and causes. This does not mean
that the answer has to be naturalistic. In speaking of noises and ink on
paper naturalism is as blind as "transcendentalism" to the specificity of
language and of linguistic perception. Thus, my aim in this paper is to
indicate a way of explaining language by, at the same time, explaining
its irreducibility. "Form in language" or "linguistic form" are the terms
that – hopefully – will carry my arguments, while my doubts and hopes
will be connected to both Wittgenstein and structuralism. 
In Wittgenstein's thinking on language there is no concept of linguistic
form. Instead we have logical form (and "logical grammar"), language-
games and rules. Besides, Tractatus introduced the peculiar way of
speaking of language as something general (by having a logical syntax
independent of specific languages as for instance sanskrit or urdu). This
also gave the subsequent alternative of speaking of occurrences of lan-
guage-use as if there were no different languages involved. Did the
shopkeeper understand english or did he only understand german? 
Structuralism can develop a concept of linguistic form that is indepen-
dent of the concept of rules and of codes; that is as a way of thinking of
linguistic form as a "gestalt" not reducible to its elements. Second, lin-
guistic form cannot be understood as something independent of linguis-
tic expression and content. I doubt we can find something like this
within linguistics. One of the reasons is that form is commonly thought
of as a product of a formalization. Another reason is that language – in
spite of Saussure – is seen from the point of view of the speaker. The con-
sequence; a concept of form justifying the distinction between invariant
and variant. Against this, I will argue that in language there are only
variations and relations between variations. Here there is a use for Wit-
tgenstein's concept of "family-resemblances" and for his hint that a gram-
mar is arbitrary. There is no patriarch or code that determines the
identity of a member of our family. Or if we think there is, it is a politi-
cally determined identity. 
In this way I will try to open the field for a concept of linguistic form as
something local, historical (subject to change) and linked to the specific
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materiality of language.Something between a picture and a ruler. Some-
thing that is neither analogical nor digital. Something that has nothing to
do with Hjelmslev's notion of a system under a linguistic sequence. It
has rather to be understood as the organization of the sequence with
respect to its own temporality. As a form – gestalt – this is of course
something that is primarily shown, i. e. perceived. What we hear we can-
not write about in the same manner as we hear it.
– *** –
My wish is that I could have started on a point where I was
already understood; that you – my ears – gave the content of
my talk. Wishful thinking – especially in philosophy if we
regard it as a difficulty or disturbance of understanding;
thus, as an absence of the other giving the meaning to our
words. But feeling this, we may seek the meaning of words
everywhere – in intentions, things, rules, ideas etc. – except
in the ear of the other. Was this the fate of Wittgenstein? I do
not know. But I will argue that it is the fate of philosophy of
language being a symptom of a problem it doesn't under-
stand. This is the problem of the meaning of what we say –
do the others understand it? do I understand it myself? And
the common solution is to search for what gives meaning to
our words, to reassure ourselves about the relationship
between language and reality. This is a solution I'm deeply
dissatisfied with. On the one hand it offers no reflection on
language, on the other there is no reflection on culture or
society. In speaking of linguistic meaning – of how words in
language get their meaning, both language and culture are
presupposed. Culture is presupposed both as the context for
language-use and as the content being expressed; what is
talked about. Language is presupposed as something lin-
guistic and is as such of no problem for the philosopher. His
problem is that of accounting for how a word as a linguistic
expression gets its meaning. 
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Let me put it in a slightly different way. Theories of linguis-
tic meaning confuse two distinct problems. On the one hand
the problem of how something can become language – be an
expression within a language. On the other the problem of
how a culture makes up the content of what we say. This
means that a study of language-use may grasp neither the
cultural conditions nor the linguistic conditions of what we
say. Both the linguistic expression and the facts talked about
are considered as something given; the problem is the one of
their relationship and not the one of their respective consti-
tution or formation. Therefore words and things are circum-
scribing each other in a closed circle that assures – for us –
their identities. The closing of language is thus reflected and
founded in the very discourse on language. 
In what follows I shall only be concerned with linguistic con-
ditions for what we say. My question; how is something
made into a linguistic expression? And my answer; this is
possible in virtue of the form in a given language. Form in
language. 
Linguistic expression: Wittgenstein once wrote something like
this. How can I know what you are thinking when I only
have access to the signs in your talk? Here comes the answer
put as another question: How can I know what I'm thinking
since I too only have access to my signs or words? And in
Zettel, § 140: "Ever and again comes the thought that what
we see of a sign is only the outside of something within, in
which the real operations of sense and meaning go on". But
there is no outside hiding something. There are no meaning-
bodies – "Bedeutungskörper" – parallelling our expressions
or signs. This means that linguistic meaning is not some-
thing distinct from a linguistic expression. I quote from
Philosophical Grammar: "I say the sentence "I see a black patch
there", but the words are after all arbitrary so I will replace
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them one after the other by the first sixletters of the alphabet.
Now it goes "a b c d e f." But now it is clear that – as one
could like to say – I cannot think the sense of the above sen-
tence straight away in the new expression" (p. 44). So what
the sentence says is given in the sentence or in our percep-
tion of the sentence. This we feel when we try to replace it in
the way Wittgenstein indicates. In one sense there is there-
fore no other way of answering the question about the
meaning of a word than by simply repeating it: "I feel fine
sitting just here" – what do you mean? I mean what I'm say-
ing; "I feel fine sitting just here". In other words: In order to
be a linguistic expression the expression has to have mean-
ing. If we speak of the expression – the word – on the one
hand and on what gives it meaning on the other, this is eas-
ily forgotten. Forgetting this, we are led to looking for truth-
conditions or use-conditions that are assumed to make the
meaning of a sentence. Language and linguistic expressions
are thus over-looked and there is created a problem of lin-
guistic meaning that systematically ignores the specificity of
linguistic expressions. A discourse is created that cannot be
but blind to the materiality of the linguistic expression. 
Here we can see that Wittgenstein goes in different direc-
tions – reflecting of course that there are different directions
to go. Stressing the unity of expression and meaning, the
analogy goes to music; he compares the understanding of a
sentence with the understanding of a piece of music. This
aspect draws upon the perception of a sentence or what we
could simply call linguistic perception. Indeed, we may say
that it is as perceived that the identity of meaning and
expression is obvious. Another way to understand some-
thing is to continue for oneself or to be able to use words as
others use them. But I will pick up one thought from Wit-
tgenstein as particularly important in this context. A lan-
guage is a technique. Of course, technique not in an
instrumentalistic sense, but in a sense that atechnique makes
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something possible which without it wouldn't be possible.
(Man is thus an animal created by his own techniques).
Techniques being more important than what an intrumen-
talistic point of view can imagine. With respect to linguistic
expression, we can then say that they are techniques. Or; the
materiality of the linguistic expression is a form of tech-
nique. It is not a technique operating on a material, but a
material – the meaningful sound – being itself a technique
and having as such a grammar. This is not a grammar of a
picture or of an object, but a grammar of a process taking its
time – something we do when we speak. But here I find a
systematic ambiguity in Wittgenstein. "Use" means two dif-
ferent things. The use of a word can mean its use in lan-
guage. This use is then just what makes it a word. Or it can
mean the use within a certain context – linked to certain
social use-conditions. Of course both forms of uses are
involved, but my argument has been that we have to distin-
guish clearly between them. Furthermore the concept of lan-
guage-game seems to give priority to the second sense. From
this it is evident that Wittgenstein can sharpen our attention
on how we can do things with words. But it is not at the
same time evident that he can sharpen our attention on how
we can make utterances or discourses by sounds. Let me
repeat; something is an expression by being used and per-
ceived. This means both that it must be part of a language
and that it is part of a specific context (with specific use-con-
ditions). Even if Wittgenstein is stressing both aspects, the
priority seems to go to the second. If this is right, he is –
together with philosophy of language – in danger of loosing
language. 
A sign is the loose sense that the term "language" takes
within philosophy of language. Saying that a word gets its
meaning from – an so on – there is no indication whether the
word is taken to be something oral or something written, or
something else. There is furthermore no reflection upon the
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fact that there are differentlanguages. The reflection is more
guided by a view on concepts that makes the philosopher a
member of the conceptual international or the international
conceptual. We should ask why? Why is it so difficult to
think of language in its specific materiality? – to think of lan-
guage? Granted that what we then are thinking is just what
makes a language a language and not something reducible
to something else. Granted that the identity of expression
and meaning, as just stated, is a semantical or symbolic pre-
supposition with respect to language. 
Well – if we are to answer that question – we must – instead
of speaking about something we call language, talk about
the ways we are talking about language. What are the gram-
mars of our discourses on language? 
Concepts of language: I think that the dominant concept of lan-
guage both within philosophy of language and linguistics is
hidden in the distinctions between linguistic expression and
meaning, and between linguistic expression and form. This
means that a linguistic expression is either a surface linked
to an underlying form (a code or a system) or it is an item
linked to a context or an intention giving it its meaning. Say-
ing this, implies that what is currently regarded as the oppo-
site conceptions of language – formalism and contextualism
– become only opposite sides of the same coin. Neither of
them presuppose the identity of linguistic expression and
meaning. In contextualism you get the impression that it is
the context that gives meaning to our sounds or marks. In
formalism the meaning is something given afterwards; syn-
tax precedes semantics. On the one hand the physical
expression, or if you wish the medium, on the other hand
the meaning or the message. This means also that speaking
of linguistic or logical form, the form is something indepen-
dent of a specific expression or medium. Stating this inde-
pendence we get what we could call the metaphysics of
modernlinguistics and philosophy of language. My own the-
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sis is this; linguistic form cannot be understood as some-
thing independent of linguistic expression and meaning. As
I will try to show later on, this follows from my way of
thinking of the identity of expression and meaning. 
Formalism and contextualism are thus two ways of escaping
the linguistic materiality – escaping language – and by that
the possibility of understanding form in language. A more
interesting concept of language can be found in the gram-
mar that indeed must be seen as the opposite of generative
grammar, the comparative grammar of the last century.
Here there can be no universal language. There can only be
different languages belonging to different families of lan-
guages. Languages had to be compared to each other with
respect to analogies and differences. The comparative
method, therefore, was also a method of discovery. In this
context the grammarian could only refer to languages – not
to an universal thought as in the preceding general grammar
of Port Royal nor to an universal language as in generative
grammar. But we could also say that the Indo-European
proto-language occupied the place where, under the influ-
ence of the new logic, generative grammar was to put an
universal language. 
Anyway, comparative grammar excluded in advance the
concept of language that generative grammar is suffering
from. That means that it did open up for a concept of lin-
guistic form that doesn't fall within generative grammar: A
concept of linguistic form linked to its comparative method
which insists on the horizontal and that which is combined –
combinations. We could say that language from now on
could be the paradigm of a form – not the organism (as in
organic form), not the machine (as in mechanical form), and
not mathematics (as in logical form). But what would it be
like to thinkthat? – something that is excluded from the
philosophical tradition. Perhaps you would have to be a
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non-philosopher in order to try to think it, granted that what
is new in philosophy emerges outside philosophy. – Who
tried? Of course, Ferdinand de Saussure – misunderstood as
the founder of modern linguistics. Saussure was a scholar in
Indo-European languages and in comparative grammar
who tried to make a theory of language on the basis of that
grammar. But at the same time this is one of the lines of what
was later to become structuralism. Using this term that fig-
ures in the title of my paper, I must distinguish between two
structuralisms; One starting with Saussure, the other with
Roman Jakobson. Saussure is stressing that the sign, the
expression, is semantical, while Jakobson – with his point of
departure in phonology – makes the sign into a signal –
something physical that can be treated by codes. My struc-
turalism, then, is the one of Saussure. But of course this is a
Saussure that I hope to marry to Wittgenstein. 
Saussure-Wittgenstein: There is at least one evident link
between Saussure and Wittgenstein. I have in mind that they
both think in a comparative manner. There is in Wittgen-
stein a comparative philosophy echoing comparative gram-
mar. No transcendental philosophy, but comparative
philosophy. Nothing is hidden – we have to compare, not to
interpret. They join therefore an "empiricism" that is not
speculative; that means neither psychological nor logical. An
empiricism that breaks with the classical opposition
between the general (abstract) and the individual (concrete).
That means not to concentrate on the individual thing or
action, but on the individuation of the individual thing in its
relationship to other individual things. Not a thing (iden-
tity), but relations between things being at the same time the
individuation of things. In this way both Saussure and Wit-
tgenstein were preoccupied with the problem of identity.
Saussure; the individuation of the linguistic sign as what-
gives it its identity. But the differences between them are
important. I think Wittgenstein did not succeed in thinking
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of what he in a broad sense called the grammar of a lan-
guage, because he did not develop a concept of grammatical
or linguistic form. Maybe he remained caught up in logic in
a way that made it impossible for him to go from logical
form to grammatical form. Even though he remarked;
"Mathematical logic has completely deformed the thinking
of mathematicians and philosophers" (Remarks on the Foun-
dations of Mathematics p. 300). Another reason might be that
he was too close to his own problems (this being of course
also his greatness). But he was so occupied with the use-con-
ditions of language – seeing these both as necessary for
thinking and talking and belonging to a culture he detested
– that I think he would refuse my academic distinction
between linguistic conditions for our talk (linked to our lin-
guistic perception) and its cultural conditions. Or my dis-
tinction could have been assumed silently if he could have
written poetry or novels. This would of course have given
another therapy than the one given by his therapeutical
empiricism. 
I said that Wittgenstein was perhaps caught up in his con-
cept of logical form. But this does not mean that Wittgen-
stein follows the presupposition stating the external relation
between form and expression. In Tractatus the logical form is
linked to expressions – signs – in a way that shows the logical
form; The form is something which shows itself1. It is evi-
dent, however, that this concept of form is linked to the pri-
macy of the visual. It is a written symbolism that shows the
logical form of language. 
1.  Wittgenstein's concept of logical form has not had any impact upon logic
and linguistics. Perhaps the reason is that this concept is linked to his thesis
that there is no meta-logic, no meta-language. The alternative has been to
focus upon rules, rules that can be stated in a meta-language; Rules in lan-
guage, not form in language.
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We find the same concept of form in his later philosophy: "I
would like to say "what the picture tells me, is itself". That is,
its telling me something consists in its own structures, in its
own lines and colours" (Philosophical Investigations § 523).
This is a visual form that cannot be a point of departure for
an understanding of grammatical form. Here, we can see the
contribution of Saussure. Agreeing with Wittgenstein that a
form is as form linked to a medium or a materiality, he
breaks with the presupposition of thinking this as a visual
form. Related to language this can only be a form for the
specific materiality of language which, as spoken, is an audi-
tive or an acoustic materiality. The importance of Saussure is
then to approach language from the perspective of the ear –
from the perspective of linguistic perception. Thus breaking
with the primacy of the eye and the gaze in the philsophical
tradition – a primacy that cannot but overlook the specific
materiality of language, a primacy that may make you deaf
to what I have said on the linguistic expression and its iden-
tity with its meaning. 
Linguistic form: If you still follow me, I will try to approach
the topic of my paper more directly. But I hope that by now
you may feel some of the difficulties and obstacles in doing
that: Our dominant way of thinking of language from the
standpoint of the visual making thereby our distinctions
between expression and meaning, form and expression,
seem evident. This makes us further speak for instance on
representation – as if a sentence can represent something or
as if language is some form of a mirror. And it makes it natu-
ral to concentrate on language as an activity belonging to the
speaking 1st person – thus forgetting that we are also using
language when we are listening. And last but not least writ-
ing, with its atomic letters and atomic signs, being visual, is
implicitly the paradigm of language. Let me say it like this;
the linguistic expression or materiality is no topic in philoso-
phy of language because it thinks oflanguage on the basis of
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an implicit theory of this materiality. It cannot think of it
because it belongs to its presupposition; seeing it as some-
thing visual belonging to the 1st person speaking subject
representing something in the world. Maybe this is the rea-
son why both linguistics and philosophy of language is
blind to the necessity of making a theory of language
explaining why man has to be a talking animal and explain-
ing by that the symbolic or semantical character of language.
This is excluded as long as one takes as the point of depar-
ture in an implicit theory of language that in my opinion is
clearly wrong. But if I'm right, I cannot convince anybody
thinking within the framework I'm criticizing. Or maybe I
could do that if I continue in a more Wittgensteinian manner
– making you hear something with as small examples as
possible and doing that without this quasi-orality that is the
game of the reading of a paper. But I'm talking a language
that is not my own, so I need a paper, something written
some days ago. And this also means that I'm not quite sure
how I will react to it when reading it. You may object that
here I'm only creating problems: Let us discuss and so the
truth will be seen, let us discuss so we can decide who is
right. This is what we have seminars for. But I have never
experienced this and I think it a great illusion. What is more,
my demand is more than that; I want to be understood, feel-
ing at the same time the impossibility of just that. By the
same token, it will be impossible to solve the problem with
an identification with the understanding belonging to the
other. Of course this can happen, as in love or in poetry, but
philosophy is not communication in this sense nor discus-
sion.
This is no digression. I want to circumscribe a paradox; a
philosophy of communication that cannot think the other as
the condition for an understanding of what we say. And a
philosophy that thinks this other as a condition – the pri-
macy of the second person – for language – a philosophy of
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the ear – but without being able to makereal that condition
even if it can exclude the solution of philosophical commu-
nication and discussion as pseudo-solutions.
But let me not dramatize. What is normal is of course what
might not be the case in philosophy. The normal case is that
the other is a condition for the understanding of your own
utterance. Only in this way can a child learn a language. It
can say what it hears from the other when the other hear the
same thing as the child itself is hearing when saying some-
thing (This is the principle of G. H. Mead). A concept of
grammatical form should account for just this: the patterns
which make us hear something as something, the patterns of
a linguistic sequence which make this into a linguistic
sequence. One way of stating the question is this; what
makes something into the same word? What in a linguistic
pattern makes us regocnize the regularity that makes us per-
ceive patterns – and accordingly something as the same
word or sign? Note that the problem is not to account for the
way we make or do things with words. The problem is more
fundamental: how we make signs with sounds in a manner
that shows that there is no difference between the sound and
the sign.
Just to presuppose a common language, will here amount to
no explanation. But this is a common way to go. The argu-
ment runs like this: When we speak, our words are
occurences of a language we have in common – a system or
a code. My words, as something indvidual – as spoken by
me, are thereby occurences of something general and com-
mon that, compared to my concrete utterances, have the sta-
tus of constants or invariants. A linguistic form, then,
defines a linguistic constant independent of its specific
occurences. As an occurence we can only have a variant, a
realization coloured by the specific individual and the spe-
cific context. We can never meet the constant or the invariant
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itself, in other words, that which is assumedto belong to the
deep-structure or to the common core of language. So there
is in some sense an invisible language that doubles the invis-
ble heaven of concepts in philosophy. In fact the same
thought-figure is involved. The concept doubles in a mysti-
cal manner an individual thing explaining the individual
thing as falling under a general concept. Language doubles
in the same manner my words or utterances explaining their
identity as being occurences of some general constants or
invariants. Indeed, it is a mystical and platonic concept of
language where, as in generative grammar, everything is
deduced from nothing. What is at stake is the following; a
language cannot be accounted for in the perspective of the
traditional distinction between the general (common) and
the individual. If we do this there is no possibility of grasp-
ing form in language. The only thing we can do is to speak
of codes or to invent rewriting rules; a method of formaliza-
tion that has nothing to do with the actual forms in a lan-
guage.
The alternative in denying this distinction implies that we
may see the form in a language as that which makes up the
identity of linguistic utterances without its being on a level
other than that of the linguistic expressions. Both formalism
and contextualism claim that they account for the
occurences of linguistic expressions. Formalism by appeal-
ing to an underlying system – a system of rules – contextual-
ism by appealing to the context and the speaking subject.
Both overlook the grammatical form on the level of the lin-
guistic expression. An example: looking at the screen of my
PC, I see something that consists of formed patterns I can
read. But inside, I have been told, there are digital codes.
They produce what I can see on my screen – but that does
not mean that they can explain what I can see or read on that
very same screen. I read signs, but my PC "reads" signals.
Therfore there is no language in my computer and there is
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no language behind what I say as comparable to codes in
mybrain. But if you accept the distinction between expres-
sion and meaning or content, then you are free to call the
physical signals in the computer a language. You may by
now guess the importance of my concept of linguistic form.
And also its difficulty. For this form can be neither a digital
form nor an analogue form.2 The first being one of codes, the
second being linked to the visual.
Linguistic form has nothing to do with representation. What
is at stake is the specific organization of a linguistic sequence
operating upon its auditive materiality. For Saussure, this
means something that is determined by the fact that we
speak within a temporality which makes our words possi-
ble. Linguistic form is the grammar of linguistic temporality,
words following each others, rhythms, repetitions, pauses;
the gestalt of what we hear displayed through the dimen-
sion of time. In short, something comparable to music.
Wittgenstein's notion of language as a technique makes per-
fect sense in this context. We have a form related to a sign-
technique that must be regarded as a process; starting, going
on, ending, making discourses or poems. But this is only
possible through the ear of the other. This does not only
mean that a linguistic occurence is something understood by
the other. It also means that it must be related to comparable
occurences in such a way that this relationship makes what
we call a word something essentially repeated. A linguistic
item in a sequence is a linguistic item if it can be repeated in
other sequences. This is essentially because the existence of –
let us say a word – is a relational existence in the sense that it
gets its identity from the web of linguistic sequences and
from its repetitions within them. This means that what is
repeated is not an indentity – the same word. Every speaker
2.  But it might be said to be closer to an analogue form in the sense that we are
identifying patterns through it.
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says a word in slightly different waysand this implies that
we have only variations and nothing but variation. There-
fore, it is the variations that make the identity of a word and
not an invariant or constant that the variations are supposed
to manifest in the indvidual speech. To use Wittgenstein's
term we can say that the variations hold family-resem-
blances to each other. The links between them are – so to say
– horizontal and comparative which means that these links
are not explained by an identity on another level. Instead we
have relations between variations – lines of variations. And
this makes up the form of a language – the form being the
systematicity of the variations. If we accept this, there is no
essential difference between the individuality of my phrase
– the fact that I'm saying it – and the fact that it is understood
by the other. For the individuation of what makes the words
in what I say is at the same time the relations – the form –
that makes us hear it as a linguistic sequence: The individu-
alization of my utterance is at the same time what gives it its
linguistic identity. Differences and variations are not para-
sitic to a language, do not threaten language. On the con-
trary, it is just what makes language possible. To say the
opposite, would presuppose a code or an invariant which
can explain variants and so called deviations; a standard or a
normal language. But this is a political entity, not a linguistic
entity. As Saussure has stressed, a language in this sense is a
construction; there are only dialects and variations between
dialects. 
According to this point of view, a language cannot but
change. Change and thereby history is not something exter-
nal to it. A language cannot but be spoken in different ways
and that means that it will also change because here there is
no identity that is repeated or presupposed. This means, that
with respect to language a form or a system cannot but
change. But this change is a change without origin and with-
out finality. The traditional opposition betweensystem and
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history can therefore only be dissolved if we give up the
metaphysics of history on the one hand and the metaphysics
of the system on the other (the system being an universal
atemporal order). This means that grammar is arbitrary – a
grammar does change, but it does'nt have to change in a def-
inite direction. Chance and order are two sides of the same
coin. So the patterns of our language change, otherwise
there would have been no language or a created artificial
language. And they change because our words are not
things and not something that can copy a model of some
super-linguistic kind. But the word is not a nothing either; it
consists in those auditive differences and variations forming
the patterns of our language.
It is essential for such a pattern to be linked to time – time
being just what makes a linguistic sequence possible. If you
still beleive in a referent making the word what it is, this
might be difficult to see. What is, then, the pattern of such a
time-sequence? It is not causal in the sense that a word is an
effect of the word preceeding it. It is not intentional in being
linked to an intention in the speaking subject. It is not logical
in the sense of giving the form of an inference. What we
have is what I have tried to speak about – difficult as it is –
grammatical or linguistic form. But here I cannot give you a
clear-cut theory or a method that can formalize what I have
called "form in language". Maybe such a form can only be
shown in the use of language and that those who try to for-
malize it are trying to write down what can only be shown
in what we say. So let me say the last sentence that I wrote in
my abstract: What we hear we cannot write about in the
same manner as we hear it. 
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Comment on Utaker's Paper
First of all, I want to express my real agreement with the
general orientation of Arild's paper, and particularly with
his original attempt to link the with the statements of the
Saussurian linguistics. I also want to express my pleasure in
listening to his paper, which, by contrast with the dominant
trends among Wittgenstein's interpreters, doesn't project
any analytical claim on the second philosophy.
More precisely, I agree with the following main presupposi-
tions of his project: 
(1) The decision to throw a bridge accross the comparative
grammar and the comparative philosophical method Wit-
tgenstein recommended, and the conclusions he draws from
it – namely that, according to Wittgenstein and Saussure, the
so-called universal language has to be rejected as a mere
prejudice. Of course, we have here a fundamental difference
between Wittgenstein and analytical philosophers, which is
reflected in some respects in the fight between generative
and comparative grammar.
(2) The claim that the linguistic form is as an essentially
material form, as Saussure suggested it, when he decided to
treat the "linguistic sign" as a "two-sided psychical entity",
and that we have consequently to contrast a right structural-
ism (the Saussurian one) with a wrong one, unable to avoid
formalistic traps (Jakobson). 
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(3) The claim that the linguistic expression taken in its Wit-
tgensteinian sense has to be regarded as a kind of technics.
That is in fact a central point of Wittgenstein's contribution,
in as much it commands not only the decision to treat words
as tools, but also the cardinal distinction between the mean-
ing and the bearer of a name.
Obviously, Arild's aim is to show that the Saussurian
approach of the linguistic form on one hand and the Wit-
tgensteinian one on the other hand are focusing on the same
solution. That's the reason why he stresses the fact that the
Wittgensteinian notion of context isn't reducible to the lin-
guistic context (i.e. the place and function the system of lan-
guage ascribe to the word), but always involves social and
cultural use-conditions. We have here a possibility to draw
an illuminating parallel between what Saussure presents as
the "linguistic value" and what Wittgenstein sometimes call
"the 'soul' of the words" (see PI, § 530). And, as far as I can
see, there are some more arguments for the Wittgenstein –
Saussure marriage Arild has in view, for instance the fact
that a close link exists between the Saussurian assertion:
"language isn't a mere nomenclature", and the Wittgenstein-
ian conviction according to which the name itself isn't "a
label attached to a thing". In my opinion, a lot of conver-
gences could be picked out which would tend to show that
Wittgenstein and Saussure, even though they used quite dif-
ferent weapons, were really engaged in one and the same
fight, and tried to unravel the naturalistic and psychological
traps. As a proof, just compare the Saussurian definition of
language as form, which, as Saussure himself emphasized it,
implies that language is "not substance", and the way in
which Wittgenstein, in The Blue Book, wants us to simply
give up seeking for subtance behind the substantive. 
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Now, although I really agree with Arild's general attempt, I
must confess I'm very reluctant to follow him when he
asserts that theWittgensteinian approach of the linguistic
form finally failed, whereas the Saussurian one was a com-
plete success. This assertion makes it appear that in fact
Arild wants to force Wittgenstein to marry Saussure – I
mean, that he wishes to correct some features of the Wittgen-
steinian thought by means of Saussurian linguistics. Hence
the strategy he adopts: he first concedes that Wittgenstein
had foreseen the two different levels of the linguistic form,
but then he traces a "systematic ambiguity" in the way Wit-
tgenstein tried to elaborate them. According to Arild, the
language-games wouldn't permit to clearly distinguish these
levels nor to properly connect them. Arild concludes that,
though Wittgenstein was on the verge to discover the mate-
rial form, he stopped half-way: of course he managed to
escape formalism in rejecting the assumption of an univer-
sal, purely syntactical, logical form, but he had to pay a lot
for this, in as much the use-conditions through which he
reached the material form made the form "independant of a
specific medium". Thus, in some respects, Wittgenstein's
later contexualism is nothing but a reversion of his earlier
formalism and it constantly exposes him to the "danger of
loosing language".
The main argument Arild invokes, is that Wittgenstein has
given priority to the second level (i. e. the socio-cultural
use-conditions) of the linguistic form. That's the very point
of my reluctance. Of course, I concede that everything is not
clear cut in the Wittgensteinian approach of meaning as use.
Hasn't Wittgenstein, as late as 1950, himself noticed that
what he was trying to say "sounds like pragmatism" (On
Certainty, § 422)? So, there is a real difficulty here. But in
order to solve it, do we need to assume something like a
move from language-games as calculi to language-games as
218
forms of life, as it has often been asserted? Such a claim
would mean, in Arild's perspective, that the second Wittgen-
stein would have simply exchange the immaterial logical
form for a pseudo-material form: theraw socio-cultural con-
tents; in brief, that Wittgenstein has merely given up ques-
tionning about the logic of our language. I'm afraid such was
not his aim at all. As he has noticed himself in Philosophical
Investigations (§ 242), the two kinds of agreement (in defini-
tions and in judgments) he discovered to be the fundamental
conditions of the use of language seem "to abolish logic", but
that's a mere appearence: "they don't do so", he added.
Therefore, in my opinion, we have to complicate a little bit
the achievement of Arild's project...
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Wittgenstein's Later Manuscripts:
Some Remarks on Style and Writing
Die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, das erlösende Wort zu fin-
den. (MS 105, 1929: p. 44)1 2
The task of philosophy is to find the redeeming word.3
It is this that Wittgenstein reminds us of – and himself – time
and again from his earliest writings onwards. The task of
philosophy is to find the saving word, the word that liber-
ates from a philosophical problem. A philosophical problem
1. Manuscript numbers refer to Professor von Wright's catalogue of the
"Nachlaß" in Von Wright 1982: pp. 35-62. Datings indicate the date on which
Wittgenstein wrote the remark(s) in question: they refer to the last men-
tioned date in the manuscript, or, in the case of undated manuscripts, or
manuscripts whose date is problematic, to the date given in von Wright's
catalogue. Page references are to page numbers in the original; in the case of
unpaginated manuscripts I quote the first words of the page which I take to
be page 1 and count from there. In quotations from the originals I try to be as
faithful as possible and as far as the facsimiles allow. The following mark-
ings require explanation: xxx = xxx deleted; {xxx|yyy} = yyy written on top
of xxx; {xxx} = xxx written on top of unspecified or illegible characters; xxx =
xxx inserted (in, above, below line, marked or unmarked); xxx = xxx under-
lined by wavy line; xxx = xxx underlined by straight line; @ = unreadable
character; <...> = my omission of text; <!> = authentic error or outmoded
orthography; <xxx> = incidental comment of mine. As a member of the staff
at the Wittgenstein Archives I feel obliged to make clear that the markings I
use here do not represent those used in the machine-readable version pro-
duced at the Archives.
2. As with many of Wittgenstein's remarks also this one exists in different ver-
sions and occurs in different contexts. Cf. GT 1991: p. 32; GT 1991: p. 44; MS
105, 1929: p. 44; MS 107, 1929: p. 114; MS 115, 1933: p. 30; MS 115, 1933: p. 66;
TS 213, 1933: p. 409; MS 146, 1933-1934: p. 55 ("Wenn mir <...>" on page 1).
3. Translations into English are printed in Italics.
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is nothing but a problem oflanguage – the task of philosophy
is therefore to correct the philosophical misuse of language. 
The striking thing is that the solution of these linguistic
problems takes place in language itself. Words themselves
are the medium of the philosophical inquiry: they create the
philosophical problem and also lead to its solution.4 Philo-
sophical inquiry consists therefore in trying out different
words and different combinations of them: just as we try dif-
ferent keys or different number combinations to open a
lock.5 It is this that Wittgenstein did: he tried out different
words in order to find the word, that combination of words
which would liberate him. The essential medium for this
search was writing as a process and an activity.
Wittgenstein was a very impatient and sometimes intolerant
man. Most of his friends acknowledged that communication
with him was difficult and often unsatisfying.6 We cannot
doubt that he himself wished and longed for long and fruit-
ful discussions, but he also did everything to complicate any
conversation and human contact. Thus Wittgenstein was left
to transfer the oral dialogue into solitary writing: there he
could work on his own, and wasn't forced to make any com-
promises. His notebooks and diaries became the platform
where the whole theatre of philosophy and life went on. He
shared the philosophical dialogue, his thoughts and inner
life with the paper. When investigating Wittgenstein's
manuscripts one gets the impression that writing became for
Wittgenstein an aim in itself. Wemust see this also in the
4. Cf. PG 1974: § 95: "<...> It is in language that it's all done. <...>" Cf. MS 114,
1933/34: pp. 143, 151, 152 and MS 108, 1930: p. 195.
5. Cf. MS 109, 1930: p. 214.
6. Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright in Von Wright 1982: pp. 15f, 31; Norman Mal-
colm in Malcolm 1984: pp. 24ff, 30ff, 52f; Fania Pascal in Rhees 1984: pp. 18,
32f, 39ff, 46f.
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context of his ideal of serving the spirit which he refers to in
his First World War Notebooks7: writing was for him a dis-
tinguished way of doing just this. 
Wittgenstein's writing can be seen as the particular medium,
the motor, the carrier of his philosophizing and of his philo-
sophical development. We should regard the various
aspects of his writing process such as deleting, overwriting,
crossing out, slips of the pen, underlining, marking, insert-
ing, varying etc., and his tendency to revise and rewrite as
the tools of his work. As such they deserve our careful con-
sideration. Significantly, writing meant for Wittgenstein –
and surely not only for him – not just the pinning down of a
philosophical thought but rather the causing, carrying and
structuring of it, letter by letter, word by word, sentence by
sentence; and it meant, contesting words with words and
looking for a possible dialogue.
In the first part of this paper I consider the idiosyncratic for-
mulations with which Wittgenstein handles his question
"what can be said". In the second part I shall focus on the
vivacity of his manuscripts: the procedural dimension, the
private struggle, the presence of personality (particularly
exemplified in the secret code passages). Thirdly I deal with
the conversational and reader oriented dimension of his
style. Finally I shall turn to his use of alternative formula-
tions as a technique and to the conspicuous aesthetics of his
work. As far as possible I shall illuminate these points in
Wittgenstein's own words. The examples I present will show
some of the variety and multiplicity to be found in his
manuscripts. It is my hope that the reader will feel encour-
aged to follow up the references and examples.
7. GT 1991: pp. 21ff.
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"All philosophy is a 'critique of language'"8
Wittgenstein states in a manuscript: 
Ich sam<!>le gleichsam sinnvolle Sätze über Zahnschmerzen.
Das ist der charakteristische Vorgang einer grammatischen
Untersuchung. (MS 107, 1930: p. 285)
I am so to say collecting meaningful sentences about tooth-ache. This
is the characteristic procedure of a grammatic investigation.
This quotation throws light on large parts of Wittgenstein's
later manuscripts. Wittgenstein wants to collect sentences
which make sense – he wants to find out whether certain
sentences do make sense. What initiates the philosophical
inquiry is a feeling of awriness, a feeling of puzzlement
about the use of words. The particular investigation is often
opened with an interrogative phrase such as: Can anyone
believe it makes sense to say ...? Could one say ...? Can I
think of ...? Is it possible to think of ...? What does it mean to
say ...? Is it meaningful to suppose ...? 
Significantly Wittgenstein asks many more questions than
he answers. But where he does propose answers, either pro-
visional or ultimate, we frequently find phrases which corre-
spond stylistically to the above mentioned questions: You
can of course say ... I can say ... It does make sense to say ...
One can think of ... One cannot say ... It is meaningless to
suppose ... etc.
These phrases appear repeatedly throughout his texts and
remind us of the grammatical nature of the inquiry. One
should study all the different aspects and different shades of
emphasis used in these phrases, for example: the personal
(Ich kann sagen – I can say), theimpersonal (Man kann sagen
– One can say), the interlocutive (Du könntest sagen – You
could say), the indicative (Wir sagen – We say), the subjunc-
8. TLP 1961: 4.0031.
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tive (Einer könnte sagen – One could/might say), the weak
(Ich sollte/soll sagen – I should say), the emphatic (Man
muß sagen – One must say).9 
In the following I present a sequence of questions and
answers which deal with "what can be said". For this pur-
pose I have selected a sequence from the first 50 pages of MS
107, 1929: 
Hat es nun einen Sinn zu sagen <...>? (p. 5)
Nein{. D|, d}as darf keinen Sinn haben. (p. 6)
Denn inwiefern kann man von der Realität sagen <...>? (p. 6)
Umgekehrt könnte man auch? sagen <...> (p. 7) 
Das sagt man wohl: <...> (p. 8)
Wenn <...> dann kann ich sagen <...> (p. 9)
Es kommt mir vor <...> (oder soll ich nur sagen: <...>) (p. 11)
In diesem Fall kann man nämlich sagen: <...> (p. 12) 
Im Fall von <...> kann man das nicht sagen. (p. 12) 
<...> & es wäre unsinnig zu sagen, <...> (p. 12) 
Hat es einen Sinn zu fragen, <...>? (p. 15)
Man kann sagen, <...> (p. 19)
Und man kann weiter sagen, <...> (p. 19) 
Diese Überlegung wäre natür{lic}h unsinnig <...> (p. 20)
Darauf könnte man sagen: <...> (p. 20)
Man könnte nun sagen: <...> (p. 23)
Dann könnte man auch nicht mehr sagen, <...> (p. 23) 
Wenn ich sage: <...>? (p. 24)
Und wenn wir sagen, <...> (p. 25) 
Wenn {wi}r sagen: <...> (p. 26)
9. The variety of applications of the modal verbs in these formulations needs to
be acknowledged. For one example consider essentially different uses of
"können", such as the difference between "können" in the context of propos-
ing possibilities and examples ("Denn es könnte Einer sagen wollen: <...> –
For someone might feel like saying: <...>" in PU 1984, PI 1978: § 56) and "kön-
nen" in a grammatical proposition ("Und so kann man nicht sagen 'Rot exist-
iert', <...> – Thus one cannot say 'Red exists', <...>" in PU 1984, PI 1978: § 58).
Typically, Wittgenstein uses the negated "können" very often in grammatical
propositons.
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Wenn ich sagen kann: <...> dann hat es einen Sinn & ist richtig
zu sagen <...> (p. 28) 
Ist es hier richtig zu sagen: <...> (p. 28) 
Das würde heißen, daß die Frage <...> unsinnig & also unbere-
chtigt wäre. (p. 28) 
Ist es aber denkbar <...>? (p. 28)
Und Oder soll ich nun sagen <...>? (p. 29)
Wenn man aber nicht sagen kann, <...>? (p. 30)
Man könnte dann sagen, <...> (p. 31) 
Man könnte das¦<arrow pointing to section above> einfacher
auch so sagen: <...> (p. 32)
<...> & ich könnte doch nicht sagen <...> (p. 33) 
Und doch könnte ich – glaube ich – nicht sagen <...> (p. 33) 
Ad<!>erseits könnte ich aber doch nicht sagen: <...> (p. 33) 
Die Frage nach <...> wäre also unsinnig, <...> (p. 33) 
<...> so daß {m}an sagen könnte: <...> (p. 33)
Was würde es heißen <...>? (p. 33) 
Man könnte sagen: <...> (p. 35) 
Von <...> zu reden hat einen Sinn <...> (p. 36) 
Ich würde also sagen: <...> (p. 38)
Man könnte es dann auch ganz naiv so sagen: <...> (p. 39) 
Dann wäre ja der gute Sinn von <...> bewiesen. (p. 39)
Könnte man etwa so sagen, <...>? (p. 41)
Kann man sagen: <...> (p. 41) 
Oder kann man sagen: <...> (p. 45)
Kann man sagen: <...>? (p. 46) 
Man könnte sagen{: |, } <...> (p. 46) 
Oder man könnte sagen, <...> (p. 46) 
Man könnte also auch so sagen: <...> (p. 47) 
Könnte man nun aber nicht sagen: <...> (p. 47) 
Oder hätte <...> nur dann einen Sinn, <...> (p. 47)
Man könnte auch sagen: <...> (p. 49)10
Searching for sense consists in searching for what can be
said, since what cannot be said cannot be thought, and this is
for the philosopher a comfort: 
10. Cf. also EPB 1984: pp. 198-207; PI 1978: § 49ff, § 227, § 587; ÜG 1984: §§ 74-76.
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Was ich nicht denken darf, kann die Sprache nicht aus-
drücken. Das ist unsere Beruhigung. (MS 107, 1929: p. 2)
What I'm not permitted to think, language cannot express. This is
our comfort.
However, the search for sense cannot avoid passing through
stages of nonsense. One could even say that talking non-
sense is necessary in order to acquire sense. It is also the case
that the criteria of sense are brought into being by means of
sentences which themselves do not have sense. This is
expressed in the following quotation: 
Es ist oft nicht erlaubt in der Philosophie gleich Sinn zu reden,
sondern man muß {oft} zuerst den Unsinn sagen weil man
gerade ihn überwinden soll (MS 107, 1930: p. 266)
One is often not allowed to start straight off with sense, but must
often talk nonsense first since it is this which has to be overcome.
The philosopher sometimes has – in order to teach the right,
meaningful use of words – first to use a misleading and not
fully sensical expression. This happens, for example, in Eine
Philosophische Betrachtung, where Wittgenstein gives a
description of how our philosophical problems come into
being: 
Ich habe früher mit Absicht den irreführenden Ausdruck
gebraucht: "ein voll entwickelter Fall"; denn diese Worte
drücken aus, was wir über Fälle, wie die beschriebenen, zu
denken geneigt sind: <...> Unser Bild und unsere Ausdrucks-
weise nehmen wir von einem speziellen Fall her, wenden sie
auf nahe und entfernt Verwandtes an; und möchten nun
sagen: eigentlich haben wir überall das gleiche. (EPB 1984: p.
234)
It was on purpose that I used above the misleading expression, "a
fully developed case"; for these words express what we are inclined to
think about cases such as those described: <...> We derive our picture
and our manner of expression from a particular case and apply them
to closely and distantly related things; and then we want to say:
actually it's all the same.
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Wittgenstein's attempts to make sense, his fumbling along
the border between sense and nonsense, his struggle with
language itself comes out very clearly in his manuscripts. He
makes his struggle visible. All the to and fro, the back and
forth, is recorded in the written word. In the next chapter I'll
concentrate on this dimension which makes his writings so
lively and personal.
"I don't know my way about"11
What Wittgenstein wrote was single remarks, exercises,
parts (roles) of a dialogue which he later and repeatedly
revised and rearranged in the search for a suitable form.
Ultimately he was never satisfied, either with the remarks
themselves or with their arrangement.12 His writings do not
form a system, but rather trace single processes: Wittgen-
stein did not see it as possible to present final results even if
he wanted to, and this was the nature of his enduring strug-
gle, a struggle which he dramatised in a conversational
form. What in the interpretation of the Philosophical Investiga-
tions is often called the opponent is nothing but the oppo-
11. PI 1978: § 123.
12. Cf. PI 1978: Preface: "I have written down all these thoughts as remarks, short
paragraphs, <...> It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a
book whose form I pictured differently at different times. <...> After several
unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I real-
ized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be
more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried
to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. <...>
I should have liked to produce a good book. This has not come about, but
the time is past in which I could improve it." Cf. also Hilmy 1987: p. 20: "The
first point that must be established is that Wittgenstein wished to write a
'book' in the more conventional sense. <...> During the course of his efforts
Wittgenstein did not decide that a stylistically conventional book would be
undesirable, but rather came to the conclusion that he no longer had the
strength satisfactorily to achieve the goal he had set for himself."
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nent in Wittgenstein himself, whichis just as real in him as is
the protagonist. With Stanley Cavell we might call two of
the voices in Wittgenstein's writings (how many voices are
there in Wittgenstein?) "the voice of temptation" (I feel
tempted to say ...) and "the voice of correctness" (You can't
say that ...):
 In speaking of this struggle I take for granted that Wittgenstein
is the name of both sides in it, both voices (for my purposes
now I need only invoke two), which I have called the voice of
temptation and the voice of correctness. (Cavell 1989: p. 38)
In Eine Philosophische Betrachtung, the voice of temptation
speaks for example in
Wir werden geneigt sein, zu antworten, <...> (p. 118)
Man möchte sagen: <...> (p. 120)
Dann sind wir versucht zu denken, <...> (p. 122)
Fast möchte man so etwas sagen wie, <...> (p. 133)
<...> denn, möchten wir sagen, wie kann <...>? (p. 133)
(Man ist hier vielleicht versucht, fortzufahren: <...>) (p. 136)
Wir sind geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 138)
Hier wäre man geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 138)
<...> man geneigt wäre zu sagen, <...> (p. 138)
Das legt die Auffassung nahe, <...> (p. 138)
<...> würden manche geneigt sein zu sagen, <...> (p. 175)
<...> so bin ich geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 208)
Du bist vielleicht geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 218).
The voice of correctness on the other hand shows itself in
this text as much more friendly and helpful than in earlier
manuscripts. The indulgent suggestions ("Wir wollen nun
<...> – Now we want to <...>" (p. 135) etc.), reminders ("Aber
vergessen wir nicht, <...> – But let us not forget <...>" (p. 138)
etc.), instructions ("Und nun betrachte <...> – Consider now
<...>" (p. 168) etc.), conclusions and summaries ("Wir sehen,
<...> – As we see, <...>" (p. 170) etc.), the frequent involving of
the partner ("Denke, Du hättest zu beschreiben, was Du in
einemsolchen Falle wirklich getan hast. – Imagine you had to
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describe what you really did in such a case." (p. 126) etc.) ... and
the recurrent use of the inclusive "we" lend the voice of cor-
rectness – in contrast to the abrupt tone of some of the earlier
mentioned examples ("You can't say that!", "That's non-
sense!") – an aspect of considerate leadership. 
The very first manuscript which Wittgenstein started after
his return to Cambridge in 1929, MS 105, provides a good
example of the procedural dimension of his philosophising.
The dialectic of extemporisation13 is clearly demonstrated in
the opening pages of the manuscript: 
Ist ein Raum denkbar <...>? (p. 1)
Und das heißt nur: <...>?
Nun frägt es sich: <...>?
Wie läßt sich aber <...>?
Es scheint viel dafür zu sprechen <...> (p. 3)14
Aber dagegen läßt sich etwas einwenden: <...>
Aber man kann sagen: <...>
Di{e} Sache schaut aber in Wirklichkeit schwieriger
aus <...>
Wenn z.B. <...> 
Dann wäre also <...> (p. 5)
Kann man <...>? 
Man kann gewiss<!> sagen: <...>
Irgendwie scheint es mir <...> (p. 7)
Man könnte glauben <...>
Es scheint <...>
Das würde heißen: <...> (p. 9)
Wie verhält es sich aber dann <...>?
Wie kann man <...>?
13. Cf. in this context what von Wright says about Wittgenstein's way of lectur-
ing: "As might be expected, his lectures were highly 'unacademic' <...> He
had no manuscript or notes. He thought before the class." (Von Wright 1982:
p. 29)
14. The text runs on the recto-pages.
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Kann man <...>?
Kann man sagen <...>?
Nehmen wir an <...>?
Man könnte sagen <...>
Aber warum soll ich nicht <...>
Es scheint mir also: <...> (p. 11)
Was ist <...>?
Es scheint mir <...>
Ich kann z.B. sagen: <...>
Es ist eigentlich von vornherein wahrscheinlich <...>
Es ist doch sehr seltsam <...>
D.h. <...> (p. 13)
D.h. <...>
Es wäre vielleicht nützlich <...> (p. 15)
Die Frage ist dann etwa: <...>
Verhält es sich so <...>?
Man könnte gewiss<!> <...>
Remarkable in the context of Wittgenstein's search for sense
and fixed points are the recurrent references to, as one might
say, nothing more fixed than his own instinct, intuition or
taste: It seems to me ..., I've a feeling that ..., Something tells
me ... 
Herewith a list of such expressions: 
Irgendwie scheint es mir <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 7)
Ich ahne daß es möglich sein wird ohne Wahrheitsfunktionen aus-
zukommen (MS 105, 1929: p. 8)
Es scheint mir also: <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 11)
Ich habe das Gefühl <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 25)
Etwas sagt mir <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 69)
Es kommt mir so vor <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 69)
Ich habe einen instinktiven Wunsch nur mit den Begriffsumfängen
zu operieren <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 121)
Dabei ist mein Gefühl folgendes: <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 72)
Einerseits fühle ich <...> Anderseits kann ich nicht verstehen <...>
(MS 106, 1929: p. 80)
Das Gefühl ist: <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 163)
230
Wir fühlen: <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 202)
Ich fühle so: <...> (MS 107, 1929: p. 11)
Ja es ist mir als wäre <...> (MS 107, 1929: p. 55)
Ich fühle <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 192) 
Zu Grunde liegt allen meinen Betrachtungen (das Gefühl) die Ein-
sicht, <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 194)
Man fühlt <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 195)
Das Gefühl an das ich jetzt alle meine Betrachtungen knüpfe <...>
(MS 108, 1930: p. 208)
Denn in mir wehrt sich nicht bloß etwas dagegen daß <...> sondern
ebens auch daß <...> (MS 109, 1930: p. 118)
Und nun wehrt sich etwas in mir dagegen, zu sagen@: <...> (MS 115,
1933: p. 12)
Hier bin ich nun geneigt zu sagen: <...> Aber ich fühle auch daß das
eine irreführende Ausdrucksweise ist. (MS 115, 1933: p. 20)
In these lines the use of "I" is not a mere rhetorical devise but
something drastically personal. Wittgenstein doesn't spare
the paper stock-takings and recollections (Is that correct?
How shall I continue? I do not know my way about ...). He
comments on the progress he welcomes and on the setbacks
he suffers. We get an immediate and very intimate impres-
sion of his philosophising from remarks such as: 
Ich sehe noch kein System in allen diesen Fragen. (MS 105, 1929: p.
12)
Ich habe die intensive Auffassung noch immer nicht ganz durch-
geführt! (MS 105, 1929: p. 16)
Ich werde scheinbar, wider meinen Willen, @ auf die Arithmetik
zurückgeworfen (MS 105, 1929: p. 19)
Wie geht es weiter? (MS 105, 1929: p. 27)
Ist nun nicht der Begriff der Distanz einfacher zu verstehen? (MS 105,
1929: p. 49)
Aber wie ist dieser Zusatz zu machen?!! (MS 105, 1929: p. 78)
Brauche ich jetzt nicht Zeichen für <...>? (MS 105, 1929: p. 127)
Aber jetzt stürmen 100 Fragen auf uns ein! (MS 106, 1929: p. 78)
Ich habe noch nicht ein ganz gute<!> Gewissen. (MS 107, 1929: p.
115)
<...> (Ist das so?) (MS 107, 1929: p. 115)
Ich bin mit allen meinen Gedanken über diesen Gegenstand noch
immer in einem furchtbaren {Wir}rwarr<!> zwischen erstem &
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zweitem Ausdruckssystem. Das mei{s}te von demwas ich {j}etzt
sagen möchte braucht man & kann man gar nicht sagen. (MS 107, 1930: p.
265)
<...> ist des Rätsels Lösung. (obschon ich sie noch nicht durch-
schauen kann) (MS 108, 1930: p. 265)
Was für Konsequenzen will ich daraus ziehen?! (TS 213, 1933: p. 35)
Hier ist noch eine große Lücke in meinem Denken. Und ich zweifle,
ob sie noch ausgefüllt werden wird. (MS 176, 1950: p. 34)
When writing, Wittgenstein must have felt overwhelmed by
the quantity of thoughts to be dealt with. In MS 115, 1936:
pp. 118-292 for example he repeatedly promises to return to
connected themes at later times (pp. 176, 210, 213, 219, 226,
236, 247, 249, 255, 272, 278, 284). 
A very striking feature of Wittgenstein's writing is to be seen
in his secret code passages, now so well known and widely
referred to since the publication of the so-called Secret Dia-
ries.15 The code which unlocks these passages is a very sim-
ple one and consists – roughly speaking – in the reversal of
the alphabet, such that z=a, y=b, x=c, w=d, v=e, u=f, t=g,
s=h, r= i or j, q=k, p=l, o=m, n=n, m=o, l=p, k=q, i=r, h=s, hh
= ss or ß, g=t, f=u, e=v, d=w, c=x, b=y, a=z, Umlaut-z = ä,
Umlaut-m = ö, Umlaut-f = ü. "Rxs" reads for example "Ich".16
Concerning the use of code in the First World War diaries
McGuinness says: 
Code-entries begin on 15 August <1914>, perhaps because
Wittgenstein was about to go towards enemy territory. The
code is a simple one (a = z, b = y, etc.): all the same he shows a
comparative facility in using it from the first, so that he had
perhaps practised it earlier. The aim was of course notconceal-
ment for ever but concealment from anyone who casually
picked up the book. (McGuinness 1988: p. 212)
15. "Geheime Tagebücher", published by Wilhelm Baum (GT 1991); Cf. the
review in Unterkircher 1991.
16. Cf. Huitfeldt/Rossvær 1989: p. 193.
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Ray Monk comments on Wittgenstein's later use of the secret
code as follows: 
<...> as soon as he returned to Cambridge, he reverted to
a practice he had not kept since the Tractatus had been
published: he began to make personal, diary-like entries
in his notebooks. As before, these were separated from
his philosophical remarks by being written in the code he
had used as a child. (Monk 1990: p. 267)
Even so, it should be noted that Wittgenstein didn't reserve
his secret code exclusively for "personal, diary-like entries".
Many remarks which one wouldn't describe as "personal" or
"diary-like" are written in code. Some of them, now pub-
lished in Culture and Value, have the character of aphorisms
or casual remarks on unrelated subjects, for example "A
good simile refreshes the intellect." (CV 1980: p. 1e; MS 105,
1929: p. 73); "Mendelssohn is not a peak, but a plateau. His
Englishness." (CV 1980: p. 2e; MS 107, 1929: p. 98); "In former
times people went into monasteries. <...>" (CV 1980: p. 49e;
MS 131, 1946: p. 79)17 On the other hand, Wittgenstein didn't
always write personal, diary-like entries in code. In MS 105
(1929) we find in standard script: "Wieder in Cambridge.
Sehr merkwürdig. <...>", "Mein Gehirn ist in keinem günsti-
gen Zustand. <...>" (p. 2), "Ich habe sehr genußreiche Dis-
kussionen mit Ramsey <...>", "Ich gehe {i}n der Wissenschaft
nur gern allein spazieren." (p. 4). In MS 109 (1930): "Engel-
mann sagte mir, <...>" (p. 28). 
Wittgenstein himself makes a reflexive comment on his use
of the secret code, itself in code: 
 Vh r{s|h}g oviqdf<Umlaut-f>iwrt dvpxsv Vipvrxsgvifut vh
mri rhg mznxhvh rn vrnvi tv{h|s}vrmvn h<!>xsirug nrvwvi af
{hx}sivryvn dzh rxs nrxsg tvi{n}v pvhyzi hxsivryvn
om<Umlaut-m>xsgv. (MS 106, 1929: p. 4)18
17. Cf. Pichler 1991: pp. 1, 2, 28.
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It is remarkable what relief I derive from writing in secret script cer-
tain things which I don't particularly wish to be legible. 
To me it remains unclear why Wittgenstein encoded certain
passages and not others. The encoding of certain remarks
might have had a separating function, to show that they do
not really belong in the immediate philosophical discourse,
just as Wittgenstein distinguished other such remarks with
brackets, special section marks etc.19 They can also be seen to
represent the points where he "waxes lyrical" or turns to
themes of ethics or aesthetics. It is in this context noteworthy
that in the notebook-drafts these remarks were written in
standard script. It looks as if Wittgenstein translated them
into code only when copying them into the manuscript-vol-
umes, which have a more official character.20 There are also
some cases where Wittgenstein in the middle of remarks
jumps from normal script to the use of code or the other way
round.21 
 Regardless of whether or not a certain comment is in code, it
is interesting to note that Wittgenstein recorded his stray
thoughts and the outsider-observations concerning the on-
going work in the middle of his investigations. He also gives
written expression to depressions and raises his morale with
18. Transcribing Wittgenstein's secret code passages begs a question about the
activity of reading: in order to identify the single handwritten characters
(especially in the secret code!) one has first to grasp the word as a whole. Cf.
Huitfeldt's discussion of the (impossible) distinction between representation
and interpretation of text in Huitfeldt 1991: pp. 100-102.
19. Cf. von Wright about the remarks published in Culture and Value: "It is not
always possible to separate them sharply from the philosophical text; in
many cases, however, Wittgenstein himself hinted at such a separation – by
the use of brackets or in other ways." (CV 1980: Preface)
20. Cf. MS 153a, 1931: ("Anmerkungen <...>" on page 1) 24 and MS 110, 1931: p.
242 ("Es ist beschämend <...>"); MS 153a, 1931: p. 243 and MS 111, 1931: p. 81
("Eine Art <...>").
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encouragements to continue. This shows the close connec-
tion of philosophy and life in Wittgenstein's work.
"Words are deeds"22
Wittgenstein's texts are highly interlocutive, or dialectical,
and his use of language is very oral. Open, for example, Eine
Philosophische Betrachtung and you find yourself in the mid-
dle of a lively dialogue full of questions and answers, pro-
posals and rejections: 23
Das ist wahr, wenn Du sagen willst, <...> (p. 118)
Es sei denn, daß Du sagen willst, <...> (p. 118)
Denken wir uns <...> (p. 118)
Aber was heißt es, <...>? (p. 118)
Ist es nicht so: <...> (p. 118)
Stelle Dir dagegen den Fall vor, <...> (p. 126)
Denke an einige Beispiele: <...> (p. 126)
Denke, Du hättest zu beschreiben, <...> (p. 126) 
21. Cf. MS 118, 1937: 27.8., 1.9., 4.9. (Pichler 1991: p. 15). Cf. in this context also
CV 1980: p. 7e: "<...> If you have a room which you do not want certain peo-
ple to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there
is nopoint in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to
admire the room from outside! / The honourable thing to do is to put a lock
on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the
rest. <...>" and Z 1981: § 74: "A sentence is given me in code together with the
key. Then of course in one way everything required for understanding the
sentence has been given me. And yet I should answer the question 'Do you
understand this sentence?': No, not yet; I must first decode it. <...>" 
22. CV 1980: p. 46e.
23. Concerning the interlocutive style of Wittgenstein's writings, consider von
Wright's remark about the affinity between Wittgenstein and Plato: "From
Spinoza, Hume, and Kant he said that he could only get occasional glimpses
of understanding. I do not think that he could have enjoyed Aristotle or
Leibniz, two great logicians before him. But it is significant that he did read
and enjoy Plato. He must have recognized congenial features, both in Plato's
literary and philosophical method and in the temperament behind the
thoughts." (Von Wright 1982: p. 33)
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Könnten aber diese Regeln <...>? – Gewiß. – Andrerseits aber:
ist eine Regel <...>? (p. 133)
Wir wollen nun <...> (p. 133)
Denke Dir <...> (p. 133)
Denke wieder daran, was Du erlebst, fühlst, <...> (p. 185)
Denke Dir diesen Fall: <...> (p. 185)
Überlege Dir etwa diese Fälle: <...> (p. 185)
Vergleiche damit den Fall: <...> (p. 192)
Vergleiche damit dies: <...> (p. 192)
Vergleiche damit: <...> (p. 192)
I want to focus attention on certain particles which Wittgen-
stein uses frequently and which among german linguists are
generally regarded as elements of spoken language, of oral
dialogue and argumentation. They are the particles
"gerade", "ja", "doch", "eben". Here I would like to point to a
special usage. They serve often as "consensus constituting
particles"24, in other words, they serve to state, assert and
remind of points about which the speakers have already
reached agreement or of things which ought in themselves
to be patently clear. We will look at some examples of their
usage, this time chosen from MS 108, 1929-1930: pp. 1-100: 
Aber ich meine gerade <...> (p. 37)
Aber in <...> verha<!>lt es sich ebe gerade so. (p. 92)
Die Zeichen mathematischen Zeichen sind ja wie die Kugeln
einer Rechenmaschine. (p. 17)
Denn diese Ausdrucksweise sagt ja doch alles was wir sagen
wollen & was sich sagen läßt. (p. 28)
Aber so etwas braucht man ja gar nicht annehmen. (p. 29)
24. I use the term as applied by Jutta Lütten in Lütten 1979: pp. 30-38 ("Konsen-
sus-Konstitutiva"). Lütten describes their special functions as follows: "'doch'
appelliert an das Vorhandensein einer gemeinsamen Kommunikationsbasis
<...>: appellativer Rekurs / 'eben' konstatiert die Faktizität einer gemein-
samen Kommunikationsbasis: konstativer Rekurs / 'ja' assertiert die
Gewißheit einer gemeinsamen Kommunikationsbasies: assertativer Rekurs"
(Lütten 1979: p. 36) The function of "gerade" is similar to that of "eben".
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Es ist ja klar <...> (p. 33)
Der Satz <...> sagt doch offenbar <...> (p. 6)
Denn es scheint doch <...> (p. 22)
Und hier bedienen wir uns do{c}h offenbar <...> (p. 32)
<...> bezeichnet doch nicht einen Zustand <...> (p. 36)
Ich beschreibe einen Tatsache Sachverhalt doch nicht dadurch
<insertion mark underlined by wavy line> daß <...> (p. 37)
Doch offenbar, nein! (p. 56)
<...> so muß man doch sagen <...> (p. 62)
Aber so ist es doch nicht! (p. 63)
Es gibt eben in der Mathematik nur <...> (p. 11)
<...> ist eben alles was wir sagen können. (p. 21)
Man darf eben über eine Sache nicht einmal das {E|e}ine und
einmal das andere sagen. (p. 53)
Die Wahrheit ist (eben) <...> (p. 53)
Unsere Erkenntnis ist eben, <...> (p. 53)
<...> sind eben grundverschiedene Satzformen. (p. 66)
<...> denn dies sind eben die Permutationen von <...> (p. 74)
<...> & aus eben diesem Grunde kann ich auch nicht sagen
<...> (p. 83)
<...> ich kann eben nicht erkennen <...> (p. 83)
Das Dazwischenliegen der Mischfarbe ist ebe @ eben hier <...>
(p. 83)
Ein "in der Mitte" gibt es eben hier gar nicht. (p. 86)
Die Begriffe <...> sind eben hier überhaupt nicht zu brauchen
<...> (p. 86)
<...> dann muß man eben durch Regeln gewisse Übergänge
ausschließen <...> (p. 88)
"Eben" is probably the most crucial of these particles in Wit-
tgenstein's writings. It is used to say that this and nothing
else is my point ("That's just what I'm saying"). It functions
at its strongest as a stamp of approval. If in a dialogue one
justifies asentence by use of the word "eben" one demon-
strates oneself to be in the right position: the speaker marks
his statement as the indisputable truth – there is no alterna-
tive, basta! – we have come to the limits of our discussion. In
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this application the word confronts us with our shared hab-
its of acting and communicating and it indicates the bound-
ary which Wittgenstein wishes to make clear to us: That's
just how it is. That's just the way I act. That's just the way we
speak.
One can attribute to the word "eben" the same function as
Wittgenstein occasionally claims to be the goal of philoso-
phy: 
Das Ziel der Philosophie ist es eine Mauer dort zu errichten
wo die Sprache ohnehin aufhört. (MS 108, 1930: p. 277)
The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall where language has already
stopped.
Wittgenstein wants the reader to focus on the process of
thinking, rather than on the search for coherently ordered
results or for a system.25 Thus he doesn't want the reader to
take once and for all an ultimate position. He wants the
reader to struggle with both sides as he himself does, and he
wants him/her to follow his instructions. Wittgenstein
pushes examples ("Betrachte dieses Beispiel: <...> – Consider
this example <...>" (EPB 1984: p. 132) etc.), counter-examples
("Vergleiche mit <...> den folgenden Fall: <...> – Compare
with <...> the following case: <...> (EPB 1984: p. 140) etc.),
thought-experiments ("Denken wir uns eine Sprache, <...> –
Let us imagine a language <...>" (EPB 1984: p. 146) etc.) under
the reader's nose and tells him/her to: Look! Imagine! Sup-
pose! Think of this! Don't forget! Remember! Be aware! etc.,
and he also says: I'll tell you what to do and where togo!
Wittgenstein doesn't spare the reader the drama of the strug-
gle he himself experiences. He provokes him/her to take
25. Cf. PI 1978: Preface: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the
trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his
own." Cf. also Bambrough 1974: p. 118: "Wittgenstein does not present a
philosophical system or series of doctrines."
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sides in the dispute, which means, different sides, since the
sympathy of the reader is never directed at just one figure.
The reader might be disappointed when the journey has no
destination, or at least an unexpected one or when Wittgen-
stein suddenly says: this is the destination! or: regard this as
the destination!26 
At one point Wittgenstein said:
Ich mache Versuche mich, oder meinen Ho<!>rer, in's Wasser
fallen zu lassen & ihn dann herauszuziehn um so eine Rettung
zu demonstrieren. Aber es geht nicht sehr elegant: einmal
gelingt es mir nicht recht ihn ins Wasser zu werfen & ich wälze
ihn auf der Erde herum ohne ihn ins Wasser zu bringen, &
dann wieder habe ich ihn ins Wasser geworfen aber ich bringe
ihn nicht mehr heraus & er ist in der Gefahr zu ertrinken. (MS
109, 1930: p. 173)
I try to let myself – or my listener – fall in the water and then pull
him out in order to demonstrate a rescue. But it doesn't work ele-
gantly: sometimes I don't really manage to throw him in the water
and I tumble him about on the ground without getting him into the
water, at other times I have thrown him in the water but can't get
him out and he is in danger of drowning.27
This is exactly what he does in the discussion of the shop-
ping-example (PI 1978: § 1) which serves, in one respect, to
show the short-comings of the Augustinian attempt to
explain language. But my own response to this text was a
strong experience of how dogmatic Wittgenstein (one
should better say: the voice ofcorrectness in Wittgenstein)
was in refusing to give any explanation concerning the
example. I myself identify with the questions raised by the
26. Cf. Z 1981: § 314: "<...> the difficulty – I might say – is not that of finding the
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks
as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything. – Not
anything that follows from this, no, this itself is the solution!' <...>"
27. Cf. Goodman who speaks of Wittgenstein's "aim of 'bumping' the reader into
a new awareness of the world". (Goodman 1976: p. 145) 
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opponent. I even feel provoked by Wittgenstein to ask those
questions. His example, in dealing with numbers and
colours – and in the very way it is presented – is certainly
one which does leave many questions open. But Wittgen-
stein dismisses them as if they were irrelevant. For any
reader familiar with traditional academic philosophy and
interested in the question of meaning this is completely
unexpected. Why does Wittgenstein do this? Answers could
be: He wants the reader to reconsider the way in which he
formulates questions. He wishes to warn the reader not to
expect linguistic answers to all questions. He denies right at
the beginning of Philosophical Investigations to give an
explaination of meaning. He wants to make it clear, that he
is the boss.
"Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim 
Reden"28
With regard to Wittgenstein one might also say, "Über die
allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Schreiben" –
"On the gradual completion of thoughts when writing". Wittgen-
stein was aware of the problem of how the sheer activity of
speaking or writing determines the progress of our
thoughts. He himself takes the risk entailed in writing. He
knows, and expects, that through the process of connecting
words he will end up in areas which are not predictable and
expresses this point in the following remarks: 
Ich greife oft im Schreiben meinem Denken vor. (MS 112, 1931:
25.10.)
In writing I often anticipate my thought.
28. On the Gradual Completion of Thoughts when Speaking, title of an essay by Hei-
nrich von Kleist, probably written in 1805/1806. Kleist 1985: p. 347.
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Ich denke tatsächlich mit der Feder, denn mein Kopf weiß oft
nichts von dem, was meine Hand schreibt. (MS 112, 1931:
27.10.)
In fact, I think with the pen, since my head often knows nothing of
what my hand writes.
Having acknowledged writing as a medium of investigation
rather than simply as one of transmission it is worth noting
the role of drawings and diagrams in Wittgenstein's work.
Drawings give rise to problems as well as to solutions.
Und zwar mache zeichne ich einen P{a|l}an Ich mache einen Plan nicht
nur um mich anderen verständlich zu machen sondern auch
um selbst über die Sache klar zu werden. ({d|D}.h. die
Sprache ist nicht nur Mittel zur Mitteilung) (MS 109, 1930: p.
73) 
Indeed, I draw a diagram not only in order to make my thought clear
to others but also to understand the matter myself. (I.e. language is
not just a means of communication.) 
Drawings often provide the only way to explore and present
specific problems and have in those places clearly a vehicle-
function. Therefore some of his drawings must be seen not
only as additional illustrations but as essential media of
accessing and showing a problem.29 
Wittgenstein's use of writing as a tool is clearly exemplified
in his handling of alternatives, the investigation of which
constitutes a field of research in itself. One should look at the
development of these alternatives in terms, both of their
quantity and quality, and of the different ways in which he
introduces them scriptually (no marking;marking with
parentheses, brackets, double-slashes ...; special comments
and instructions ...). The freqency of alternatives increases in
29. Cf. Biggs 1992, who has payed special attention to Wittgenstein's use of
drawings as part of visual experience (Biggs 1992: pp. 4ff, 10f). Biggs has also
made a catalogue of sources of the drawings and diagrams in the published
work. (Forthcoming) 
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his later writings: in the first two manuscripts, MSS 105 and
106 from 1929 (encompassing together 438 pages) we meet
the phenomenon of alternatives ca. 550 times; in the 78 pages
of MS 174 from 1951, ca. 250 times. Pages 118-292 of MS 115
from 1936 ("Philosophische Untersuchungen. Versuch einer
Umarbeitung."; published in Eine Philosophische Betrachtung,
cf. EPB 1984) seem to mark a high point in this tendency: in
this text, containing 175 pages, Wittgenstein resorts to the
use of alternatives ca. 2700 (!) times.30 Most of Wittgenstein's
alternatives barely affect the course of the argument in
which they appear. Nevertheless we must be careful to note
that the border between questions of style and questions of
meaning is very problematic; two different formulations will
never make the same point or have the same role31. We
could say that writing alternatives is editing the world in
different ways, and searching for alternatives is searching
for alternative ways to see the world.
It often seems that Wittgenstein writes alternatives for their
own sake. We have the impression that he is merely marking
time with his pen. One can find him doing nothing better
than making syntagmatic and paradigmatic substitutions;
changing – on purpose – between "daß"- and infinitive-con-
structions, indicative and subjunctive, definite and indefi-
nite articles, articles and demonstrative pronouns etc. All
this may be in order to avoid fixing the point too exactly, or,
in the hope of finding inspiration. We must not forget that
writing is not depicting a thought but rather creatingand
carrying it, so that "finding the right expression" does not
mean that we have accurately expressed a preconceived
thought but rather that we like the thought this expression
gives us. 
30. I count the number of places where Wittgenstein uses alternatives and not
the number of alternative formulations, which would give a higher figure. 
31. Cf. Huitfeldt 1991: p. 97.
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What does it mean to find the right word? It doesn't mean
that the found word expresses the point of my thought best,
but it means, that I like best the particular point, made by
this particular expression. This is true at least in many cases
of Wittgenstein's and everyone's writing.32
Wie finde ich das 'richtige' Wort? Es ist allerdings als vergliche
ich Worte nach feinen Geschmacksunterschieden. <...> Aber
ich muß nicht immer urteilen beurteilen, erklären, warum dies
oder dies {W}ort nicht stimmt. Es stimmt einfach noch nicht. Ich
suche eben weiter, bin nicht befriedigt. Endlich komme ich zur
Ruhe,; bin {b}efriedigt. So schaut eben das Suchen aus; & so
das Finden. (MS 131, 1946: p. 183)
How do I find the right word? It is in any case as if I compared words
with a gourmet's palate <...> But I needn't always explain why this
or that word isn't right. It simply is not yet right. So I keep on
searching and am not satisfied. Finally I come to rest, I'm satisfied.
This (and nothing else) is the nature of the search and of the finding.
Even so, in the following I will mention some criteria of
searching and finding, criteria according to which Wittgen-
stein decides which alternative is preferable when it comes
to their evaluation. When Wittgenstein is not satisfied with
an expression – or where he senses that an expression could
mislead (to psychologism for example) – he usually under-
lines it with a wavy line (with a straight broken line intype-
scripts33). Here I will mention three criteria which guide his
writing and which are particularly illustrated by his alterna-
tives.
32. Cf. TLP 1961: 4; PI 1978: §§ 330ff; MS 108, 1930: p. 278; MS 115, 1936: p. 282;
MS 137, 1948: p. 45; MS 138, 1949: p. 17.
33. Cf. WWK 1979: p. 166: "<...> Wittgenstein shows typed sheets from his
manuscript to Waismann and makes remarks about certain signs. A word
which is underlined in this way: --- means: Wittgenstein is in doubt whether
it is to be retained or not. <...>"
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One criterion is Wittgenstein's preference for direct every-
day language. This is obviously connected to the program-
matic remark in Philosophical Investigations, § 116: 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to
their everday use.
His ideal of writing ordinary everyday language finds
expression in several instructions and comments, such as the
following, which he occasionally makes regarding the sub-
stitution of a word: 
[ich sollte hier ein gebräuchliches Wort setzen] (MS 108, 1930:
p. 53)
[I ought to put here a commonplace word]34
Another criterion is – as for many writers – that of economy.
What goes for logic also goes for language: 
Was, in der Logik, nicht nötig ist, hilft auch nicht {[}ist auch
nicht hilfreich von Nutzen] 
Was nicht nötig ist, ist überflu<!>ssig. (MS 109, 1931: p. 294)
In logic, what is unnecessary, is of no help. What isn't necessary is
superflous.
We find applications of the criteria of economy for example
in the history of the paragraphs of Philosophical Investigations.
Of course, writing more economically doesn't necessarily
lead to more clarity,at least not from the reader's point of
view. What is unclear in the Philosophical Investigations is
often clear in earlier versions of the paragraphs in question. 
Thirdly: Wittgenstein's writing is strongly determined by an
aesthetic dimension. This can be briefly exemplified with
34. Cf. TS 213, 1933: pp. 412, 420 (Published in PH 1989: pp. 182, 190).
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regard to rhythm, punctuation and stress. Wittgenstein dis-
cusses in a manuscript of 1946 the following: 
Die Verwendung gewisser Wörter dem Satzrhythmus zu–
liebe. Dieser könnte uns viel wichtiger sein, als er uns
tatsächlich ist. (MS 131, 1946: p. 96)
The use of certain words for the sake of a sentence's rhythm. This
could be much more important to us than it in fact is.
His fanatic search for the right words, his occupation with
the fitting rhythm and word order is impressively shown in
MS 152, 1937: pp. 37f, 8635, where on three pages he
rehearses the opening to the first paragraph of Philosophical
Investigations which eventually resulted in the simple and
short "Augustinus, in den Confessiones I/8: " (PU 1984: § 1). I
quote only some of the attempted formulations: 
Augustinus stellt hat ... das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache
mit folgenden Worten so dar: ..... (p. 37)
Augustinus beschreibt das Lernen der Sprache so: (p. 38)
In den Confessiones (I/8) beschreibt Augustinus, wie das
Kind die Sprache lernt. Er sagt (p. 38)
Augustinus sagt in den Conf. der Mensch das Kind lerne die
Sprache seine Muttersprache so: (p. 87)36
We can also note a careful use of punctuation in Wittgen-
stein's manuscripts which is evidently not determined by
grammatical rules but which generally has an important
rhythmical function. Regarding particular cases of punctua-
35. As indication for the date of this manuscript I take the date reference in the
preface draft on page 13 (Mathematic formulae on page 1): "Dieses Buch
stellt meine Anschauungen über die Philosophie dar, –<dash deleted,
comma inserted> wie sie sich in den letzten acht Jahren <Since 1929>
entwickelt haben." Cf. also the date references in the preface drafts of MS
117, 1938: p. 110-126, particularly the one on page 120. Cf. Von Wright 1982:
p. 130.
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tion in his manuscripts, Wittgenstein very often proposes
several alternatives37 or makes comments on it explicitly38.
Punctuation is occasionally also used to achieve an alien-
ation effect: 
Punkt am Ende des Satzes. Gefühl des Unabgeschlossenen,
wenn er fehlt. (TS 211, 1932: p. 417)
Fullstop at the end of a sentence. A feeling of incompleteness when
missing.
The use of straight underlining in the manuscripts or of dou-
ble spacing in the typescripts – which usually appears in the
publications in italics, or, in the case of original double
underlining, in upper case – shows again the oral dimension
of Wittgenstein's writing. These phenomena are used at such
points whereWittgenstein wants the reader to lift his voice
in order to clarify the thought by appealing to vocal habits.39
Finally I would like to turn from the style of writing to the
style of reading and quote a recommendation of Wittgen-
stein's, regarding how he should be read: 
36. In order to gain the full picture of the development of the first four para-
graphs of Philosophical Investigations through the whole Nachlaß compare:
MS 111, 1931: pp. 15ff. – TS 211, 1932: pp. 11ff. –  TS 212, 1932-1933 (cuttings)
– TS 213, 1933: pp. 24ff. –  MS 114, 1933-1934: pp. 35ff. – MS 115, 1933-1934:
pp. 79f. – [AWL 1982: pp. 46f. (1933-1934)] – MS 141, 1935: p. 1 – D 310, 1934-
1935: p. 1 – MS 115, 1936: pp. 118, 166 – MS 140, 1936-1937: p. 42 – MS 152,
1937: pp. 37ff., 86f. – TS 220, 1937-1938: §§ 1-5 – TS 226, 1939: §§ 1-7 – TS 227,
1944: §§ 1-4 (Some of the dates have been inferred on the basis of stylometric
studies).
37. Cf. MS 109, 1930: p. 1; MS 115, 1933: p. 67; MS 115, 1936: p. 253; MS 175, 1950:
p. 41.
38. Cf. MS 114, 1932: ("27.5.32. <...>" on page 1) 33, MS 115, 1933: pp. 52, 61.
39. Cf. on punctuation and reading: CV 1980: p. 48e ("If you <...>"), 57e ("Some-
times a sentence <...>"), 68e ("I really <...>"); on intonation: MS 115, 1936: p.
263; on the feeling of familiarity when looking at words or sentences: MS
150, 1935-1936: pp. 1ff. 
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I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow down
the speed of reading. Because I should like to be read slowly.
(As I myself read.) (CV 1980: p. 68e)40
40. For inspiration, encouragement and helpful comments I would like to thank
Claus Huitfeldt, Dinda L. Gorlée, Hanspeter Ortner, Paul F. Schmidt and Ole
Letnes. To Ralph Jewell I'm particularly grateful for begrudging me neither
time nor effort to discuss many questions. My deepest thanks I owe to Peter
Cripps who improved and corrected my English on every sentence and
made a number of constructive comments on the subject. 
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